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INDIVIDUAL PROJECT IN THE LIBERAL COLLEGE
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This study lies within the general field of higher educa-
tion, but within the junior-college, as distinguished from the
graduate and professional schools. Its purpose requires that tne
distinction be kept clear also between this field of "the college/
which for our purposes is the historical "academic" college, and
the technical college, or any vocational school. The study pro-
poses to test the claims of such a college to a right to separate
institutional existence. As a good reason for such separate in-
stitutional character, it is proposed to sound the claims of the
college to a pedagogy of its own. By proposing a "pedagogy" for
the academic college, the implication is intended that the teach-
ing art and its explicit cultivation present a sufficient reason
for higher institutional organization, as they have long done in
lower schools. The perfection of the teaching of the high school
presents as strong an institutional claim as does any other stated
purpose of secondary schools, not excluding the vocational. No
such demand for the college has yet been acknowledged in practice.
An ultimate purpose of the study is to reach actual pre-
cepts of collegiate pedagogy. Its hypothesis is to affirm the ex-
pectation that the liberal college has a reason for institutional
existence and an obligation to acquire and maintain an institution-
al integrity, which shall be expressed in organic features. This
expectation may be set forth as follows.
We simplify the problem by waiving all appeal directly to
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vocation. By hypothesis the institution to be studied is a finish-
ing school. The place and value of all vocational and professional
schools are intended to be enhanced, in no sense questioned, by
this specialization. A liberal college, evidently, is shorn of
reason for existence unless it can justify itself by an improved
human output, which must be expressed in results of what we have
called an improved pedagogy. If in this sense it affords no im-
provement of what is called the person's preparation for profession
al studies, we must grant at the outset that we have begged the
question of personal culture.
This quest of a justification for such an institution may
not be made, however, chiefly in the region of such abstract prac-
tical determinations. The ends of material production, put in
terms of the types of service we call vocation, are not guaranteed
to have consulted the facts of human development for their warrant.
It is for the purpose of establishing an answer to developmental
demands that we resort first, in Part I., to an effort to lay a
philosophical basis for collegiate education. The philosophy adopt
ed, at least as a point of departure, and applied, seems fully to
justify the belief in the existence of a "liberal period" in human
individual development. This period is, of course, shortened more
or less for all by the technical demands of preparation for, or
pursuit of, life-work. Depending upon the personal culture and
skill of teachers in all grades, and even especially of teachers of
the arts of vocation, all periods have a right to be liberalizing,
xjut the question we propose to lace is of the devotion of a stated
period
-to distinctively liberal pursuits. Such a period, if al-
lowed, lies between the elementary period of necessary education

and the higher period of actual vocational and professional prepar-
ation. Why not call it the secondary period? It must, to be sure,
lie within the period called secondary, which period has a right to
be one of strenuously extending privilege 01 personal development;
but we are just now made conscious, even to defend an element ary
period from the greed of exploitation, of the fact that vocational
education is at least distinctly secondary, as contrasted with el-
ementary. The fight is the same in principle, whatever period we
try to protect, a struggle for the education of the individual
person against the exploitation of his powers to render services,
in the elementary period it is humanitarian. In the secondary per-
iod it becomes a question of important individual development.
in the inclusive field called the principles of education,"
1"
this essay is within that of principles of collegiate teaching. It
can only be, however, rather preliminary in that narrowed field
than mrnisning actual precepts of practice for collegiate teach-
ing. It offers itself in terms of what, in elementary pedagogy,
was called "general method." The "special method" of collegiate
teaching must be provided by teachers of such subjects or study
as offer themselves for the collegiate curriculums. It remains,
then, but to state the place these chapters might fill in a general
collegiate scheme, which must be outlined to show the exact intent
of this monograph.
A theoretically complete system of collegiate practice v^ould
embrace principles (axiomatic, empirical and theoretical j , which
would be a platform tor such practice. Such practice implies an
institution. A collegiate institution implies teachers as the
1. nuediger , .an.C.
,
Principles of Education , ^ch.monographs
Ho. 2, pp. 88-118
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agencies tor conceiving the meaning of subject matter and apply-
ing the principles of method. Supplemental to thie is all the
'instrumentality 1 which 'agency' uses. (ij'or the sake of complete-
ness) this may be stated to include teaching organization and
administrative organization. The purpose of administrative organ-
ization is to facilitate maximal efficiency of teaching organiza-
tion. I'eaching organization exists to produce maximal learning
efficiency, which is the institutional end. A complete scheme
would include housing and equipment and their hygiene.
She work in nand turns out to be a study of thinking as the
essential activity of learning . It must endeavor to find all the
implicit precepts it can apprehend. It must, in the nature of
its own peculiar task, render explicit all principles of thinking
and learning that come into view. "A person in pursuing a consec-
utive train of thoughts takes some system of ideas for granted...
borne context, some situation, some controlling purpose dominates
his explicit ideas so thoroughly that it does not need to be con-
sciously formulated and expounded. ... let the xact that reflection
originates in problem makes it necessary at some points conscious-
ly to inspect and examine this familiar background, we have to
turn on some unconscious assumption ana make it explicit."^" If
the matter of a certain few books were in the reader's mind, such
a context would be carried, but the task of the study would still
be distinct, though abbreviated to a mere application of an adopt-
ed psychology and pedagogy to collegiate education. Instead it
must "consciously formulate and expound" so much of these funda-
mental doctrines as immediately underlies the pedagogy of the
"1. Dewey, J., How We Think , p. 215. More particularly, Dewey'
s
Philosophy of Education is chosen as background of this
discussion.
I
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college. We make whatever apology is due these authors for ap-
plications they might not approve. In extenuation v/e can only
plead the demand of the times lor applications.
This study of collegiate pedagogy is not addressed to
students hut to collegiate teachers. It would be proper to ad-
dress the collegiate student with suggestions for the rational
improvement of his student-work. There is much evidence that
he realizes its need of improvement. Aids for the improvement
of study as an art are already beginning to appear. 2 Their ac-
ceptance and active use will follow tne arousal of interest twhich
in turn will follow the serious interest of teachers in their
part of the enterprise. The interest of teachers may be expected
to be only moderate until the ideal of trained service for a
prolessional art gets vogue. The conjecture here made is that
such interest will be subject to mere exhortation until the work
of students has acknowledged character. Critics fear little
challenge hitherto in placing a very low rating upon the current
supposition of student-industry. It will be easy to err on the
side of premature and cock-sure formulation of methods. It will
be still easier to fill the student's atmosphere too full of our
own over-sanguine suggestions of untried methods, doubly out of
place: first, as being ours ratiier than his, and second, as be-
ing in a state of development, not yet ready for formulation.
Collegiate education may not be in so much danger of sophisticat-
ing its students to a condition of self-consciousness of method
1. See Dewey , Phil . of jgd_. ,Ch«XIlI, The hature of luethod.
"Learning demands unconsciousness of processes. Teaching
demands consciousness
^
2. See the various books on "How to Study."

as the elementary school has been, but the rule that metj od comes
before its formulation1 is universal, and here as elsewhere the
college should profit by mistakes already made.
Still this caution does not forbid giving first attention to
the methods of learning as tnose taking precedence in every way.
But it implies a limitation of first effort to those things which
may well soon be made objects of the attention of students themselves*
This limitation ought to serve the purpose also of concentrating
iirst attention upon elementary needs. We wish to find the first
principles. They should be the conscious possession of the colleg-
iate teacher, Their application will be by precepts addressed to
both teachers and students. ''Jkethod-consciousness" is a teacher's
professional privilege and duty, nis business is to teach, that is,
to help make the student successful in his business. The student's
business is not the sane, nor does it involve the same kind of
"method-consciousness." One may be conscious of the other's art
and thinking. She other's consciousness is ideally, not of pro-
cesses but of objects, not even of his own processes as such, to
say nothing of the mental activity of another, The first objects
of students' consciousness, at le&.st, are expressed in precepts of
ideal and end, simple and definite, something which presents itself
in such form as to guarantee it as worth while — something to do
and think-out. Ho one can be his teacher who cannot do somewhat
more and something different in its nature from this. This differ-
entiates completely the platform of method oi student and teacher.
Student-method ought to evince itself first. Teacher-consciousness
of student-method is the beginning of the development of teacher-
method. They may safely be kept in this order. The student is to
1. T>ewey, How We Think
,
p. 113.

be conscious, of an end worth working toward, ihis i& objective.
Means and methods of attaining this end may be themselves so ration-
ally attached to the end that the methods are themselves objective,
ihe teacher's path is parallel, but as distinct as if divergent.
One does his work in absorbed, objective, unselfconsciousness. The
other parallels him throughout with increasing capacity, if the
thing succeeds, to intensify his appreciation of what it means to
do things so, and what shall be tne way to improve and perfect the
performance observed.
wow to substantiate aims, ultimate or mediate, requires a
philosophy of education. What things are worth the doing and think-
ing which are to constitute the student's endeavor, and why they
are worth it, are questions that are answered only by a philosophy
of education, it is conceivable that such a philosophy might sep-
arate this question of subject matter from method, buch a possibil
ity helps to show the importance of a choice of philosophy. Our
choice, in this case, has everything to do with both, because it
seeks their complete amalgamation, ouch a philosophy is bound to
be equally interested in 'what' and 'how'. It will not altogether
differentiate its appeal to its estimate of values from its appeal
to psychology and logic for an account of how we think, it is a
matter of more than incidental importance that the author of this
philosophy was the pioneer in formulating a dynamic psychology, to
Lch we may incidentally appeal, .but finally the question of how
we think deserves tne fullest possible consideration, without dis-
allowing the iusepsrableness (in importance, at least, if not in
every aspect) of subject matter and method, it remains a matter
of the utmost importance to collegiate pedagogy to know what the

r
=——
— a,
exponent of a complete system of psychology may be able to teach.
It may be admitted, as frankly as we made the free choice of a
philosophy of education, that Aashburn's Movement and kental Imag-
ery has been chosen as a further guide to thinking, because it is a
dynamic theory and because it deals subtly and with convincing sat-
isfactoriness with the psychology of 'determining tendency' or
•problem-idea'. For our purposes, no more than for the psychol-
ogist's, is it a matter of ultimate importance whether the scheme
of movements used to characterize psychological process is absolute-
ly true. Perhaps it is of less importance to us, because our pur-
pose is so utterly practical. Uot that it is not of importance to
pedagogy to base itself upon a true psychology, but that it may
nevertheless have its practical purposes well served by a plausible
scheme of movements which might have to be revised in minute partic-
ulars for psychological truth's sake, without being in the least
vitiated as adequate basis of pedagogical precept. At any rate we
use the one thoroughgoing theory which consistently gives a dynamic
account of thinking. The practical advantage for our purposes is
that which inheres in the objectiveness of treating psychological
phenomena in a languege constituted of the physiological movements
posited as their correlates. Movements are very tangible objects
of our thinking, even if they must be conceived of as microscopic
or less than microscopic in their amplitude.
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PART I
PHILOSOPHY OF HIGHER EDUCATION
CHAPTER II
INTRODUCTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OP COLLEGIATE PEDAGOGY
Behind any essay a philosophy expressed or implied doubtless
lies. It is here assumed that this study of a particular field of
pedagogy will profit by a statement of its philosophy at the outset.
It is "believed to be an element of sat isfactoriness in the philos-
ophy we ohoose,^ first that it is not metaphysically ambitious about
'ultimates' , but is sincerely a philosophy for practice, and, second,
that its own field of application, elementary education, is not the
one we wish to treat. If we do violence to the author's beliefs as
to the way in which it should be applied in higher education, we
do so in ignorance of what application he would make in that field,
A philosophy which declares itself moreover, as by definition a
"generalized theory of education" challenges an effort to accommo-
date any ideas on education one may want to live by, to test both
the ideas and the philosophy. I am not sure that one must be a
pragmatist in philosophy, or be assured that a biological philos-
ophy is a complete universal scheme, to profit nevertheless, for
f such a purpose as ours, by accepting the expressions of evolutional
biology as the terms which are pertinent to education. Evolution,
growth, progress, achievement, seem inevitable as expressions of
education's purposes.
We might proceed with only so much of apology for the adopt-
ion of this philosophy, but it is incumbent to forecast a little
1. Dewey, John, Democracy and Education , An Introduction to
the Philosophy of Education .
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further what seems necessary to apply it to higher education. In
applying this philosophy to the elementary grades of school, its
author has become famous in advocacy of the claims of 'the social 1 .
Perhaps it is fairer to say that the philosophy has been made to
appeal through illustrations from elementary school-practice, than
to say that it has been applied in elementary schools. At any rate
we propose no severer test of it than will be incidental to testing
higher educational theory and practice by its main tenets. The
genetic difference between elementary and higher education may be
expected to draw contrasts without doing violence to the great prin-
ciple of adjustment. The difference we are inclined to find most
pronounced is in this fundamental contest between sociality and in-
dividuality.
To dissolve this dualism by interpreting the individual in
terms of the social is certainly much less pertinent in higher rang-
es of the individual's life. Where elementary education faces the
problem of adaptation through socialization, it is equally true
that higher education faces the problem of adaptation by individ-
uation. Much of elementary education has been undertaken by prim-
itive man as unconscious adaptation in wi .ich !I ends"^rather than
"aims" operate as they do in lower stages of evolution. Higher
education supplants these primitive, racial, adaptations of child-
hood by mediate adaptations, different iational in the interest of
perfecting individuals, though this individuation may be, in turn,
tending toward higher social ideal. It must be the individuating
process of higher education that makes education something more
than a successful unconscious factor of racial adaptation. Even a
1. See Howerth, Educational Review, January, 1917.
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vigorous exploitation of individualism (as a developmental, not
an ethical, term) is wholesome as a defensible reaction for higher
education against a pervasive doctrine of adaptation for the race's
sake, iiducation has no way to express itself biologically more sig-
nificantly than in this compensating doctrine of individuation.
Above childhood it is the prevailing factor. Education must finally
express itself best in individualism.
It is only in the individual activity we call learning, think-
ing, coming to know, accumulating character through experience,
that we secure a principle for higher education. It must be that
such standards of value as we have, educational as well as ethical,
are much less the vague, averaged, high, low, and median, than the
actual achievements of individuals. The achievement of individuals
leads on to the expectation of individual achievement, and this is
platform for the expectation that individual help can be given to
individual achievement. Higher education is nothing less than the
stamp of approval on this expectation, the way in which society de-
liberately tries to supplement the very service to the race of in-
dividuals by increasing their individual value.
One thing for which we are indebted at the outset is a
definition of education which we make free to apply within our
field. Whatever else education may be, its institutional aspects
always present two parties to the undertaking. If it is a vital
process, those two parties are distinct and both subject to modifi-
cations by the processes of teaching and learning. Apply it strict-
ly: nothing could be more wholesome for the collegiate teacher to
contemplate than the fact that he ceases to be a teacher when he
ceases to be modified as one of the agencies, or when he fails to
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improve the quality of human material in "both parties. That the
learner's is the point of view of first importance, to which the
teacher's function is subordinated is part of this insight. The
learner's is, of course, what it must be considering who he is and
what the problem of learning in his particular case must be. The
teacher's point of view is, in one sense, determined also by who he
is, but if it is not adjustable to the particular mechanism of
the situation represented by this learner and this problem, he is
only by courtesy of convention "the teacher." His real superiority
as a teacher abides only partially in the fact that he has tra-
versed the roads to the goal, has discovered the pitfalls and short
cuts and finally perhaps the best route; only partly in the fact
that the learner's attitude is that of problem, while the teacher's
knowledge has both the advantage of organized finality and the
pedagogical embarrassments of the same. But the teacher's real
superiority, if it exists, lies chiefly in the fact that he is ade-
quately sympathetic with the learner's state of mind, and apprec-
iation of the terms and processes of problem, as problems must lie
before the learner. Hot the least important distinction of col-
legiate learner and teacher, but one that is all too largely over-
looked, is the requirement that the collegiate teacher snould be
older than his student in every important sense. This fact will
bear repeated attention.
Preliminary to a philosophy of higher education, is a tenta-
tive definition of higher education, to be constructed in part as
hypothesis for the criticism of Dewey's philosophy of education
so far as it is to serve for higher as well as elementary, and in
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part by differentiation of higher from elementary education.
It is in the nature of life to continue in being. Does the
process of adaptation by which the social continuity of life is ef-
fected, that is education as a means of this continuity, suffer
diminution in degree or kind as adulthood is approached? In the
sense of the necessary transmission of that minimum of nurture
which successfully adopts the individual into his tribe even at a
high stage of civilization, the span of elementary education is
even now being criticized as too long. The introduction of the
junior high school is chiefly advocated upon the ground of a need
to improve individuation rather than mere social transmission. How-
ever, such distinctions are not to be too nicely made and the
question as to whether there is need of a long continuance of con-
scious socialization may safely be answered in the affirmative,
whether for mere adaptation or for individuation, processes which
fortunately cannot be wholly separated.
It must be noted that when the question of "transmission of
culture by communication" is involved, the history of primitive
education shows that conscious efforts to educate took place rather
in those activities which we now call "secondary" than in those
most primitively connected with adaptation to the tribe. Mere liv-
ing with children, ir other words, is a safer assurance of element-
ary education than of the stage where more specialized tribal
customs must be inculcated, to say nothing of any education which
can attain to a type called "human, " Especially as "the gap be-
tween the capacities of the young and the concerns of adults widens"
and formal education has to begin, does the significance of the
upper ranges of that increasing gap increase in larger ratio; until
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in time, as now, the limitations are not in the space and the matter,
but if any, are in the individual and his limitations, whether of
social opportunity, of capacity, or of interest.
There is, of course, the accompanying danger that tne higher
will especially "be subject to estrangement, or "isolation," as
xiewey calls it, from life experience. Yet even so, there is the
fact that the farther we recede from the mere necessities of adapt-
ation to the tribal customs the less becomes the urgence that school
practice shall not be isolated. It is^elementary education, that
the fear of the predominance of 'literacy' prevails, and it may be
that higher education as a liberal undertaking will have less to
struggle against than elementary in the way of traditional encum-
brance when it seriously takes up the problem of its own renovation,
it may profit, both by copying the reforms of elementary education
where they are pertinent, and by realizing the differences which
may even give it historical advantage. It is well to keep in mind,
at any rate, what has been said about the claims now being made for
an earlier cessation of elementary (tribal) education in the inter-
est of an earlier engagement in the more individuating performances
of what is called secondary education. On the individual, psycho-
logical side this need of individuation increases as adolescence
progresses (always modified , of course, by the striking social
claims of adolescence, of whatever sort). The approach to a more
consciously individuating type of work as appropriate to the col-
legiate stage is progressive, and may even i:ave been obscured in
late years by the too undiscriminating application of the social
precepts
.
The apprehension of a tenable psychology of elementary edu-
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cation upon which to case an acceptable practice has been slow,
at least as we see it in the perspective of a very recent past, i'his
is shown in Dewey's masterly chapters V, and VI especially. Students
of secondary education on the side of improving its practice are
beginning to study the way in which their exemplary practitioners
of the art of elementary education succeeded with the philosophies
of Herbert and j'roebel, and may well devote some time to a mastery
of the insights of Dewey's Chapter VI, on "Preparation, unfolding,
and formal discipline." There seems no good reason why secondary
and higher education should either repeat mistakes so recently made,
or fail to build more rapidly upon tested and sound foundations.
To repeat errors so recently made will be sufficient reflection
upon the sincerity of higher pedagogy, as ignorance can not be safe-
ly pleaded; but to proceed without shortening and improving, not to
say without recognizing mistakes, will be to open to question the
scientific character of higher pedagogy at the moment of its begin-
ning. Processes that have been already explored must be short-
circuited or modifed as experience has taught. Elementary educa-
tion, for example, has only just become conscious of the fact that
its productive psychology is the psychology of learning, to be first
attacked that it may duly regulate approach to the subordinate psy-
chology of teaching, i'o repeat the groping process by which this
has been learned would do no credit to the ordinary sense of the
collegiate pedagogist. A body of experimental results is fast ac-
cumulating in the laboratories of the new field of educational re-
search, elementary education accepted itself, with whatever im-
perfection of insight, as an art worthy of empirical study, at the
very time when experimental science was first strongly asserting
——^^^^^^^^
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itself even in the pure sciences. It lias the blemishes, of course,
as well as the merits, of being an actual pioneer in the days of
pioneering, ./hat it has done deserves especially the careful re-
view, not only of scientists in general, but of students of the
newer sister ( or daughter) science of higher education. All ex-
perimental results that are acceptable for the purposes of higher
education, deserve to be sifted and assorted for this purpose; will
increase in value often, for their original purpose; will increase
in scientific value by being subjected to new scrutiny with refer-
ence to new applications; and contain, moreover, in the nature of
the case much original pertinence to the education of near-adults
rather than of children. A test of the sincerity and experimental
competency of the new pedagogy of higher education must lie in its
capacity to assess for itself the applicable results of experiment
already performed; in its ability to take its part in performance
as it is being improved, both of experiment and practice; and, es-
pecially in its capacity to avoid presumptions, not to say ignorant
repetition de novo ; in a word, to take the place which the recent
history of educational science has clearly prepared.
This recent discovery mentioned a moment ago, that the defin-
ition of education must account in due order for the activities of
two persons, first a learner and second a teacher, seems simple
enough to have been always involved. Of course it always has been,
but the profit seems to come at last in the access of dignity which
comes to the function of the teacher, when he rinds his professional
niche no less important than that of the functionary who must know
the psychology of the learner, but must know it as a specialized
activity "called learning, building up a body of applied science
of its own, revealing such expanding hints of its unlearned poss
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bilities, that, as he progresses in this science, he finds his own
function as expert agent of that performance opening out before him
as no mean or unimportant incident. If the teacher is still a com-
placent by-stander moved only to that interest in learning which
sees it as an inscrutable, implanted instinct or the inviolable
group of interacting instincts which need most to be let alone, ne
has the initiatory insight of the teacher; but he is only on the
threshold of the professional privilege which awaits the eager
student of the science and art of teaching.
If the science of the elementary teacher has cleared its own
way by a period of child study, by an apprehension o± the genetic
principle in psychology, by a differentiation for itself oi the
field of learning in the field of psychology, it has incidentally
opened up to higher education, the instantly expanding vision of a
calling of immeasurable importance. In primitive education the
tribe did succeed without conscious art in elementary education. In
secondary education, differentiated "educational" means entered un-
conscious of the evolutional part they played, but the era of
higher education, in a real sense not yet consciously opened, may
open its conscious existence in the midst of a historical "background
not long but very real, of developed educational practice. If the
insight of the psychology of learning yielding a real function of
teacning, is one that opens a new future for elementary education,
it is an insight without which, it seems fair to say, higher edu-
cation as a genuine pedagogical adventure could scarcely have mean-
ing. If it is worth much to lower education, it is worth everything
to higher. If instincts could compass a respectable amount of edu-
cation, unconsciously supported by the mere life of the tribe; it is
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by the converse operation of that principle in negation, that we
see adulthood void of sufficient corresponding "native powers" to
effect anything which could "be called education. The upper stages
of the period of infancy 1 are the stages which test its availabil-
ity, for the education of which, nevertheless, we iaiow man to be
capable. It needs no other proof than mere notice that, while
tribal adaptation is a function which unconscious social evolution
may supplement organic evolution to perform, tne very idea of that
individuation implied in civilization is an educational enterprise
which will stand at a minimum by default unless conceived and con-
trived as the highest art to be developed by human ingenuity. If
higher education, at least collegiate education, awaits in bewilder-
ment the pronouncement of its vital commission, may it not fairly
be expected to come in terms of the acknowledgment of the profes-
sional paramountcy of teaching?
These two poles of the educative function, learner and
teacher, constitute one of the few dualisms Dewey labors to em-
phasize rather than dissolve. The vitality of the teaching process
is subject to various tests. It goes without saying - is in terms
of definition - that the learner should be changed by the process.
A more subtle test is as to whether the teacher is modified. We
have just noted primitive elements of vitality in learning, as
itself a process which may attain, especially in elementary stages,
a degree of consummation without, or in spite of teaching. The
test of the teacher, even there, is in his moaifiability to aciapt
to an evolution in which he may otherwise become only an encysted
excrescence. It is in that higher education of the individual which
we are trying to conceive, that the urmodliia blfe* teacher may even

~19-
defeat the process. Where elementary education is the token of ad-
justment by adaptation, much of which will take care of itself, high
er education is inconceivable except as an individuating stake-
setrer for differentiations. There is no such thing as teaching
w] ion can tolerate the supposition of unmodifiability in the teacher
It is this fundamental fact that pronounces the ineptitude of con-
servatism in higher education. Many collegiate teachers' prepar-
ation i or their office has been the most contradictory inrutting of
their own intellectual character that could be conceived as negation
of even a willingness to foster a liberal and progressive attitude
in learners. Teaching is a vital process or it is no adjunct of
the vital process of learning. Learning is differentiating and
progressive, or it is certainly not that individuating learning
which should characterize higher education. Eeadiness to be changed,
that is, to be the teacher-associate of learning, is a teacher's
qualification for the college too often not even acknowl edged.
It was a function of the elementary teacher to improve the
character of the environment and thus to improve the quality of
human experience. Primitive elementary education was an educative
situation for the child, because the presence of his elders so
constituted it, and the quality of human experience has ever since
been subject to the improvement which the essentially inventive
tendency of the child produces in interaction with the conservative
sagacity of his elders.
1
The presence of elders enforced itself as
an educative necessity. To turn, for contrast's sake, directly to
the institutional conditions of modern higher education, we find
first an enormously greater demand, if possible, for the presence
1. Chamberlain, A. F. , The Child
.
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of elders. Higher education sins on the side of over-attention to
the preservation of civilization's tribal attainments. This must he
done beneath the threshold of higher educational function, so that
its real individuating and progressive function may not he inter-
fered with nor left undone. But higher education's shortcoming,
intrinsic to its very meaning, is the lack of youth's "elder's" in
it. Not that tribal elder whose function carried itself because
he was an elder, but the "elder" in that wisdom which knows these
things we are discussing - that elder whose added experience is
illuminated by the light of its educative significance. Higher
teaching may by no means be done by the apprentice. Higher "teach-
ing" that has left out the presumptions of all that may be meant
of the superiority of experiential eldership is not teaching in the
sense in which that word must be understood to justify the demand
that "the teacher must improve the quality of human experience.'
This one iact alone, that much college teaching is done by the
novice who would asperse the doctrine of his teaching obligation,
if he had ever heard of it, leaves college-teaching almost an un-
explored art.
Keeping the terms of the same contrast in mind, it is worth
while to raise the question whether the greater age of that pupil
who is collegiate student has increased or decreased the demand
for institutional, formal attention to his education. We are not
driven to those facts in the history of education which show an
efficacy of private, tutorial education almost unknown in our own
day of institutions and mass instruction, but may observe the phe-
nomena of education of outstanding individuals even in the midst
of institutions, to find that the significance of such educational

experience is not largely connected with the instituti one except
as the institution furnishes a teacher . The problem ol individuating
is made more exacting by reason of the increasing social complexity,
hut probably much less so in the college than in tne elementary
problem of adaptation and adjustment. Or, not to violate tne prin-
ciple of adjustment, which of course, is not remitted, though mod-
ified, it is enough to recognize the fact that the increasing
numbers of persons who must be afforded the higher education ne-
cessitate the development of adequate institutional modes, i'he
question is a practical one, and yet it is not only the increasing
complexity of society, affecting, as we have seen, the lower edu-
cation most, nor simply the practical necessity of accommodating
more persons; but we may sately expect that the nature of higher
education itself will argue the appropriate institutional agencies
which will express in an organic way what the science of collegiate
pedagogy may demand. It would be a well-nigh fatal negation of
the scientific character of the enterprise, to be compelled to admit
at the outset that organized institutional machinery of higher
education could not be devised. Machinery means an adaptation of
means to ends. If a problem of collegiate education takes form
as such, its definition as a problem implies its institutional
solution. To provide xor and secure an association of the older
with the younger with an educative end in view appropriate to the
age and interests of collegiate youth would be to provide a colleg-
iate institution. la write in the adjective which states the
particular educational purpose is the next step; to write it
"academic" or "cultural" college suits our particular purpose, and
serves us with a type in which ridelity to the first principle, of
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ideal association of youth with elders for a liberal educational
purpose, may be most typically invoked. This is but one of tne
types of college which the present movement toward curriculum-making
will give us, but it has the typical merit 01 being the one which
will heve to struggle most directly with tne traditions of nigher
and secondary education; the type which will need most cautious
bracing with the solid principles of pedagogy which the more un-
sophisticated practical (technical) colleges have unconsciously
developed. Most important of all, this will be the college in
which both the strain and the rewards of educational self-con-
sciousness will he greatest and yield the most lasting pedagogical
fruits. This college will have the conservative advantage of in-
tentionally trying out, with new interest in things old, what is
stock in trade of the whole cumulus of educational experience,
and using what is for the present economically necessary even where
changes are contemplated. These points may be slightly amplified
in a summary of the relation of Dewey's definition of education
to a definition of collegiate education, before passing on to the
philosophy of collegiate education.
Education has the conscious office of husbanding the pro-
cesses which provide for intellectual "nutrition" and "reproduction^
The collegiate stage of this process should be distinguished from,
rather than confused with the earlier stages. But this distinction
may not, without reflection, declare the difference so great as to
absolve collegiate education forthwith from any of tne fundamental
differentiae which enter into the definition of education, in
fact, if instead, for hypothesis' sake, some of these be
demanded
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as necessary to definition of collegiate education the efiect is
somewhat startling: (1) There are two parties to education (as
there are two aspects - learning and teacmng ) . (2) Both of these
are modified in disposition by the process. Is the college teacher
not truly a teacher when he fails to be modified by teaching?
This may prove one of the most fertile suggestions to hold in mind,
at least till it prove not relevant to collegiate teaching. It
seems not unlikely that it holds true in such a way as to differ-
entiate collegiate, or near- adult, teaching by peculiar sorts of
mutual modifications increasing as such teaching iinds its most
vital status. (3) Must the collegiate teacher also improve the
quality of human experience , or does this obligation cease with
the teaching of children? This would be a queer sort of negation
to try to hold as a positive doctrine. If collegiate teachihg may
be held to this obligation, what must be tie whole platform and its
underpinning upon which such an expectation may be based? How far
shall we have advanced professionally toward dissipation of the too
long-enduring delusion that collegiate teaching is connected some-
how only with the interests of abstract science, while human im-
provement must take its chance?
(4) It is part of the definition of education as a process that
one of these parties shall be older than the other. This demand
raises no sort of question when elementary education is in mind,
as with Bewey. But the careful use of terms here where education
is being actually defined as that socially "nutritive" and "re-
productive" "self-renewing" process which transmits through "com-
munication." which is a "sharing of experience,"
gives us just
the word which may be used discreetly to
supplant the mere temporal
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aspeots of 'older' and 'younger.' Where experience is the element
the teacher is older for purposes of teaching ii ha is the party
with experience to share. There is the demand that the collegiate
teacher he distinctly "older" in this sense, not lacking at the
very least, the wisdom which genuine experience gives to make him
the superior in discretion, insight, and consciousness of a teach-
ing purpose. It takes no argument to prove that the greatest
single lack in the high school is the lack of disparity in age be-
tween teacher and pupil as measured hy the mature wisdom of the
person who ripens to the teacher's work in the even warmth of a
genuine professional purpose. And yet the high school has espoused
the doctrine of preparation for its teachers, while the college is
still content to trust the intellectual growth of its students
to teachers not yet acceptable as serious apprentices for high
school-teacher training.
(5) The increasing complexity of society and the increase,
very rapid in the last few decades, of knowledge and technical
modes of skill, entail respectively heavy burdens upon elementary
and higher education. It will he part of the whole treatment of
higher education to show that its share of this increased obligation
is peculiar to it because it is higher education. Although there
are respects in which civilized life entails distinct obligations
for formal apprenticeship to mere living beyond the resources of
the family or unorganized sociality of the community, it seems
likely that the real burdens of complexity will increasingly impinge
at the upper border of youth, where more and more profound in-
tellectual preparation for individual burdens will have to be made.
General education has burden enough, to be sure, in the overwhelm-
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ing demand for universal diffusion of the training which as second-
ary, was hut yesterday regarded as the privilege of leaders. Who
knows jow soon the education we now call higher, the collegiate
part of it, at least, may be oppressed with obligations of the same
sort, for which it may be still more unready? There are many
signs that the state universities, made integral part of an un-
broken public school system, have, for many, obliterated a supposi-
tion that their work in life could be as well done without col-
legiate education. And such work is not thought of by them as the
work of "leaders." The obligation to give them good teaching well
into their near-adult years bears down heavily upon the state,
which has not yet solved the problem of perfecting the teaching of
the high school. That this collegiate work is more exacting, more
difficult, calls for more mature and better-trained teachers, is
implied in the mere fact that it deals with older, more experienced,
wiser and more discriminating students, to say nothing of the
fact that at present it is to be done away from home with all that
is implied in that revolutionary change in the student's type of
living and self-depending.
(6) But, finally, by definition, the present demand for
formal education is erhanced and its problems particularized by the
fact that modem life widens the breach between school-experience
and home- experience. If elementary education has had a perennial
struggle against this tendency, what do we know? and what especial-
ly have we increasingly to contend with, in a higher education
which as yet has attained no unsophisticated rationale of its ex-
istence? Higher education has a hoary history to be sure, but
collegiate education, as the modern community has begun to demand

it, is one oi* our youngest institutions. The question which a
discussion of it will have to answer is this: Is collegiate educa-
tion more, or less, subjeot than elementary education to the em-
barrassments of the split which appears between experience as it
is in lift and experience as it forms itself in the school?
(7) The purpose of Dewey in dealing with elementary education
leads him to stress more neavily than ever, if possible, the es-
sential sociality oi" education, as he himself has led the tnought
of educators for the past two or three decades. The one dualism
which he makes more pointed and even renders acute, while he
succeeds in its philosophical solution, is the antagonism of social
and individual. If not, why is one so strongly impressed with a
conscious propaganda for socializing school-education? The best
that can be said for the individual is that his definition is found
in terms of social meaning. Let it be so, whether finally, or
for argument's sake. I propose to be at some pains to inquire
whether it may not prove to be as significant an emphasis in col-
legiate education to find its test in the claims of the individual
as the functional educational factor.
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CHAPTER III
THE COLLEGE-STUDENT
We are now used to the idea of tne school as a social institu-
tion. The democratic idea of institution carries with it the pre-
sumption of sociality. There is bound to he some negation of this
presumption when the specific purpose of the school we are here deal-
ing with is taken fully into account. The collegiate student is
now nearly enough adult to have definite intellectual purposes as-
sert themselves. That collegiate institutional purpose, must he
maturely serious is doctrinally assented to. The college- student
is babied on the side of externals and justly resents it. He
naturally shirks the onus of responsibility which he is not duly
encouraged to shoulder. On the side of expecting performance with-
out motive there is, also, short -sight and small result. Genuine
adult thinking, the inescapable obligation of the collegiate student,
is a pragmatic factor in evolution. Dewey's critics
1 make a poor
case against him when they fail to realize that to be such a factor
by no means bars thinking from being also an exercise of sheer
pi ay-enjoyment. Uo evolutional factor is disqualified by being
the object of the redundant repetition of piay- activity. Rather
the contrary. But in thinking we have an activity that is most
characteristically individual and non-social, in contrast to the
many factors which depend upon group-relations, a factor rather
super-social in its best manifestations. The rising structure of
science the public have little to do with. The organization of
thought is by special groups of chosen thinkers with a leader.
1. Cohen,M.R., John Dewey's Philosophy ,New Republic, Sep. 2, 1916,
pp. 118-9.
_, ,
2. Koss,E.A. ,The Organization of Thought , The Am. Jour. of _oc.Mov.
1916.
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tfewer and fewer persons ore able to exercise an iniiuence upon
thought as it becomes technical ana special. Its organization is
a group affair, but the thinking itself is an individual matter,
and one for which persons have to be more and more carefully pre-
pared. It is an individual contribution that has to be made for
the social whole, rather than worked out together by any large
group. It is the capping achievement of human activity, but is an
achievement made by individuals, so far as it is the kind of think-
ing that is more than bare adaptation. Such thinking is the kind
that is often lauded for its uselessness as sheer exploitation of
a high aapacity for enjoyment, but that is no limitation of think-
ing, just because it is a characteristic of it. It is done after,
and so necessitates, social thinking as its background, but in it-
self it is a unique excursion into solitude.
If this interpretation of the activity called thinking is
admitted, it gives us one 01 the most striking distinctions between
higher and lower educational institutions. Indeed I am not sure
that we are not awaiting the acknowledgment of this distinction
for the respectable habilitation oi a higher institution which
lacks nothing so much as to take itself seriously, draining and
socializing are but two of the three cardinal aspects of human
education. These two bank upon habit and are comparatively prim-
itive handmaids of survival. Thinking , also genetic, builds
upon
these, as freedom builds upon habit, but manifests itself best,
not
in merely serving survival, but in distinguishing the sample of
what may be. It is no disparagement of the genetic, pragmatic
service of thinking to exalt it as a fruit of evolution.
It is no
less a factor in the development of social man because
it is the
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distinguishing mark of the best individual samples.
The idea so oi'ten recurring, of the dominating importance
of "shared activity" may come to ti.e point through repetition where
one has lost sight oi the complete meaning ol' the phrase. To be
sure the theme, where Dewey uses this expression is tLe adaptation
of the immature by the mature* s manipulation of environment, and
the school is shown to be an instrumentality for such legitimate
manipulation. Initiative of the individual in the process is no
small nor unimportant part of the school's obligation, but there
comes a time when initiative is not merely an important condition,
but when the institution must be organized on the idea of the in-
dividual 1 s initiative as its ioremost pedagogical principle. Put
in this way, the most glaring defect of collegiate education is
placed in the foreground, and an ideal lor its reconstruction set
up with no equal conflicting claim. To individuate and to secure
collegiate performance by individual initiative will be found not
only consistent with, but fundamentally necessary to, the under-
standing of any principles of collegiate education that may emerge.
The prime obligation of childhood's education must not be
postponed. Social impulses must be provided for, but these im-
pulses are not so much outgrown as finally taken for granted, be-
cause the period comes in which they must be assumed as sub-struc-
ture. The direction of education which must be effected by a
training oi the young person's sense of common social value of con-
joint activities in situations which furnish occasion for sequence
of acts for a common purpose is the thing distinctively character-
istic of that stage in which the native impulses must be social-
1. On the foregoing paragraphs, cf. Dewey, Philos . of ad.. Gh.I]
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ized, uecouse men live in groups, and have developed life-customs
for which individual impulses are not provided by nature. In fact
it can only he done normally in childhood. In childhood this pro-
cess must, in a sense, he completed. Family and immediate community
expand into larger environment with some new stimuli, but enlarging
sphere is changing sphere; stimuli are not identical. The turn
of the individual comes at latest when family and home-community
are exchanged for educational institutional environment that lacks
many of the social claims of earlier environment. Especially, by
hypothesis, is the academic college a place which does not have
a civic community, as does the high school; and more than that,
has a stated purpose for the individual which takes the place of
the more social, less personal, purposes of the home-community.
The social features of collegiate life have been overdone,
and have tended to defeat the purposes of personal culture which
cannot be effected without manifestation of power to isolate
oneself and to do individual work.
It would be a mistake, Lowever, to assume that the over-
socialization of collegiate life is sheer perversity, or that a
principle of earlier development has been remitted and deserves
no further attention. In fact the most successful part of col-
legiate living has been the part that has developed with unrestricted
function oi social proclivities. It is where effort has been made
to exclude, rather than use, sociality, that the college has had
least success, and the disparity between its intellectual failure
and its athletic and other organized successes, is a challenge to
comparative analysis. This emphasizes its social successes but
does not argue that all its successes must be social.
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" Intentional education signifies a specially selected en-
vironment, the selection "being made on the basis of materials and
meti.od - specifically promoting growth in the desired direction." 1
We are only just pasting out of a period in which the college has
lacked a tenable statement of educational purpose. It may now
become a place especially favored in this regard. It is sufficient
ly absolved from the primitive social obligation to be the freest
institution to state its purpose and live up to it. The technical
colleges have done so. They are in so far exemplar to the academic
college, students give much evidence of being ready to choose ac-
cording to such definite educational purposes as are understood
in technical colleges. But students may not be depended upon to
conceive the pedagogical obligations involved in framing the ideals.
This is itself a technical task of direction which may do exactly
what Dewey's precept demands. Cone eive the educational purpose ,
learn the changes that must be made , construct an environment for
the purpose , apply its precepts sincerely , and make the academic
college an institution that is a directive influence for the age
and type of person who can choose to traverse the section of road
in which it pretends to be guide .
The conception of education as growth presents some con-
troversial difficulties, but these scarcely restrain the full use
of most of the precepts which apply to childhood. That immaturity
is a "power" of growth rather than an empty capacity is a truth
which gathers significance as we approach the higher stages, where
1. Dewey, Philosophy of Education , p. 45 . Of .upon these paragraphs,
Chapter III., Education as i/irection.
2. Of. Ibid, Chapters IV and V.
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"habituation" may be an increasingly effective "leverage'" for the
conscious development of "active habits." "Habit" is rescued from
the bad implications sometimes exclusively made ar;d the identifica-
tion of habit with "mechanical and external iorms 01 aotion" is
corrected by the assurance that mental and moral attitude are as
certainly habitual facts, and that the best side of habit is not its
routine, conservative cnaracter, but the intelligent power it may
exhibit to modify an environment toward one in which intelligence
is to operate in the formation of new habits themselves. And "there
are habits of judging and reasoning as truly as of nandling a tool,
painting a picture, or conducting an experiment."
Growth is not a term, however, exclusively applied to the
child. These increasingly intelligent aspects of growth argue
most important phases of it, with corresponding phases of education
belonging to the adult. "The difference between child and adult
is the difference between modes of growth appropriate to different
conditions. With respect to the development of powers devoted to
coping with specific scientific and economic problems we may say
the child must be growing in manhood. With respect to sympathetic
curiosity, unbiased responsiveness, and openness of mind, we may
1
say that the adult should be growing in childliiceness." The faults
of doctrine with regard to growth are mostly mixed up with the
notion that the adult environment is accepted as a standard for
tne child. Perhaps, conversely, the college is victim of an oppo-
site, if not corrective, notion that schooling is schooling, that
pedagogy is pedagogy, that once formulated lor the school of the
child we have formulated the principles of pedagogy, and the college
1 Dewey, Philosophy of Education , p. 59

is only an older child's school. If an improved doctrine of growth
will help correct this error it will be hailed at once by collegiate
pedagogy.
Less a correction, and more frankly a new insight, for higher,
and especially lor secondary, education is one 01 the chief corollar-
ies of Dewey's chapter on iiiducation as Growth.
"Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative
save more growth, there is no tiling to which education is subordinate
save more education. .. .the purpose of school education is to in-
sure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that
insure growth." 1 Now it is true enough of life itself after school
that it gives scope for the growth for which schooling thus pre-
pares. But this relationship, not to unorganized iiie, but of one
school to another has been sadly overlooked in the matter of
college-preparation. If the high school, without any compromise
whatever 01 its own liberal purposes, might be frankly regarded as
the "habituating background," the "leverage" of the collegiate
"active habits," it would be most consistent with such expectation
that high school experience should serve with much inerrancy to
designate those prepared to pursue collegiate life and to do col-
legiate "growing." The conception of college-preparation as a
choosing process is altogether consistent with the presumption that
collegiate "active habits" can turn only upon successful high
school "habituation."
It is more the privilege and obligation of higher than of
lower education to keep itself superior to routine, and to husband
the finer and maturer aspects of intellectual plasticity and growth.
^Op.cit .p. 60.
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"Infancy" is here to be extended on its intellectual Lide - "re-
organizing, reconstructing, t ran storming." The high school's minor
obligation to prepare some, perhaps many, by habituation in it,
to the appropriate activities of the college, is a faint type of
the college's 'preparatory' privilege, though it ought not to be
different in kind. This privilege of collegiate habituation is
not simply against the routine of ordinary living, but against
the deadening routine of ordinary thinking. The present habituation
of the college for the active habits of growing that are to lollow
is not only indifferently an all in degree, but is wrong in kind.
The flexibility of "advanced infancy," where are the possibilities
of continuous adult habits of intellectual growth, it is the ob-
ligation of the college more than any other institution to foster.
The college is not living up to its educational privilege unless
it is purposely organized to nurture habituation in reorganizing,
reconstructing, transiorming, the active r.abits of thinking by which
men may extend their adolescence indefinitely. The obligation
of college teachers to refrain from helping to "set" the minds of
their students is the obligation implied by this fact of the al-
ways unrealized further plasticity of a young man. The liberal
college is not doing its most characteristic work when it is merely
preparing for the professional school. It is the institution con-
ceived to afford the "broader and freer thinking and choosing im-
plied by these upper ranges of human plastic possibilities. It is
no disparagement of the particular preparatory purposes that the
ethod of living and thinking and growing there should be the method
of such intellectual habits as may fairly still be called grjowth.
This is the value of genetic study as applied to adolescence
and
m
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as
the college as well and as appropriat ely_/to childhood, boyhood,
and the lower schools.
In the sense of its main thesis, that the method of growth
is thinking, Dewey's doctrine is immeasurably more applicable to
tnose stages of individual growth where the intellectual aspect of
thinking (if one may so put it) is the predominant aspect, and
where the imminently important method 01 intellectual nabituation
is that which guarantees unlettered active habits of thinking to
follow. Jiducation is living away below its privileges when, in
the midst of it, the adolescent is settling into the molds of
the static minds of teachers. The college teacher who reiterates
his beliefs is taking a risk of this kind.
A statement in Dewey's chapter twenty-two
1 is so important
at the beginning of collegiate doctrine that it ought to be brought
back here and allowed to help lay the loundation of a genetic
doctrine of the college:
"As maturity increases and the student has a greater back-
ground of familiarity upon 7/hich a new topic is projected, txie
scope of more or less random physical experimentation is reduced.
Activity is defined or specialized in certain channels. To the
eyes of others, the student may be in a position of complete phys-
ical quietude, because his energies are confined to nerve channels
and to the connected apparatus of the eyes and vocal organs. But
because this attitude is evidence of intense mental concentration
on the part of the trained person, it does not follow that it
should be set up as a model for s-cudents who still have to find
their intellectual way about. And even with the adult, it does
1uewey, Philosophy of i^ducati on , p. 3bb. (Underlining for the
purposes of this paper).
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not cover the whole circuit of mental energy. It marks an inter-
mediate peri od, papal' le of being lengthened with increased mastery
of a subject , but always coming between an earlier period of core
general and conspicu ous organic acti on and a late r time of Totting
to us
e
what has been apprehended .
This statement both serves x>ewey' s purpose to protest against
the restraint of the various activities proper to the student who
"still has to iind his intellectual way about," and to point out
the corresponding fact that real study of such problems as are ap-
propriate to collegiate study is a type of trained activity which
must intervene between the random activity of the mere explorer
and the applied activity of the person who has worked out his
problems and faces professional performance. "Learned profession"
has greatly expended its meaning as a phrase. It has done so both
by the improvement of the character of the professional school and
by the dependence the professional school has placed upnn the train-
ing and sifting powers of a collegiate course. Professional train-
ing is improving itself by recognizing the period in which students
have to be made. She college will improve itself by recognizing
the gravity of this opportunity to make students. And the word
'student' will have to get its best meaning as applied in that stage
and institution where individual experience superadds to its in-
structive power to find its wa£ by. phy_sicaa activity,,_the lower to
settle down to the task which is involved in problems to be solved .
Throughout his discussion i>ewey is at great pains to em-
phasize the increasing demands and educational possibilities of
the expansion of science. It is at this point that the college
finds its place in that extraordinary development. Sot apprentices,

but students, must be the answer to tiie demand that the schools
snail meet this expansion, it does not set the college off as a
peculiar educational institution, so much as it reveals its cnarter
to enlarge the field of secondary education on the intellectual
side. JJ'or x>ewey the lower schools must improve their metnod by
participation in the subject matter which makes the life oi the
community, 'ihis principle never abates its hold, ^ut for the
upper ranges of secondary education, especially, including an ex-
pansible college, the form this demand takes is increasing com-
petence to live by the methods which identify themselves with the
problematical aspects of scientific living. We have no choioe, we
may no longer live by the unscientific "according to nature." The
burden of science and its methods upon us are still primitively
mild in the lower schools con^pared with the inescapable obligation
to make students in the higher schools.

CHAPTER IV
THH COLLiiGiS-TJiACHiilR
If the central fact of collegiate education is the student,
the axial center upon which his student-life turns is aim. A chaptei
on Aims in Education1 is hasis ior a soundly constructed doctrine
of collegiate teaching. "Education as such has no aims, only per-
sons," consequently they are varied, differing with different per-
sons, and with the same person at different times. Aims are not
in things and enterprises, they are in persons, and cause persons
to accept responsibilities; help persons to maire observations,
choices, plans. Aims give continuity and persistence to the ex-
perience of persons. A student's won: has not begun if it is not
animated by his own aim. Yet it is the common experience that
collegiate work hangs upnn teachers' aims, and looks to teachers'
dictation for its fulfillment. £ood aims must be founded upon the
intrinsic activities and needs of the given individual to be educat-
ed, ^election of ends by others, and making them so uniform as to
neglect specific powers and requirements of an individual, are
abuses of this principle, bo in every way aims are of the greatest
importance to the doctrine of an adequate organization of individual
students' work. Teacher's aims which provide for no subordination
to the ;.:ore important aims of the learners, are aims in divergence
from legitimate collegiate purposes.
„£
Through the extremes ol "education according to Mature,
with all its grotesque deficiencies, simmering down to the one
blanket failure of Rousseau to realize the pragmatic principle that
native impulses are in themselves neither good nor bad, we come
^ewey, Philosophy of aducati on , Chapter 71 II,Aims in
Education.
Sibid, Chapter ll.
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flnally to the doctrine of the enfranchisement of the
individual
against imperfect society, and in, rather than against, a so
ci ety
conceived to he the individual's normal environment, it
gives us
at last an opening for a restrained and intelligent
doctrine of
the part which individualism may play in a well ordered
higher edu-
cation. The interplay of the reasonably sobered and
adapted in-
dividual gives us at last a conception of a democratic
citizenship
in which the machinery and presuppositions are perfected
and only
human selfishness remains to mar complete harmony,
uertainly no
grown-up citizenship is conceivable without a frank application
of the democratic principle throughout, and the kind of
higher
education we are exploring means nothing except under
democratic
ideal. "Ultimately social efiiciency means neither more
nor less
than a capacity to share in a give and take of experience."
1MB
enlightened unselfishness which must make a tolerable society
through individual power to tolerate and be tolerated,
can mean
nothing less than an individualism of a fine type at
that stage
where education is doing its best and highest work,
"if democracy
has a moral and ideal meaning it is that a social
return be de-
manded from all, and that opportunity for development
of distinctive
capacities be afforded all."
1
It is impossible to give space to any complete
summary, even,
of a philosophy of the collegiate teacher. Several
chapters of
Dewey's Philosophy of Education make specific
contributions tome of
which may simply be listed; and a few questions
may be jotted down
with the expectation that such formulation of doctrine
for col-
legiate procedure as we shall engage in will make
a be.;inning of
answer
.
1 Qp cit . ,p.l42.
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Chapter ten, on Interest and Discipline, opens for us the question
of the scientific aspects of incentives, for exemple. We have
space only for some of the questions, yet more oj them than we
shall, "by any means, he able to answer, or even forecast.
College learning suffers from indifference to study. The
thin air is ransacked xor excuses "both tacit and unulusi-Lngly ex-
posed. Is it true that the type of appeal made by athletics is
impossible to study? We have, at any rate, the current proof that
the apparent incapacity for enthusiasm is not real, though this is
little consolation.
Is a study of student-activities likely to yield any help
to a reconciliation of the apparent antagonism represented by
athletics and studies? Is the difference perhaps one of method ,
which can consequently he bridged? Watch the methods of student-
activities. See what they show which studies lack. How far do they
exhibit (1) init j ative not allowed in the usual method of prosecut-
ing studies? (2) scientific methods , not employed by studies?
(5) responsibility not expected in studies: an independence of
petty calendar requirements accompanied by strict exactions, never-
theless, of severely tested results, implying an efficient use of
time? Can a requirement that a student refrain from a holiday (e.g.)
take the place of an expectation that a student will so regulate the
use of his own time that a stated result, will accrue? Are results
stated in any shape which gives certainty that time will have to be
used judiciously to get acceptable results? Is the teacher ever
used, in a position, comparable, in the good natured expectation
of expert arbitrariness , to that of a coach? If he is recognized
as expert, and an authority upon the matter at issue, why may he not
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become an agency of a class's voluntarily organized effort, in the
way in which they use a coach'; Can the college teacher attain such
a relation to the work of his class? Is it desirable?
Why does a class ignore a suggestion from the teacher that
such and such a hook is so germane to the present work before the
class as to make it almost necessary to read it? Why do teachers
have to request students to read such things with the expectation
that the suggestion will be ignored, even by students who would
be interested intensely if they made the effort to get the book?
Is there anything to be gained by securing a spirit of emulation
answerable to the social judgment of the group rather than of the
teacher? Is it guaranteed that a teacher could produce the same
feeling of apologetic shame on the part of the individual student
for not knowing what the teacher knows, that could be produced by
the felt censure of the class-body? Why should not this attitude
toward the class be secured? Is it not present in the student-
activities? How is it secured there? How is it made effective
to secure work from individuals? "hat are the limits of social
claim of this sort? Would; it be as wholesome if a peculiar power in
a teacher could secure such an attitude toward him? Does he suffer
at all in other functions left peculiarly to him, if he turn this
influence over to the class itself?
How does debating secure full i^t^erest of an individual?
What kind of an educational project is it? What is its psychology
as compared with class-work even in the same, good student in the
same subject? Does it involve principles which would be applicable
in class work - e.g.: rivalry, record, scientific measurement
of
results, scientific ordering of procedure to make a rivalry
sig-
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nificantv What do we know of the successes of certain high school
teachers in answering these questions?
A danger to the unwary in following Dewey along to that con-
clusion of chapter nine which dissolves tfct dualism between self-
sacrifice and spiritual self-perfecting, is that a very necessary
function of education will he buried under the refinements of ideal.
Ideal may hold up social efficiency and culture as synonyms; in
fact it is a splendid improvement of both terms to have this identi-
fication made; but the process of amalgamating them in the experience
of an individual in "a naughty world," is a stupendous and dis-
heartening task. This ought not to discourage from holding the
ideal, which cannot be abated; but ought to strengthen conviction
as to the need of setting high, but not impossible, goals for
present attainment.
Social di sinterest ness is a most characteristic mood, not
steady or permanent enough to be left to persist without help, but
a pronounced "nascent power" of the adolescent. It is perhaps the
burden of Royce's chapter on Individualism in The Philosophy of
Loyalty , that the proof of individual culture is in a loyalty which
is at least likely to be social. There is much room in Dewey's
doctrine for a definition of self-develcpment that identifies the
aims of self and society. Real unselfishness is a better quality
than is even present at the stage when the adolescent is, as it
were, exploiting his capacity for altruism. But it is the part of
sagacious educational practice to use all useful instincts at
their appropriate time to make the best individuals possible. Un-
less higher education shall do its best to perfect all the forward-
looking powers of such individuals as it can lay its hands upon,
the very possibility of the evolution implied in democratic, or any
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other, ideal vanishes from the scheme of things as they are arid as
the ideal hopes they may become.
This Chapter on Interest and Discipline is no less important
for a philosophy of higher education than to furnish a platform
for the central pillar cf such a structure. Collegiate education
will take a new lease of life when the present method of pursuing
fragmentary lessons, as parts of subjects of study organized and
foreseen only by specialist teachers, gives way to some scheme in
which individual projects, which take shape from such experience
as the student has, shall make a real chance for the psychological
laws of learning. "The act of learning or studying is artificial
and ineffective in the degree in which pupils are merely presented
with a lesson to be learned. ".. ."This connection of an object and
a topic with the promotion of an activity having a purpose is the
first and the last word of a genuine theory of interest in education.
..."A reorganization of education so that learning- takes place in
connection with the intelligent carrying forward of purposeful
activities is a slow work. It is a challenge to undertake the task
of reorganization courageously and to keep at it persist en tly.
" 1
In chapter eleven, on Experience and Thinking we have the
theses developed (l) that experience is an active-passive affair, not
primarily cognitive, and(2) that the measure of the value of an
experience lies in the perception of relationships or continuities
to which it leads up. It includes cognition in the degree in
which it is cumulative , or amounts to something , or has meaning.
The college is especially victim of the method of "actor and
1
Dewey, Philosophy of Education, pp. lb8-161. See also p. 378.
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speotator" in its extreme form. Exhortation to "tnink," "appro-
priate knowledge by direct energy Of intellect," is about as far
as collegiate pedagogy has gone with this problem. The results of
misguided effort to divorce the physical quietude of "thinking"
from bodily activity, are more painfully apparent in the lower
school; but it must be in college that the evil results to tl inking
are most acutely due to tne false dualism of mind and body.
The phenomena of "conceptual thinking," the place of "mean-
ing" in the process, the subordination of drill, tne false relations
of things and relations , the separation and isolation of percept-
ions, ideas, and judgments, the misconception of genetic order;
confusion of words and ideas, the mistaking of "pseudo-ideas"
and "half-perceptions" for a vital experience; the heresy that re-
lationships can become perceptible without experience; that "mind"
can grasp if it will" give attention? and that this attention can be
given at will; the ineffectual! ty of theory without experience,
and in fact all the important aspects of the psychology of thinking
are, if not better illustrated in the college, certainly more fatal
in their violation there.
"Reflective experience" may be said to be a consummation the
college exists for - to secure the thinking which is "the in-
tentional endeavor to discover specific connections between some-
thing which we do and the consequences which result, so that the
two become continuous,"
The college has a task worthy of its existence if it may
actually make thinking take the place of routine and caprici ous
behavior.
..."Only gradually and with widening of the area of vision
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through a growth of social sympathies does thinking develop to
include what lies "beyond our direct interests." This is the
mea.ing ol hj pher institutions of learning. 1
What the graduate school tries , at least, to do, in the way
of instituting a chance for individual pro bl em , t he undergraduate
college will have to do as well or better, because thinking is not
thinking except in the pursuit of problem. The uncertainty ,. doubt
,
suspense, inquiry, looking into things, investigating, - the "in-
quiring" which precedes "acquiring," the seeking, quest - in a word
research
,
always "native," "original" with him who genuinely
carries it on, no matter how many others know it already — this is
the proper work of the collegiate student. 1'he "general features
of a reflective experience" are the rules of collegiate procedure.
If not in collegiate thinking, then where shall that con-
summate paradox of thinking be manifest as the experience of more
than just the favored few who do scientific work - the paradox of
impartiality of the thinker, whose identification with his own re-
flection is complete. The proof of the genuineness of his think-
ing finally must be that he can use his preferences to inspire and
motivate his observations and reasoning, yet without allowing them
to modify the "stuff" of them. 1
E own ere better than in studying the college student's function
as an independent thinker could a doctrine of the individuality of
learning be developed. The dynamic character of one's world of
culture revolving on its omi center is especially enforced in
chapter twelve. It is a defect in the teacher to be regarded as
"^ewey, Philosophy o_f aduoati on, pp. 1? 2-5.
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having complete compass of a closed circle of experience. The im-
plied defect in the learner is that he must fail of the kind of
stimulus from the teacher to which he has a right. Without such
studies his learning cannot be dynamic. If the learner aims only
to enlarge his own circle to approach tne (conceived) circle of
perfection of his teacher, the process of his learning is in so far
wrong. It must "be centrilugal on its own center (to risk pushing
the comparison to extreme), seeking tangent to its own circle,work-
ing on eccentric and erratic lines, if necessary to find individual-
ity, which are limes of his own force, at least; breaking through
the circle 01 the teaeher, if its periphery lies across these lines
of force. It mutt be possible (by hypothesis of genuine learning)
to cross in new lines over any boundaries. Boundaries negate the
real teacher-attitude, and dissipate student-force. "The essentials
of method are identical with the essentials of reflection. They are
first that the pupil have a genuine situation of experience — that
there be a continuous activity in which he is interested lor its
own sake; etc." 1 This is the foundation of tne doctrine of 'pro-
ject' we intend to develop.
A pivotal insight in Dewey's Philosophy of Education for the
purposes of collegiate pedagogy is that of tne relation of subject
matter and method. The one thing hitherto negLected has been method:
The one thing upon 7/hich all attention has been focused has been
subject matter. It had to be by way of the reconciliation of
the assumed dualism in their essence that attention could be
drawn effectively to the consideration of method. While method
was considered mere form and subject matter substance, anybody
^•Dewey
,
Phi1 oso phy of Education
.
p. 192. (Chapter SI I. Thinking in
Education.
)
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knew enough about the tendency of modern philosophy to Know which
one to choose so as not to lose intellectual caste. It is not
strange that a philosophy of education is feared when we realize
the residuum of mental content wiich the word "philosophy" carries
for him who knows little more of its history than that it is an
"unreal" "belief which it was once no disgrace for a "scientist" to
hold. 'Vorrn" and "substance," whatever improvement philosophy
may have made for their content as terms, are about as far as we
could get from the respective meanings of method and subject matter.
In fact it seems fair to say, as hinted, that this distinction
has been responsible in a degree for the fear to tackle method.
When method offers itself as merely the way in which subject
matter shapes itself for pedagogical purposes^or better, the way
in which the activity acts, which activity is a necessary part of
the meaning of subject matter, one is driven to quarrel if one
must quarrel, with the c one ept of activity itself rather than with
method. If inclined, still, to convict of the lingering concepts
of an older philosophy, the suggestion of the "actual existence"
of "activity" could set the wheels of thinking as easily as the
puzzles of "form" and "substance."
When method is taken to be the way in which action moves to-
ward results, we have it already understood as orderly, and its
ordinary connotation is rather restored than confused. Its test
will be its effectiveness. Moreover its perfection will be both
the consummation of the teacher's conscious art and the complete
unconsciousness of method as something separate.
We might fairly characterize our crudeness in collegiate
method by noting the fact that, although it is in subject matter

-
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as surely as subject matter is a pedagogical term, we have not
found it there, but are inclined to try to put it in when we "become
oonscious at all that it should be there. It seems too simple to
be called a discovery, but challenges our acceptance as such, that
what we are ire lined to despise as "method" is nothing more nor
less than the degree of actual completeness of our own knowledge of
our science. We do not despise method of ,tl owing, but of teaching.
But we seem to have passed through our own experience of learning,
may we say too successfully unconscious of it? to be able, without
more attention than we are willing to give it, to realize that the
method was there, ihis brings us to the startling confession that
all we have as scholars is due to that margin of good method over
poor by virtue of which we have made the progress we acknowledge.
If the process was uneconomical we have the more to face as teacher's
obligation.
This is but saying, for our purposes as collegiate teachers,
that subject matter and method have been falsely estranged in our
imperfect conception ox them which imperfect conception may, in the
nature of method itself, have made us pay part 01 the price 01 our
own ineptitude in our own learning experience. What pedagogy de-
mands of us, is that at the very least we shall let our teaching
profit by this discovery. The method of our learning was bound up
in the process by which we say we have become possessed of knowledge,
or scholarship, in our science. Like the enterprise said to "have
money in it," because the man confessed "he had put it in," that is
not subject matter which is devoid of method, but subject matter
"with method in it," just because it is in own, knowledge, acquired,
organized, ordered, methodized.

In this problem of collegiate teacldng then we have reached
a dualism Discovered, or created, by that very insight wbicn has dis-
solved the false dualism of subject matter and method. It is the
distinctly different point of view of teacher and learner. We have
seen that, along with help i'or our pedagogical thinking, herbart is
credited with having generated an exaggerated idea of the school-
master's importance. The schoolmaster's serviceability, duly sub-
ordinated to the enterprise of learning, is not conceivably to be
overestimated. But the teac hing function, regarded as not simply
different from, out organically independent of, even superior to,
or prior to, the learning process, got a fatal vogue, which the
collegiate teacher has done much less than the elementary teacher
to analyze and understand, and finally to restate. 'We come honest-
ly enough, historically, by the idea of improving method by im-
proving teaching. It is not so easy to comprehend the fact that
any teaching we do will be by grace of that margin of more or less
accidental success we may have in divining our personally lost art
of learning. What method we possess may be hidden from us while
it functionates in what teaching we do. It does revive itself if
we really teach, for if we really teach we help somebody to learn.
If somebody learns, method functionates in the process. It is the
privilege of the learner that it should be unconsciously implicit
in his learning. It is the pedagogical obligation of the teacher
that he should be richly conscious of what is taking place. If
then his teaching knows learning and its natural way of working,
and fosters the process, he has method. So conceived, what would
be left of that heresy, which drags "pedagogy" into disrepute, that
it is "handing out recipes and models to be followed in teaching."
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A test of a real art is that it dies with its possessor, and must
renew itself in the experience of everyone who becomes an artist.
Most points in the chapter on the nature of method have a
special pertinence to nigher education, in many cases more profound
tnan to elementary education. The consideration 01 method as gen-
eral, as well as individual, lays a platform for the whole con-
sideration of the subject of collegiate learning and teaching as
that in which method is eminently a necessity, ihat each learner
must make his own reaction in any case, in no way relaxes the obli-
gation "both to economize his learning energy to the minimum, and
to base his individual method upon all that has been universalized
as fundamental to it, as well as to furnish for the learner's use
the utmost of what has been universalized as method of such a pro-
cedure as his. This opens the great uncharted domain of collegiate
learning.
But the traits of individual method, the few "attitudes"
which Dewey cites of the many characteristics of good individual
learning method, are the more appropriate to higher education, as
higher education is superior to lower as indivi dual method of learn-
ing. Directness, openmindedness
,
singlemindedness, responsibility,
might well be illuminated and hung before the student's eyes; but
better than that, in fact they must, become understood and assimil-
ated until the learner really is actuated as a matter of course by
methods of learning which stand the test.
It is impossible that method, when duly conceived, should
interfere with initiative and individuality, to the question of
what "general method" must be this chapter makes an enticing chal-
le -1
"f
6
iJewey
.
Phi 1 o s ophy of Education , Chapter XIII. The Mature of method.
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The discussion oi\ subject matter and its nature1 is one of
peculiar importance in the selection oi types oi collegiate in-
stitutions. The conception oi subject matter as social is one of
vital importance to the cultural college. Other types oi college
have freely chosen their subject matter as something which deter-
mined their choice of type. It has been questioned in this paper
whether a social environment is anytMng like so essential a
feature of the collegiate learning itself as a process as it is
held by Dewey to be in the case of elementary learning. But from
the point of view of content, breadth and depth of Knowledge in-
volved, and social value of the problems, it is especially signifi-
cant that a criterion should be applied in the choice of cultural
collegiate material, such a criterion is that of social worth.
This, rather than a social environment in the college itself, is
the social meaning of the college. Its natural problems are those
which deal with human living. These are the essentials, and es-
sentials come first. *'or this collegiate purpose, the problems
of specialized groups and technical pursuits are secorjdary.
The choice should not be one of certain sciences as such so
much as of certain kinds of problems. For teaching purposes,
this reorganization of subject matter must eventually take place.
The organization of subject matter for a cultural purpose is strict
ly the way it shapes itself in good learning, solving bo na lide
(human) problems. The "sciences" represent finally, not even the
solution of teachers' problems, certainly not students' problems,
2
but the solution of the problem of organizing a science.
1 Dewey, Philosophy of aducati on , Chapter XIV.
2But see Dewey, Philosophy; of liducati on , p . 224
«
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Now it is, never ti:eiess , true that this very structure of
"the sciences" is the process that has made learning method. i
(, or
the particular ourposes 01 c on duoting discovery - just what learn-
ing: must he - the relations called "soient ific
,
" as opposed to
those which give the common every day experience of things, are
the signiticant relations, The educational problem seems to be,
now, so far as the college is concerned, to use the methods of
science for the purposes of learning through the real problems of
the learner. This is exactly what technology has done and is
doing, for its purposes. This is the second great lesson for the
cultural college to learn from the technical college. The first
was to take itself seriously and dignify its calling by naming and
justifying its educational purpose. Technology escaped the im-
plications of tradition. Cultural education may escape by learning
the methods of the technical colleges, the methods of science, both
organizing and applied. The technical schools are proof of the
pedagogical meaning of science, "of the primacy of method in the
definition of science." But to apply this principle is for the
college to accept the fact that learning is its business, that
learning is thinking, that thinking is an organizing process
centered upon the intellectual growth of individuals, xhat its
subject matter is individual problem, and that the method of problem
is identical whether here or in what we know better as the proced-
ures of what we call "science."
We have realized that completed science is abstract, aloof,
an imperfect educational instrument, and we have
attained some
success in breaking up its crystallized c ompleteness
for pedagogical
purposes in the lower schools. The need is
rather different than
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less for the student of the college. By default of effort to do
anything for hira hitherto, the collegian's need of teaching is
great. That need will be more difficult to meet just as it nas
been more difficult to discern, and more plausibly minimized. It
will be no easy matter to apply the teachings of these chapters on
method and subject matter to the college, but their pertinence may
be none the less emphatic.
The "correlation of subjects" was perhaps an unconscious
effort to mend the breach caused by trying to teacn separate
sciences to children, who were not at all prepared in their exper-
ience for science in that way. The attempt of culture to express
itself in the form in which science itself developed, i.e., in
subjects of study, isolated as scientific study had left them,
is so deeply seated as to be perhaps the one gravest difficulty
with which method of teaching will ever have to struggle. But to
put it off is to dig the rut of habit deeper. The proposal of
"courses of instruction" or "courses of study," instead of "subjects
of study" shows a glimmer of the solution. The organization of
"units of instruction" may point in the same direction.
The organized subject matter of curriculum gives us, not so
much the fruitage of teac ing experience free to do its own acting
and thinking, but rather the scientific experience of the past,
not worked over at all into untrammeied teacher-wisdom. We await its
pedagogical organization. This will be, not in subjects of study,
but in projects and problems.
Eventually we shall not, as now, so completely assess its
own values to instructional skill as abstracted from the learning
success oi students, as to be able to rate it as not itself com-
-

54-
promised in excellence when learners are failing to learn, students
often rate the attendance upon lectures in a course as so far an
incident as not to pretend to meet the teaching effort put xorth
there. A student reads a newspaper throughout the lectures of a
course, does what he understands as "studying" on it t and weeps il-
logically at the dispensation of fate when he fails to pass the ex-
aminati on.
An immense amount of student-performance is done without
even a definite pretense to oneself as student that such performance
is a part of one's own effort to learn. The complete explanation
has too many facets to be exhibited at once, even if we had enough
wisdom to dare think we knew. Much of this is the most laboriously
and faithfully done of student-work. Fortunately some of this per-
formance will be illuminated by later experience - which is taking
an indefensible pedagogical risk. .Elementary physical laboratory
work, e.g., often is yielding very little learning, tnough it may
involve experience which one's later experience will organize. This
is too muck like the argument that boys should fill themselves with
the language of Cicero, to assimilate their pocket-fulls of verbiage
later when their mental capacity should grow up to the ideas lying
latent. We shall have to take pedagogy more seriously than to
accept such sophistry, or not complain if our problems as teacners
turn out to be chiefly peace-parleys and policing.
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CHAPTER V
THIS INSTITUTION
The philosophy of collegiate education is directly indebted
to Dewey^ for calling attention to the shortcomings of those modern
philosophies of education which have both furnished tne most effect-
ual insights that have prevailed in such pedagogy as we have, and
have, with them, left that pedagogy short, where it followed, in-
stead of doing its own thinking, .vhether collegiate pedagogy has
taken a cue from them or has been unsuspectingly influenced, it
seems to he the college that has most frequently exemplified the
two main defects. It has identified "cultural" with 11 cl assical ,
"
"humanistic" with "linguistic," and kept its future "behind it. It
has not even agitated itself, as the high school has done to shake
off either the false implications of formal discipline or the error
in the Herbart ion correctives. It sees no imperfection in the im-
plication that the mind is formed by the "presentation of the
proper educational materials," that "new presentations are to re-
enforce groupings previously formed," the past being the determinant
of the future, and that "consequently there is a perfectly uniform
method in instruction in all subjects for all pupils of all ages."
Although Herbart did more than one man's share in relieving of a
false psychology and in turning attention to subject matter and
away from faculty-training, collegiate pedagogy holds untested
doctrine from it-knows-not whither. It is the complacent chief
performer in the act of teaching whether there be any le arners or
not. Least anxious to be considered "pedagogues," the collegiate
teachers are the best examples of those who adopt Herbart'
s
^ewey. Philosophy of ^ducati on , Chapter VI. -education as Con-
servative and rrogressive.
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"school-master's point of view," as Dewey calls it, the conception
that the mind consists of what has been taught, and that the im-
portance of what has heen taught consists in its availability for
further teaching - what he calls the pedagogue's view 01 life.
Collegiate pedagogy could not mate a more wholesome resolution than
to study the subordination of teacilng to learning.
The primitively fascinating doctrine of recapitulati on took
a powerful hold on students of pedagogy as they felt the grip of
the doctrine of evolution and caught the vision of"actival homol-
ogies" to add to the biologist's homologies of structure. That
ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny only had to be guessed to be
seized upon as scientific fact.-1- It is in keeping with the con-
servative tendency of higher education, that it should look back-
ward for its cues rather than cultivate the helps to read evolution
forward into progress. It's golden age has always been in the dim
p
past. And yet youth is the race's chance to help the individual
to short cut the long racial processes and the advanced infsncy
of college age is -one precious opportunity of civilization "to
emancipate the young from the need of dwelling in an outgrown past."
The interest the college takes in the historic past is not
even so well supported as the biological idea of recapitulation.
It is not even reading itself "back into evolution, instead of
evolution forward into ourselves." It seems rather a deliberate
choice of a static past ideal instead of a dynamic present. The
aim of education is clearly to facilitate short-circuited growth
according to the principles of conscious modification of evolution
long since pointed out by Wallace, John Fiske, and others. "Utilize
Davidson, P.S. ,The Recapitulation Theory and Human Infancy.
2i;ewey
.
flew Republic
,
July, 1^16.

the products of past history so far as '.hey are ol help 1 or the
futur e. " . . .They are "a part of the presen t environment of in-
dividuals: but there is an enormous di iierence between availing
ourselves of them as present resources and taking them as standards
and patterns in their retrospective character."
Not "unfolding," then, nor "recapitulation" yields a tech-
nical definition oi education, but it is "that reconstruct ion or
reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of exper-
ience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subse-
quent experience." So it would be a mistake to conclude that the
title of this chapter expresses a dualism Dewey has not labored to
dissolve. Not unfoldment nor recapitulation, but reconstruction
is the solvent by which to conserve in order to progress. Primitive
meanings are conserved and meaning increased by experience, and "an
educative experience, one in which instruction is conveyed and
ability increased, is contradistinguished from a routine activity
on the one hand, and a capricious activity on the other." While
Dewey's illustrations are most pointedly connected with the abuses
of the school experiences of children, his characterization of
capricious action has volumes of significance for collegiate
criticism. "Individuals act capriciously whenver they act under
external dictation or from being told, without having a purpose of
their own or seeing the bearing of the deed upon other acts." Now
"there is a tendency to seek the cause of such aimless activities
in the youth's own disposition isolated from everything else. But
in fact such activity is explosive and due to maladjustment in
surroundings." If we are looking for the defects in the college
chiefly in the perversity of human nature, we need to throw our
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emphasis sharply over on the side of the question as to whether the
institution has so perfected itself as to be the immaculate accuser.
Human nature is neither good nor blamable from a pedagogical point
of view, but is what pedagogy has to deal with. Like instincts,
which are neither food nor bad, it is tne matrix in which worthy
results are to be formed.
Who can foresee how completely the ineptitudes of capricious
action will dissolve themselves when the college shall become the
place of skilTful adaptation of tne maladjusted surroundings to
the one purpose for which it primarily exists? The obligation of
the college is peculiar and much greater, in its way, than that of
the lower school; not simply to suggest and put learning before
students as a thing worth while if they can make themselves believe
it, but to frame an environment which includes teachers eager to
be subordinated to the success in learning of individual students.
Students are net now generously devoted to the task of reorganizing
and reconstructing their experience*
There is still room for interpretation of the demand expressed
for education by Lester F, Ward,l that diffusi on of intelligence
should occupy a prominent place until humanity was decently possessed
of the practical benefits of that science which has been attained
by the few. His expression of this demand is clearly in the in-
terest of diffusing among the masses such an increase of the knowledge
available as to raise the level of existence for the whole mass of
humanity. Different degrees of this demand are expressed in differ-
ent grades of schooling, and in many types of increased community-
Hlard, tester ff.
,
Dynamic Sociology , Vol,II ,p,541.
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use of educational facilities as v»rell by adults as by -ch ildren, also
by improvement of social and hygienic conditions in the community.
It is represented remarkably in the enormous increase of use of
high school privilege and by the increasing generosity of types
of high school service. It is specifically and multifariously find-
ing expression in some degree in all forms of education not charac-
terized as professional or research. These latter forms represent
that extension of the boundaries of science in which the universit-
ies are engaged. More and more the energies of the universities
are absorbed, and properly so, in research or vocational training.
It is no derogation of the educative character of the universities'
work to pronounce an increasing failure to fulfil another function
which still too largely depends, nevertheless, upon the universit-
ies.
The function which increasingly goes by defau.lt is one im-
plied as correlate of the demand ior diffusion of intelligence. It
is the specific duty to avail humanity of that finer culture which
is the most natural fruitage to be expected of flourishing science.
It will take conscious effort in a pragmatic age, and it will take
a rare kind of professional devotion to compass this supreme con-
tribution of science to the nobler uses of humanity; but there could
be no more plausible function for a separate educational institution
than to be completely absorbed in the task of devoting science to
the education which, as such, should be the highest education we
know. This demand has that definiteness, even that specialization,
which is the characteristic demand of the times. It is logical
part-and-parcel with the demand of democracy for complete opportunity
for the individual. Indeed democracy's keenest need of constructive
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defense is against that criticism too likely to be justified that
democracy tends toward the increase of mediocrity. The completest
possible diffusion of intelligence implies no such tidng, but the
tendency cultivates itself without help. It can only be met by a
determined effort to avail humanity of all that humanity is willing
to receive. If this issue has any such definition as it seems to
show, it is eminently worthy of institutional effort. The round of
educational institutions is not complete until a "cultural college"
is nabilitated upon the issue of giving the best instruction that
can be had to those who choose themselves for this specialization
by those very processes of proving worthiness and capacity which
prevail in all other respectable fields of endeavor, it must be
true that part of what now prevents enthusiastic willingness of
teachers to train themselves ior collegiate service is in the fact
that collegiate education exacts nothing but mediocrity in prepar-
ation of its students and promises notdng but a byproduct in its
training. If worth doing at all collegiate work is worth doing
well enough to justify a worthy educational institutional character
of its own. Unless it intends this and in a measure attains it,
collegiate education may be as little able to make a place ior it-
self as it now seems failing to do. Its pedagogy cannot possibly
thrive while it has no clearer definition than, as now, to differ-
entiate no whit the pedagogy of specialized research and the peda-
gogy of professional training from the pedagogy of a sound liberal
culture.
We are not so ill instructed as to the meaning of this
culture we crave, as to let it mean a selfish discounting of racial
demands. There is no essential difference between the demand for
:
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this specialization of individuals in the interest of the progress
of the race and any other worthy choice of individual function and
improvement for it. These are not indivi duals being picked and dis-
carded to polite uselessness. That is hut to disallow tne conditions
in the premises. They are not the persons who choose a period of
intensive self-cultivation in lieu of preparation for active life
and service, but in add it ion to their professional preparation. This
is their prime credential, that they are worthy of, and choose,
that cultivation of themselves which is possible only to persons of
ability and patience, and persons who because of these qualities
and their cultivation shall render such service as may not be
offered by him who neither wants nor can profit by such devoted study.
Adolescence wants extension ; the period of educability is
too certainly curtailed by those very types of training which most
effectively polish off the skill of an early craft or a pseudo-
proiession. Precocity of training is as truly a cultural, as a
physiological, shortening up of tne life of the individual. We
lament the frivolity of the non-professional student, and crave for
him the steadying influence of his more serious training in the pro-
fessional school; but that is a question of two sides. We have not
yet fully tried out the proposal that a like demand 01 serious at-
tainment, similarly motivated, might be a fair test of his worthiness
to be carried over to the professional school. It cannot be none
by fiat, of course, but we are nominally, at least, extending for
him in his undergraduate days the period of his changeability, his
mental growth. That part of his experience which is the ground where
reason may ripen up the man. If, being devoted to his "education,
"
it is not used, it is much worse than wasted time. It is -Dime in

wiiioh the fibre of his charfcicter has been loosened by the persistence
of disintegrating habits. He has not simply waited, simply lost time,
Education, in its period of plastic experience im ows no such alter-
native. It is not so certain, nowever, that the man hiraseli has
lost irretrievably by the cultivation of lax habits in a critical
period, as that by nis trilling, the name of collegiate education
has been damaged, and the community itself has lost heart, and
weakened the faith it thought it had in its cherished higher educa-
tion. This is a consummation devoutly to be dreaded, ana, if
possible, prevented.
We hope now to be completely satisfied with the community's
ambitious eff orts to bring the public schools up abreast of the ever-
increasing demand for more good citizens to live the life that
practical science has made possible. This ambition does not quarrel
with, but emphatically argues, its sequel. Not only are there al-
ways too few people trained to live the life which science has made
possible, but too few by far are ever being prepared to hold the
ideals of 1 ivi ng which only an improved higher education can make
possible. Only the greatly improved lower schools which we peren-
nially crave and are always improving, can secure the prime desid-
erandum ; but it is equally, and more fatally, true that the seed of
a better generation is directly sacrificed to fill the unfertilized
kernels of the current crop, if we are in any degree satisfied simply
to "live up to our times." The lower school does completer justice
to the"average man," but there can be no improvement of xr& t yp
e
of intellectual justice humanity shall try to do itself, without
that seminary of ideals in which the stock itself must be improved.
Hot completer, but a higher type of justice is done the average man
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by society's furnis.lng him, not simply the essentials of modern
existence, but a chance to choose from a maximal numoer of possible
specialisms. That round of choices is by no means complete unless
the institutional opportunity is open to make his own personal
culture as serious an object of pursuit as is that of any other
calling or training that invites. There will always be a lively
demand for persons prepared to hold the ideals materially made poss-
ible by general education.
A fallacy easily creeps in to vitiate this suggestion that a
liberal, cultural, pursuit is a legitimate educational choice. Its
correction is in the text of Dewey's discussion of "Labor and
Leisure," and of "Intellectual and Practical Studies." Purify the
terms liberal and cultural of the false suppositions of their history,
and no incompatibility is left between the finest idea of democracy
that can be conceived and tne idea of choice; and among choices
that of tne cultural pursuit by him who is able to engage in it is
as necessary as any other choice that can be conceived. To engage
in a rational contemplation of all that humanity can conceive of,
as "equality," but strengthens the assurance that choices are an
essential, and that what we are to expect of humanity must be expect-
ed to come through those diversifications of function which involve
choices based upon personal likes and individual capacities by what-
ever means determined.
Any school is a place of selected activities. Ideally these
are not isolated from their ordinary practical setting and function.
The college is a place of more highly selected activities for more
highly specialized purposes. To suppose that such selection and
use implies estrangement from their actual meaning is not to condemn

the idea of the college, but simply to suppose incapacity to ad-
minister its activities successfully to adapt them to the ideals
acknowledged. Intellectual studies exist in isolation only when
one insists upon an estrangement from the practical which sound
pedagogy nowhere inculcates. It seems to be only in nistorical
exemplifications of imperfect ed practice that we lind objectionable
features in "cultural" education. Education must be partly dead
at the top until it can heartily devote a part of its effort to
breeding intelligent practitioners of its own and civilization's
best ideals. How well are we prepared for the doctrines of DeweyY
Is it a matter for gratuiation or regret that few will be found in-
terested in tne problems of education he discloses and fewer will be
found able to press them to solution?
It is of especial moment to the college that the dissolution
of the dualism between subject matter and method, treated by newey
in chapters twelve, thirteen ,and fourteen, on the nature of method
as thinking and its relation to subject matter, and more fully ac-
counted for historically in chapter twenty-one, should be taken
to heart in establishing collegiate principles. It is especially in
collegiate education that the historical influences upon method
still pronounce themselves. Secondary education has the keenest
struggle with the language tradition, because its excesses are there
less relieved by that strictly liberal purpose we are arguing for
the college, and because the language obligation falls more heavily
in tne period when training in language for those who are to need it
should come. The secondary school is seeing some relief from two or
three sources (1) the differentiation of curriculums which leaves
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much unnecessary language- study out of the curriculurns o± many,
(2) the offering of foreign language still lower in the schools and
(3) the accompanying improvement in the naturalness of the teaching,
easing the task and arguing its earlier introduction. These all
tend to liberalize the teaching of literatures in the high school,
freeing it from the routine of linguistic drill, and still more,
tend to free the college. But the real relief may come only after
the tenaceous practice of partial methods gives way to a more
catholic doctrine of method. An early stage of pedagogical con-
sciousness makes method-consciousness a new menace, replacing the
laissez faire of tradition. A method becomes for its partisans
the method, and, applied too exclusively in one subject, even over
enthusiastically applied where it is less appropriate in. many other
subjects - method becomes an end in itself exalted above the in-
strumentality it should serve. So has foreign language teaching
had one emphasis after another, each western country looking back-
ward, as each period looks backward, to a foreign and earlier cul-
ture, borne by a foreign and earlier perfected language. Behind
lies the culture which must be had and languge is its vehicle,
bcholastic method ensues upon the necessity to transmit the author-
ity which lies in foreign antiquity. But scholastic method per-
fects itself for other purposes than linguistic instruction, and
teaching takes on the permanent habit of transmitting the ipse dixit
of other authority than literary and theological, until we take a
self-conscious look at our practices, and find, as Dewey shows, that
even the teacrlng of science itself, both confuses itself by accept-
ing a separation of itself from "humanities," and at the same time,
accepting the methods that have prevailed, enforces them where least
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appropriate. Hyperconscious of a distinction shown not to be
vital, that "between nature and man, science eschewed tne methods
of authority ior its dootrines and attitude, but preserved and pro-
pagated the age- during scholastic methods in its teac j.ing
. hence
it is not extreme to find that the college is heir to an improved
subject matter, an improved attitude toward autnority and nature
in its research, and an improved method of "inquiry, discovery
and invention" in its own work, to displace there the "defining,
expounding, interpreting" method of scholastic science facing
backward; while in the methods of its teaching it has, more con-
servatively, retained these modes of authority. In short we are
eagerly turning to "contemporary nature and soceity" for subject
matter, but are too largely still in the unreflective age of either
using good methods in wrong places or using method for our teacning
which we have discarded in our own thinking, ihere is a suggestion,
too, that if carefully chosen, where authority is really in place,
we might at least profit by the accuracy and thoroughness of the
scholastic method; that irrational reaction against it will be
unprofitable because unreflective. <»e become convinced that science
teaching is being slighted by tne researcher, and even turn to tne
fatal opposite extreme of entrusting its teaching to those who are
not scientists.
Then, finally, if not exhaustively, the college is bound to
remain, while the influence lasts, the chief sufferer from the
special pleading of the propagandist. It can not soon live down
the indefensible doctrine 01 devoting educational institutions to
the purposes of narrow special interests like those in which
theology has prevailed to cloud the liberality of genuine higher

67-
education. The university itself has either outgrown such narrow-
ing tendencies or never suifered, because 01 the presumptions of
freedom in its European examplas. The college has had salutary
tradition transmitted to it "by its close connection with tne uni-
versity. But it may not for this reason he necessary to keep tne
college con, ected with the university. It is true that the high
school has also profited "by a similar immunity through its complete
connection with a jealously guarded public school, and the logic
of events will soon make the high schools into colleges where local
resources permit. Such high school-colleges will, again, embrace
an increasing number of types of curriculum as resources permit
and will undoubtedly assimilate each in a measure to tne high
school as we know it. That public interest will prevail to make
it liberal as well as vocational may be taken for granted from the
past history of the nigh school. That it will, for some time to
come, divide what is now called collegiate work with the university,
is evidence enough, perhaps, that such special efforts may be need-
ed to try out the types of curriculum as that which is advocated
here in the case of the "cultural type," It would be no ultimate
relinquishment of tne need of such exemplification to grant that
such a college is essentially "secondary" in its character, that
its term might be shortened even in the interest of its own pur-
poses; or that it would be in keeping with the interests of the
graduate and professional schools that it should share with them
the earlier stages of professional work. Liberal-minded persons
with a respectable amount of training for tneir work are increas-
ingly demanded for the lower schools. The doctrine of excellent
preparation for high school teachers prevails, with standards of
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requirement advancing, ihe college is tJie institution that has the
good iortune to get pretty well educated persons in its teaching
staff as a matter of course; but though representing the most hope-
ful place for effective teaching, it stands nevertheless committed
to no aggressive policy for their training.
if the question should he raised why collegiate teaching
should not be sufficiently improved hy supervision and otherwise
in tiie collegiate courses in universities as they are, the case of
college teaching seems to exhibit some new phases not yet similarly
evinced by normal school teaching, it is not a mere guess that
college-universi ty teachers as now employed would stoutly resist
that kind of an effort to improve their teaching. It seems more
than doubtful whether the introduction of university supervisory
officers, even of the greatest tact, could install the presumptions
of their welcome authority to improve collegiate teaching. If it
is the work of spiritless persons who will only improve if "made
to," or of spirited persons who cannot be made to welcome the new
venture, the road to genuine success is in either case too far ab-
stracted to be a promising route toward a consummation which must
be voluntary.
This is the one most important reason for experimenting with
improved collegiate teaching in a separate college organized de novo
with separateness as a conditio.
,
sine qua non. Clearly, it must
not be a case of introducing an officer who has the spirit of a
spy upon poor service and an authority to improve it or dismiss
the teacher. Some things can be done in that way, but not collegiate
teaching. The enterprise is worthy, moreover, of a finer type of
experiment. The voluntary acceptance of the contract offered by a
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college that proposed a cooperative study by its staff of the utmost
possibilities of sane pedagogical experiment would oonfitituta the
only conceivable working force of such an experiment. This alone
is reason enough why the problem of collegiate teaching muBt be
studied under peculiar conditions, and why the collegiate problem
demands the organization of a separate college. C^-vm).
The firmest ground for Dewey's enlargement of the claims of
the social is secured by an adequate appreciation of the ways,
nevertheless, in which the real expansion is made by the individual.
The social whole has no meaning worth trying to understand except
in terms of attainment which must be expressed by the individual.
Movements in the history of thought are skillfully traced to show
oscillation from theory of world-mind to extreme philosophic sub-
jectivism, resting finally in the fact that individual mind must
be the agency of that significant reorganization of the known, and
expansion of its borders called thinking. The static Platonic
division of labor which left all thinking to chosen philosophers
made even their function less characteristically expansive than
conservative of such wisdom as was conceived of as worked out and
applicable without prospect of continued disturbance. But the
"philosophic subjectivism" of a late stage "misconceived the sig-
nificance of the practical movement." Hot freedom from nature and
one another but freedom in nature and society expresses the imper-
fection of a "thinking" conceived of as estranged from doing. Ho
other conception of the individual frees from dogma and authority.
Men have always pursued sound inductive and experimental methods in
some of their thinking, but not always in such a way as to prevent
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the ratal separation of those practical arts where they did real
thinking from their philosophies where they preserved the tenaceous
errors of past "thinking, M isolated to protect them, doubtless from
an instinctive feeling that their exposure to "modern methods"
would dissipate their authority. Krratic individuals might not "be
allowed to move with freedom upon the borders of the known, because
the known was not conceived of as itself organic, able to engage
in assimilative exchange, as it v/ere, with the environing unimown.
Yet we have no other way in which to conceive of a freer action at
this forbidden zone than in terms of what we call individual free
thinking.
In spite of all that must be acknowledged of the reciprocal
and even identifying conceptions of society and the individual,
one more dualism not only remains undissolved, but gets its meaning
in the terms of this very process of individual activity on the
orders of the old "known." It is that between t linking itself as
a "subjective" fact and knowledge as its "objective and impersonal"
product. Knowledge, though in its essence changeable, else think-
ing could have no meaning, is
.
nevertheless the "context" of think-
ing. It is not conceived of as having an unchanging nucleus, ac-
commodating itself like a snowball by agglutination as the surface,
but changes at its core as individual thinking activity compels. In
the days of its being guarded by the jealous conservatism of author-
ity, upheavals shook and loosened it to the core, while the genius
who discovered suffered the displeasure of its guardians. Genius
is not made by the schools, and even higher educational institutions
may not be expected to refrain suddenly from an anbition to foster
mediocrity, but schools and colleges are puny aids to such movements
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as have shaken the world. A matter of present interest is that the
process is now so facile that cataclysm is not necessary; genius
will spring up as always, but the process of enlarging the borders
over against the house of every man, as it were, becomes a possibil-
ity depending upon a fostering of the free spirit of such chosen
sons as will specialize for the function of productive thinking. If
thinking is an active doing on the borders of the known, it is not
so much in our times a doing "by the genius, who will do without
schooling if necessary, but it is an even, disseminated, balanced,
doing-thinking which works with steady certainty over the whole
surface of the mass. Not a few geniuses - they will appear without
special organized effort on society's part - but our present time
seems peculiarly to demand more individuals who doubt without dis-
aster, who through an atmosphere of wholesome, forward-looking un-
certainty, are by their training prepared to be the "hunters, in-
quirers, searchers," dispossessed of the uncritical complacency
of completed mastery and possession, capable of the critical activ-
ity by which knowledge is revised and extended and convictions set
forward to correspond with reorganized imowledge.
The figure of the mass and its change is not to be
mistaken here as being altered because new thinking is no longer
by convulsion. The self-active individual doer-thinker is not fac-
ing outward, oblivious of what is behind him. The mass of the
known is not more separated from the active zone of the current
thinking, because the whole mass is no longer disrupted with
violence. A most characteristic demand upon that kind of thinker,
which the collegiate education must produce is tne demand upon
him for historical perspective. How else are we relieved of the
_
,
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necessity for volcanic thinking, than "by the fact that v/o rid- think-
ing has itself both moderated its contradictory extremes, and
leveled itself into a perspective which requires, nevertheless,
a mental compass in the individual thinker immeasur ably greater
than before? Time was when humanity inculcated its narrow round
of domestic life and tribal custom even without the specialized
mechanism of the lower school. Tne time has passed when even the
man of more than ordinary ability can assemble the apparatus and
materials for genuine thinking without the definite aid of the
schooling whose real business shall be with productive thinking. Ee
may not be a contributor without society's help to lay hold of
the organized ,:nown.
The whole attitude of society is no?/ too well instructed,
too congenial to the expectation of new ideas, to leave a possibil-
ity of the convulsions that broke the crust of an earlier stage
of world-thinking: but this in no wise increases the possibility
that thinking will do itself or that society will do it. If we
were not already aware of it, Dewey has made it very plain that in -
dividuals must as surely still be depended upon to bring forward
the new idea, as that the new idea as surely springs forth from the
old, and does not arise unaccountably in place of the old. It
would be easy to be unsoundly extreme in stating the proposal for a
college which is, indeed, invoked because there seems need of the
innovation it proposes . It may be merely ninted here, what will
demand fuller treatment elsewhere, that although the identity of
subject matter and method must be accomplished in the interest
of both, it still remains true that the conservative element is what
we call subject matter while the dynamic element is method. Subject

75-
matter remains as a tangible product o±' thinking done, though as
such we call it the known, the cumulus of process, "knowledge"
rather than subject matter, which term we use oi" it while it is
coupled in the learning process with thinking; calling it knowledge
to denote the passage of action on beyond it. Yet it is not so
much a change in subject matter, nor even in its ultimate organ-
ization, which will characterize pedagogical process as a change
in method where change is in the nature of the case implied. It
will be proposed that subject matter oi instruction in any school
is bound to be sciences as we have them, both fjor intrinsic and
for practical reasons. Intrinsically because science is the pro-
duct of thinking done and, such as it is, is what we have always to
work with and forward from; practically, for the college's sake,
at least for the present, because the sciences must be taught by
persons trained in them and not by amateurs. But method may itself
be but another name for our appreciation of the pedagogical possibil
ities of sciences (I use the word sciences for "subjects of study"
as we know them, as remonstrance against the supposition that only
certain subjects of study are really "sciences," hence really
legitimate objects of study ). It is in met nod, then, that con-
structive attempt is to be made.
It will be a matter of some interest as we proceed to see
whether the college shall prove to have a different relation to
specialism from that borne by the professional school, where the
speciality comes finally to be a specialized performance based upon
previous study of specialized knowledge, both of which types may
in their turn or simultaneously afford themselves as assets of pro-
fessional pedagogy. If specialization is an essential of the in-
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dividual's education, it will be a matter of much moment to be
assured of the form it may take in collegiate education. It may
prove to test severely the adaptability of him who too easily as-
sumes that his specialty as teacher or even his specialty as a
learner may serve linally without modification to serve him in the
teaching also. It will prove a severe test of such complacency to
have it proposed that the type of specialism which is to serve
another learner must, in its turn, he that learner's specialty. In
short, to forecast the ultimate demand for integration of colleg-
iate teaching in terms of the individual and his requirements,
no other case of integration need he expected than the individual
learner himself in some form or other. Adopted, even arbitrarily,
as hypothesis of integration, the doctrine 01 individual student as
center of collegiate pedagogy appeals with great plausibility.
Much of Dewey's argument in chapter twenty-two is to assure
the complete reciprocation of individuality and sociality as
necessary to each other in conceiving the nature of the elementary
school. Much that is needed here is granted for the college with-
out argument, yet much of it is accepted philosophy instead of
actual practice. It is even humiliating to admit that certain
truistic phases of his doctrine discover abuse of fundamentals in
college much more inexcusable than in lower schools. "Freedom
means essentially the part played by thinking - which is personal
-
in learning: - it means intellectual initiative, independence in
observation, judicious invention, foresight of consequences, and
in genuity of adaptation to them." How much freedom is the college
capable of? How much does it nave? To what extent does the idea of
freedom come in off from the playground and functionate where free-
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dom is really pertinent to the acknowledged purposes oi" college?
"Individuality as a lactor to be respected in education haB a
double meaning. In the first place one is mentally an individual
only as he has his own purpose and problem and does his own think-
ing. The phrase 'think for one's sell"' is a pleonasm. Unless one
does it for one's self, it isn't thinking. Only by a pupil's own
observations, reflections, framing and testing of suggestions can
what he already knows be amplified and rectified. Thinking is as
much an individual matter as is the digestion of food." We all
know how little originality is cultivated; we are even aware of
the sophistry by which the desirability of originality is dis-
allowed. We are not always so clearly aware that the impossibility
of 'originality of product' by no means implies lack of 'originality
of attitude'. My discovery of an old truth need be no less mine
because the means at my disposal are immeasurably greater than
those of the original discoverer. And yet often 'heuristic method'
means the farce of forcing through the outgrown steps of procedure,
instead of securing the priceless attitude of inquiry which sub-
ordinates details of procedure. The method of the original dis-
coverer may also profitably become my problem, but it may have no
rational pertinence as my_ method of copying his solution.
At the center of the wnole problem of pedagogy is a statement
made in this connection. "In the normal process of becoming ac-
quainted with subject matter already known to others, even young
pupils react in unexpected ways. There is something fresh, some-
thing not capable of "being fully anticipated by even the most
experienced teacher, in the ways they go at the topic and in the
particular ways in which things strike them. Too often all this
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is brushed aside as irrelevant: pupils are deliberately hold to
rehearsing material in the exact form in which the older person
conceived it. The result is that what is instinctively original
in individuality, that which marks off one from another, goes un-
used and undirected. Teaching then ceases to be an educative pro-
cess for the teacner. At most he learns simply to improve his ex-
isting technique; he does not yet need points of view: he fails
to experience any intellectual companionship." This seems to
point to what might be called the first law of economy of pedagogy.
Is it soundly observed in collegiate practice? Following this
is the paragraph in .Dewey's ohilosophy which l have already re-
ferred to as the genetic charter of collegiate institution. It
must be borne in mind that we are seeking to state the application
to collegiate education of the doctrines Dewey applies in ele-
mentary schooling. The insepar ableness of initiative doing from
initiative thinking has been his theme.
"As maturity increases and as the student has a greater back-
ground of familiarity upon which a new topic is projected the
scope of more or less random physical experimentation is reduced.
Activity is defined or specialized in certain channels. To the
eyes of others, the student may be in a position of complete physi-
cal quietude, because his energies are confined to nerve channels
and to the connected apparatus of the eyes and vocal organs. But
because this attitude is evidence of intense mental concentration
on the part of the trained person, it does not follow tlhat it
should be set up as a model for students who still have to find
their intellectual way about. And even with the adult it does not
cover the whole circuit of mental energy. It marks an intermediate
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period, capable of bei. -ig lengthened with increased mastery of a
subject, but always caning between an earlier period 01 more general
and conspicuous organic action and a later time of putting to
use what has been apprenended.
"Where, however , education takes cognizance 01 the union of
mind and body in acquiring Knowledge, we are not obliged to insist
upon the need of obvious, or external freedom. It is enough to
identify the freedom which is involved in teaching and studying with
the thinking by which what a person already knows and believes is
enlarged and refined. If attention is centered upon the con-
ditions that have to be met in order to secure a situation iavor-
able to effective thinking, freedom will take care 01 itself. The
individual who has a question which being really a question to
him instigates his curiosity, which feeds his eagerness for inform-
ation that will help him cope with it, and who has at hand an
equipment which will permit these interests to take effect, is
intellectually free. Whatever initiative and imaginative vision
he possesses will be called into play and control his impulses and
habits. His own purposes will direct his actions. Otherwise his
seeming attention, his docility, his memorizings and reproductions
will partake of intellectual servility...."
If one of these paragraphs is the charter of collegiate edu-
cation, the other, on this assumption, serves a purpose of ours,
to indicate the basis of choice of collegians, even better than
the author's purpose, which is to indicate how essential is such
intellectual freedom to democratic society. The college we con-
ceive is an essential epitome of democratic society evincing its
finest ideals. In so far our purposes are identical; but in so far
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as tiie "charter paragraph" contemplates an actual institution cul-
tivating the condit ions under which this "intermediate stage" of
thinking may be lostered, it demands a severe selection of its can-
didates. Its use as a sifting organ agrees with what we nave said
of
oeiore/the nature of preparation. A necessary implication of col-
legiate life and work must be freedom. It can scarcely be in the
nature of its charter business that the college should both do its
actual work and engage de novo in preparing persons to practice tne
freedom its work necessitates. No more fatal delusion prevails
in collegiate practice than that which either expects a cursory
test of more or less irrelevance to establish fitness for freedom,
or, with greater inconsequence, expects the college life itself
to test that fitness. This one preposterous uneconomy, if not the
result of too faithful patching up of old futilities would be
chargeable with insincerity. It may not be mended until the "rules
of admission" have some actual policy in the college by which to
correct themselves. If secondary schools knew what timber colleges
must have, they could at least select if not prepare it, and if
they could select it tne colleges could even better afford to do
part of the preparing 01 selected timber than waste good energy
in testing and discarding timber which would never have been
offered, ii the college's demands had been rational and clearly
understood. The college can only succeed with persons who are able
to live in the "intermediate stage." From the very fact that the
secondary school itself forms part of that intermediate stage there
is no excuse ior passing on to a real college more than the mis-
taken fraction of one percent of those whose destiny is to slight
the self-directive requirements of the intermediate stage.
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If Dewey's philosophy of the individual has iorce in those
stages of his development in which the immediate tribal claims are
strong and unmediated, by every token of its claim, its applicability
to the stage where the efficacy of individual thinking is tne price
of the race's progress, is immeasurable.
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PART II
PROJECT AS METHOD OF COLLEGIATE LEARNING
CHAPTER VI
INDIVIDUAL PROJECT: THE METHOD OF THE COLLEGIATE STUDENT 1 S WORK
Although we use the word 'project 1 for a concept which it will
require our treatment to define, there is, nevertheless, the more
reason for a tentative definition at the outset as hypotnesis. We
expect project to he that sort of active effort to learn which ful-
fils the conditions of problem.
The use we shall make of the term project serves to distinguish
a type. It will iigure in our final proposal for the integration of
the particular type 01 college we have in mind, and will recur in
our treatment 01 the educative coherency of project (p.iifc). It is
necessary here to distinguish three types of project. In the high
school, and characteristic of the lower school throughout, should
be placed the social project. The high school where the extreme
egoism of onildhood, and even the predatory associations of tne
gang instinct are being supplanted by the appearnace of the genuinely
social, altruistic, humane, instincts of adolescence, the social
project is now finding a diversity of application. Some of the most
telling suggestions for improvement of secondary pedagogy are found
1
in what is called the socialized class exercise . There is no oc-
casion for ruling out the principles which here improve high school
practice from acceptance as equally promising suggestions for col-
legiate practice. Nor, is there anything in the individual project
to be proposed here for collegiate use which makes it ioreign to
1See Johnston, and Others. The Modern high School , Chapter IX.
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the best purposes of the high school. The disti.iction is ratner
in the imperativeness of the demand that the college shall attend to
a need to whioh the individual project is believed to maice direct
answer.
A distinction of real educative vitality, however, has to he
made between even the initial motives of project in the junior and
senior colleges respectively. A distinction and an identity must
be noted. The project of the university student is, if possible,
even more emphatically individual than the project here to be treat-
ed as collegiate. It is so characteristically individual that it
eventually may entirely supplant work in course, and become the
sole occupation of the student. In this respect it marks the limit
01 the tendency toward individualization of study as one progresses
into one's highest and best student-work. Every best feature of
such senior collegiate student's worx may remain exemplary for
the collegiate student without interfering with the important
distinction in purpose which has to be made. The university in-
dividual project is by definition, sp ecialized research. As such
it is not essentially an educative enterprise, though if it fail to
be educative for tne individual, it will be by inexcusable default
of a golden opportunity to have the very best of educative experienc-
es. On tne side of the results immediately aimed at, it must
reflect training before it can exhibit it, for it ratner requires
training than promises it. As it tends toward the limit of its
ideal of specialization, it may recede from tne obligation to ex-
pand the cultural outlook of tne researcher who pursues the narrowed
problem. The cultural result will come, as all cultural result
comes, by virtue of the teacher's capacity to restrain from the

tendency a problem often has to exact a clerical rather than a
cultural experience. This is no derogation of tne type, but marks
a distinction which must characterize the third type of project.
At large throughout this paper the tneme of our treatment is
intended to characterize the method of the student of the junior
college as tne method of individual project. The single sufficient
differentia to insist upon in any effort at definition is that such
project has one supreme purpose, the cultivati on ox the individual.
It is desirable that our present treatment shall be in all
respects regarded as fundamental though it takes an executive at-
titude toward project, which involves the statement 01 some pre-
cepts. But the rules ior effective studying, xor an example of
application, so far as they are rules for right thinking, are rules
under tne nead of 'project'; and it is the aim of the present study
to avoid, if possible, confusion 01 its corollaries with the main
proposition. If our statement of project as the way problem is
worked out is right, it cannot fail to take account in general, of
such rules for study, or research, or experiment, as are dependent
upon the laws oi thinking. Where 'project' does not apply, it
quarrels with no other mode.
Similarly if a question were raised as to whether we had done
violence to the issue of university research in setting off so em-
phatically the collegiate function, it ought to be noticed that
solicitude is sometimes expressed lest research itself may languish
in this country for the want of trained researchers. There is even
room for the criticism that this most important function of pure
research sometimes recruits, rather than trains, its performers;
while there is at best the collegiate training we criticize as the
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recruiting ground. A favorite criticism of collegiate procedure,
such as we nere distinctly participate in, is tne criticism tnat it
too definitely shapes its scientific training to the supposed tech-
nical needs of future researcners. If this were duly successful
in its preparatory purpose the strictures would "be unnecessary.
But the trouble lies in the fact that, with an eye too singly upon
the end, tne means have "been regulated hy no adaptation oi pedagogi-
cal means to that end. Whether we shall train , as well as recruit ,
researcners, depends upon whether we shall apply principles of
pedagogy applicable to real collegiate needs.
We propose, then, to appeal to psychology, not for a complete
exposition oi thinking, hut lor such aspects of that problem as
a Whole as throw light upon ours — the psychology of tniiiking as
represented in problem and project, with especial empnasis upon
the executive aspects oi the collegiate student's thinking. The
active character of problem, as it begins at once to reveal itself,
both justifies this study oi the executive in general, and, in
particular, carries an injunction in the very meaning 02 the word
'problem 1 . The necessity for persistence and continuity raises
at once the practical question, how can tne psychology of tninking
exhibit the essential means oi sticking to tne purpose which starts
the tninking? This is clearly tne main issue. It presents the
usual three-fold aspects of psychological questions. Studies in
the psychology of thinking have already collected and expounded
such resources of tne pedagogist. They furnish a terminology and
almost a technique. If 'project' proves to be an inadequate ex-
pression of their implications of collegiate nedagogy, it
is only
tne pedagogist' s fault. But the application to our purposes
is the
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statement of the psychology of problem in terms ol the pedugogy
of project. This, when fully applied, as it is not necessary lor
our purposes to do, would sift the materials the student uses as to
their susceptibility to pedago; ical treatment, would regulate the
way he uses such materials, especially the way in which he faces
them at the outset, and in the third place, would canvass the dis-
tribution 01 materials.
There are clearly, however, the three ways in which psychol-
ogy must show how to hold to the issues of a problem until it is
solved. There are consequently the three headings under which the
terms in which it expounds the persistence and solution of problem
may be made to classify the precepts of project. The intellectual,
the affective and the more strictly executive, may be stated in
terms of 'context', 'cycle' and 'activity attitude 1 . As the psy-
chologist himself puts our problem when it is stated to him in
pedagogical terms, it is a problem involving three psychological
aspects, (1) that of 'cortical set', (£) of ' determining tendencies'
,
(at
and (3) of 'associative tendencies'. If these terms are made ob-
jectively intelligible, they will cover our case.
The comparison here insisted upon between collegiate and
university modes of procedure demands a moment's consideration
oi the terms 'specialization' and 'research', often uttered as
synonymous. When we warn against premature specialization we seem
often to be setting like restrictions upon "the method of research."
If our philosophy is half-right, there is no other method oi think-
ing, hence no field where 'research' is not a name for at least
the fact-gathering aspect of thinking activity. There is a wi de-
spread conviction among those who are solicitous for the college's
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fiuture xhat this false distinction has "been overdrawn, to the detri-
ment oi tj:e undergraduate. With specialization iorbidden, serious
research seems therefore to have to be deferred. A thoughtful
assumption of the college's obligation to cultivate research as its
vital method is beginning to be made. Research, as a collegiate
method 1 can scarcely be saved from diffuseness unless made coherent
by some principle applicable on the side of student- at tack. Research
was the method by which the te-.cner gathered Ms materials of in-
struction, but it has nothing immediately to do with a didactic task.
The student will be a researcher as surely as he is 'student',, that
is, something more than a note-taking auditor in a diaactic perform-
ance.
It is worth noting that the collegiate teacher's research
in preparation for collegiate teaching, while built upon specialized
research, to give him original mastery in his oubject, is not, per se
,
as immediate preparation iof tnis particular te&cning, what might
be called specialized research. To deal with collegi ate problem
from the side of either teacher or student is not primarily to deal
with a problem of specialized research. So far the teacher's pro-
cedure corresponds to the student's. Where teacher and student
differ utterly in point of view, is in the important fact that one
generalizes here alter specialization, while the other pursues such
generalized research as must precede in his student-experience the
specialized research to whien he may later aspire. it is incon-
ceivable, however, that he should be making sound preparation for
^ee -uckmich.C.A. , A bcheme of method , Psychological Review, aXl ,i»o. 6
.
i.ovember 1914, p. o98, for use oi terms, 'method 1 , etc. these terms
need distinction in pedagogy, as well as in psychology. I am using
Method' for the larger rubrics of procedure.

86-
specialized research in a field without previous pursuit of ral
research in the same field. The necessity for 'context' in which
thinking may go iorward forbids. One must proceed to specialized
study through gradually increasing the specialization of his general
study. Undergraduate project is thought of as satisfying this re-
quirement. It intensifies the individual's study of a field called
a 'subject of t.tudy' or 'a science'. But the process of intensifi-
cation is a process of 'correlating 1 . Intensification clears the
individual's path and trims its borders, while 'correlation' keeps
its connections open. The project means both of these, and saves
from the devi ousness which sees a net-work of paths but no arrows
of direction through, and no signs at the junctions. Discovery
whici: is genuine, development actually made by the learner, and test-
ing, all necessary to thinking, can cane only through actually build-
ing up some general experience in a field.
The order of excellence of a teacher's participation in
the process does not begin with his own fully specialized knowledge
in a field, father his qualification is in his capacity to follow
with active comprehension the entrance of the learner into the field:
the degree and type of his ignorance, the probable images he has to
work with, his materials for thinking in this field, his lack of
materials essential to a beginning - now to get them into significant
suggestions of hypotheses for the first thinking, how to get the
suggestions which will stimulate this learner to make a beginning of
thinking in this field,
1
Critical testing of the capacity of an
individual to engage now or later in specialization of study is a
1 For something of the guiding power required here of teachers
as well as something of the test of power in students see
Dewey, Philosophy of Educati on , p. 84.
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duty of the collegiate teacher, just as it was incumbent upon the
high school teacher to help individuals choose their collegiate type
of work - or to choose against collegiate work. Has the person
patience? capacity for suspended judgment? a liking for inquiry?
willingness to return upon and live in the tacts where successful
thinking is hound to require it? None of these powers in a teacher
is necessarily implied in his own credentials of scholarship.
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CHAPTER VII
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PURPOSE OR PROBLEM
The prevalence oi' pin-pose in adult thought is strongly marked
in the psychologist's account or the nature of thought. To intro-
duce his own definition Titchener quotes ho )bes for an early ap-
preciation of the difference between random and intentional think-
ing. "'The train of thoughts or mental discourse is of two sorts.
The first is unguided, without design and inconstant; in which
case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to
another, as in a dream. The second is more constant; as being reg-
ulated by some desire and design: and because the end by the great-
ness of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts
begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced 'into the way'. 1
Hobbes is here distinguishing, as far as unaided observation allows
him, between the mental connections that reflect a random play of
the associative tendencies, ana those whose course is directed by
some determining tendency. The former, to be sure, are never
wholly random; ideas are grouped together by the situation in which
they appear ;.. .There is, nevertheless, a marked difference between
the two kinds of 'mental discourse', between (say) the casual flow
of conversation and the working out of an argument; and it is the
second kind, the progressive movement of ideas toward an end, that
modern psychology has technically named th ought . n
As to the possibility of an ultimate explanation of purpose
Titchener says, after enumerating the many native tendencies in
1 Titchener. E. B. .A Beginner's Psychology , p. 261. See also Dewey, J •
,
How We Think . First pages.
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music. "These things, however, are not enough [to explain iier-
ceptiorj . For behind all music lies what we may call an intent to
express , as "behind all speech lies an intent to communicate; ana
this intent baffles us; we can only say once again, that it is
carried by some native and ingrained disposition of the nervous
system
An appeal to the phenomena of attention, finds among the sub-
jective conditions of attention, "a factor that is variously desig-
nated the intention, the purpose, or the question in mind at the
moment. When one has the intention of seeing a particular t.ing,
that tiling will come to consciousness, . . .In daily life this purpose
is the determining factor in all observation. One sees or hears only
what one desires to hear, or what harmonizes with the intention....
Some objects that have been under one's eyes for years may never
have been noticed unless some purpose made it desirable. .. .This
purpose or mental attitude may be aroused either from without or
from wi thin. .From within, the purpose usually arises by a suggest-
ion from something that has been seen. .. .Observation is most fre-
quently the result of a series of problems self-set for solution.
Without the problem, observation is indiscriminate and relatively
unprofitable. In this sense thought usually precedes observation,
but the thought itself grows out of preceding observation and so
both are to be regarded as parts of a continuous progression in
which each thought suggests attention, and the result of each at-
tention, a new thought, in a succession broken finally by the ir-
ruption of an intense stimulus or the necessities of the daily life,
^Titchener^.B. , A Beginner' s P sy oh ology , p . 155
.
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and tnis in turn starts a new series 01 questions
.
Associations are, of course, controlled by conditions of
attention, probably by strong feeling also, but, "by far the most
important oi these subjective conditions of attention is to be
found in the mental attitude of the moment, the purpose or problem
p
that is set the individual.
We shall have occasion to take note oi important differences
between the psychologist's and the logician's view of thinking, as-
sumed now to be the purpose of collegiate thinking, (p.'^) but
from every point of view the conditio sine qua non of thinking is
problem. Unless we want to be so nice about it as to make dis-
tinctions of no particular use, problem and purpose mean the same
thing for us. Strictly speaking a purpose involves problem though
problem is no problem except as we have a purpose to solve it. At
any rate the psychologist is likely to use "Che words interchangeably,
and it is his help we seek first. The very definition of reasoning
as "the application of knowledge in a new way" implies either the
particular problem of avoiding a difficulty in accomplishing some
task or the abstract problem of reaching some conclusion about the
nature of the universe.
It does not differ, in laws of association involved, from
memory and imagination, which it closely resembles on the cognitive
side; nor from habit and instinct upon which a muscular result
follows, as upon thinking. But the characteristic thing about
reasoning is "the way the material is applied and the resulting
attitude toward the construction - the attitude of belief or of
1 Pillsbury.W.B.
.
Fundamentals of Psychology , p. 255-4.
2Ibid,p.261.
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doubt." 1 Though reasoning is liite imagination in that both are
new combinations 01 old material, it is more liice memory in that
both in memory and reasoning, these results are believed to hold
of reality. This attitude of belief or doubt, as the case may be,
identifies itself with the problematical attitude, and is apparent
in all the four phases of the process of reasoning. (1) a felt
need, (2) the Getting, mutually dependent upon the purpose, (3)
the suggested solution (following inevitably when a purpose and
situation are given), and finally that phase of thinking with which
logic interests itself (4) the testing of solution which brings
the result of thinking. 2 These four are always present though
they may be disguised. (1) The controlling purpose often seems to
be no part of the reasoning process and one is in fact seldom aware
of it. But failure to take the influence of the dominant purpose
of the moment into account is responsible lor many misconceptions
of the process. .. .Purpose is represented in the systems of Herbart,
Stout and Wundt by apperception. In the writings of many it
appears as attention or as the controlling factor of attention
called "attitude" or "cortical set." Whatever called, it is the
determining factor in practically all the concrete mental operations.
It gives form to the different percepts, gives direction to assoc-
iation, decides between the different memories that are competing
for recall, and it rules action. (2) "The appreciation of the
situation" is approximately identified with attention and percept-
ion." It is this part of an act of thinking which represents in
psychology about what "judgment" may be made to cover in logic - an
\ Pillsbury, The Psychology of Reasoning , p. 2.
I Ibid, p. 4.
^See Bagley,W.C, Apperception of the Spoken Sentence , p. 24.
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interpretat ion of the situation. (5) lo^ic'3 1 inference 1 oorres-
ponds to psychology's "overcoming of the appreciated difficulty"
or making any needed improvement in the appreciated situation -
association, in thinking, (or habit, if the fulfillment he an action).
This singleness, not to say simplicity, of the act as psychology
views it, compared with the laborious complexity whicn logic in-
volves in its problem of proof , rather than of thinking , well il-
lustrates the difference between these sciences as we need to note
it in another connection (p*!^ • )• But tne most characteristic ex-
pression of the fact of problem in an act of thinking is (4)
belief. Belief is the one of these phases of thinking which is in
some degree peculiar to t ranking or reasoning. (Inference, as
logic has it, covers solution, belief and proof)."
1
" Pillsbury's
second chapter discusses belief, which is the end of the process,
and still better s^ows the inevitability of proolem, difficulty,
something to be solved. But better illustration still of the
reality of problem as constituting the case of thinking is the tact
that belief itself may, and in those not yet real thinkers, does,
come so easily and without the hesitation of difficulty that be-
lief itself is not the real thing but doubt . "Credulity is
natural, doubt comes only at a relatively late stage in intellectual
development. Doubt, not belief, needs discussion" says Bain.
"There is no moment when a thing is neither believed nor disbe-
lieved," is quoted from Brentano. There is no moment oi suspended
judgment. On entrance it is (1) a thing believed or (2) disbelieved
or (3) doubted. .. ."Doubt arises when a statement can be brought
into two or more contexts and changes as the context changes. . .re-
^illsbury, The Psychology of Reasoning , Chapter I.
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sults from viewing a statement from different points of view."^
A doubt, then, is something very real and none the leas bo is that
active process of raising doubts, weighing them in the different
contexts whicjl bring them, and dissipating them by bringing past
experience to bear upon them, "Doubt is due to the alternating
dominance of systems of experience that have not been altogether
coordinated one with an ot her. . . . In same matters and at some moments
one context and one alone is present. That constitutes or character-
ises tne momentarily settled conviction. In other matters several
systems or contexts conflict and no single organization can be
made to include them all .... Growth in knowledge is invariably ac-
companied by corresponding change in belief.""*" It is clear that
the t^ing which creates problem is the effective determining
tendency wnich works when equilibrium of conflicting contexts has
to be established.
Reasoning is profitably compared with imagination, especially
when we are engaged with this purposeful aspect of reasoning.
"Reasoning in its wider applications covers all the rational con-
structive processes." Memory produces the old, but rational think-
ing and imagination produce the new, at least in the sense of new
connection. "...And experiment shows that an idea comes to us as
imagined only if it comes as unfamiliar, with the feeling of novelty
idea
and strangeness upon it ... .k?y . .becomes or is made into an idea of
imagination by its mental setting, which is this feeling of strange-
ness, the opposite of the feeling of familiarity." ... unlike memory,
too, "the idea of imagination ...cannot be replaced by_ another mode
j^illsbury. Op. Cit . Chapter II.
Pills bury , Fundament al s of Psychology
,
p. 587
.
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of imagery . . . .It must not simply moan something new, it must b_e
80i.ietr.mg new. ...The memory idea'," moreover, "is common to all minds;
it persists as meaning, under the limitations of imaginal type
and the general laws of associative tendency. The idea of imagin-
ation seems to depend rather upon special endownent ; it persists in
kind, also under the limitations 01 imaginal type; and it is con-
served by. some special grouping or 'convergence' of associative
tendencies. We do not hesitate to describe a man as 'wholly lacking'
in imagination; though we should look upon a total lack of memory
as a sign of mental incompetence...." Of course the results of -
thinking are unlike those of imagination and like those of memory
in being believed."^"
The self- fee ling found by warren (to be cited a little later)
to be characteristic oi x purposive thinking belongs also to imag-
inative thinking. Spoken of as seemingly incompatible with the
feeling of strangeness , the ' feeling ' of our own concernment is
nevertheless characteristic of the imagined situation. "The
tendency to feel oneself into a situation is called empathy; .. .and
empathic ideas are the converse oi perceptions: their core is
imaginal and their concept is made up of sensations, the kinaesthet-
ic and organic sensations that carry the empathic meaning. Like
the feeling of strangeness, they are characteristic of [receptive^
imagination" which takes place in primary passive attention. "In
memory their dace is taken by the imitative experiences, which
repeat over again certain phases oi the original situation.
But constructive imagination , which takes place in secondary
llitchener.B.Bi, A Beginner '_s Psychology, pp. 195-7
.
2 iitchener. Loc.cit.
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attention is still more in point as exhibiting phenomena like those
of constructive thinking. "...In general . . .tnere is more hard work
and less inspiration than is usually supposed. The poet or t;.e
inventor starts out with a more or less definite plan or aim or
ambition; the plan persists, if only as a nervous disposition, to
determine the course of his ideas. It also helps to initiate
the imaginative complex, the first clue to which seems in fact, to
come, at least ordinarily, as an inspiration, a happy thought; some
external situation or some grouping of the associative tendencies
that is active at the moment, touches off the disposition, and the
initial idea flashes into mind. Whether this first idea is crude
or complete and whether the stream of later ideas is broad or
narrow, these things depend altogether ipon circumstances. Now,
at any rate, begins the stage of skilled labor; the idea is worked
upon and worked over; the plan decides what shall be accepted,
what rejected, what put aside lor another trial; we are reminded
of the course of recollection, - only that rejection, active as it
is in memory, is still more to the lore in imagination, and con-
struction is more critical than re-construction. Here and there
other happy thoughts may crop up; but in essentials this stage oi
hard work continues, until the idea attains its linal expression in
objective terms, in the words of the poem, ior instance, or in the
effective machine. Meantime there have been all sorts of feelings.
The imaginative ideas bring with them their own xeeiings of
strangeness; but this may be overwhelmed by the joy of success or
the irritation of failure; and these feelings may themselves alter-
nate, swinging from extreme to extreme. Meantime, also, there have
been all sorts of empathic experiences, which have formed about the
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focal processes, vivifying and personalizing the partial products
of the constructive effort; and they too lind their natural term
in the actual accomplishment of the imaginative task....
"...Imagination" unlike memory "is a more or less steady ilow,
in a single direction, from the fount ainhe ad 01 disposition; there
are no limits of any kind, save those of individual capacity and
experience; but the curse is determined by the initial plan or
ambition."-1-
This rather full quotation 01 Titchener's account of "the
pattern of imagination," for wioich the author does not claim
literal accuracy, but which he believes to be "in broad outline and
on the average. . .true to the psychological facts" has been made
here because of its suggestion of the "pattern of thought" with
which it must be put in close comparison. First, however, tne
author's summary of nis own comparison of imagination and memory
may well be given, to be kept in mind as he further compares imag-
ination and thought: "Memory is discursive movement within fixed
boundaries : imaginati on is pr ogres sive movement from a common source .
Memory ijj characterized by the feeling _of familiarity and by im-
itat ive kinaesthesis : imaginati on by the feeling of strangeness and
empathy
.
"There is a broad general resemblance between the pattern of
thought and that of constructive imagination; it has indeed been
said, though with exaggeration, that thought is an imagining in
words, and imagination a thinking in images. The thinker, like
tne artist sets out with a plan or design, and aims at a goal; and
thought like imagination is a more or less steady flow, in a single
"kitchener, A Beginner '
s
Psych ology, pp. 197-200.
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direction from the fountain-head of nervous dispositon. 'Happy
thoughts' occur in thinking, as they occur in imagination; there is
a like movement between the poles of feeling; and the ompathic
experiences of the artist are paralleled by the mental attitudes at
the thinker. ..."
We have probably done well to get i'itchener's pattern of
constructive imagination pretty fully into account for exemplifica-
tion of purpose . In fact the constructively imaginative is largely
indistinguishable from constructive thinking. The fact that the
end of imagination is to construct a so-called 'figment' instead
of a so-called 'reality' is a less important distinction on the
activital side than is the acti vital identity of the process by
which tne plan works itself out. Here the distinctions become Ic^ic
al rather than psychological, and lose their force because we are
not concerned with the ends of purpose, since logic concerns itself
always with proof, the validity of -chinking rather than the process
of thinking. This tendency vitiates i'itchener's further account
of the pattern of thinking, turning to the ten dsn cy to objectify as
characteristic of thinking, really not more present in thinking
than in imagining, though in one case we say the resulting object
is real and in the other that it is not real. Equally futile, and
even more a surrender of psychology to logic is his finding one of
the two distinguishing characteristics of thinking, the "tendency
to dual division ." The judgment as "answer to a question" is sheer
logic, not psychology, and we are not helped in our description of
thinking to sell out the primitive process of thinking to the so-
phistic of logic, which must conceive its tninking, of course, to
be crystallized in language. Language knows no thinking short of
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the proposition, which is the formal sign oi' a judgment. There can
he no doubt oi the tendency to dual division, but that is not a
primitive tendency of the thinker, whose thinking Titchener shows
to he independent of language, hut is the least cumbrous unit
language can show. Language can scarcely he conceived of as start-
ing its mechanism oi* expression without predication. Thinking is
tied to a slow vehicle indeed if it can not take place without in-
troducing the dual form of "judgment" as its characteristic pace.
Reasoning does depend, for its logical description, upon the duality
of form which crystallizes judgments into propositions, out psycho-
logically there seems no better reason for linding judgment intrin-
sically characterized by duality than to say that wood is character-
ized by duality because sticks of wood must have two ends.
It is worth our while to get a little more complete notion of
the psychology of purpose since purpose is the concept which is at
the center of our present interest. Purpose initiates and regulates
acts of constructive imagination and constructive thinking. How is
purpose itself best expressed psychologically? Nothing could be
more abjectly a defeat of our search for it than to rest satisfied
with 'purpose 1 as a new name for old mysteries. Psychology has
lately been especially active in trying to state what purpose or
problem means to the psychologist. "Most, if not all, reasoning
is concerned with problem- solving; reasoning proper is restricted to
solving problems in thought alone, although the problem once
solved may and usually does prepare for real construction. The re-
sults attained in thought lead directly to and control action....
Problems of mere understanding of the world, and those which go
beyond in preparing the way ior action... are solved in the same
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way.
"Most of reasoning consists in bringing order into experience
and in justifying suggestions for new advances ... .Reasoning as a
whole must have a positive stimulus. The problem is always forced
upon the individual by some inadequacy of old habits or of old
thoughts, by something tiiat goes wrong in the ordinary routine. Wher
habit and routine suffice, one never reasons. Necessity is the
mother of all thought as of all invention. The problem usually pre-
sents itself by the man's being thwarted in his mental or pnysical
progress. On the mental side some fact presents itself that will
not fit into the theories already developed."
A very primitive expression of the animal's situation in his
environment is in terms of the difficulty which makes 'problem'.
"There is for the organism a certain condition in which its or-
dinary structural activities go equably forward. Any disturbance
of their equilibrium is a stimulus to reactions which continue un-
til the equilibrium is rest ored. . . . in higher stages we recognize
this condition without ambiguity as one of effort. . . .The action
tending to remove tne trouble is chosen out of many possibilities,
and if it does not succeed the animal persists till relief is ob-
tained. .. .Equilibrium gained, the 'efforts' cease. .. .Here we have
actions directed to a certain result and something maintaining them
as being so directed. This we shall see is at least the germ of
effort and purpose." The characteristic movements of Paramecium
which has entered a noxious area of its environment is the illustra-
3
tion used.
ipillsburv. >j.B. . Fundamentals of Psychology ,pp.387-8.
20p.Cit. ._
siiobhouse.L.T. .Development and Purpose ,p.^l.
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This essential feature of difficulty as the starting point of
thinking needs emphasis. In his introduction to a new edition of
Assays in Experimental Logic
,
Professor uewey still iurtner eniorces
this feature as he has stated it in how ,.e Think . "It was the
purpose oi the essays to point out that reflection, (and hence
knowledge having logical properties) arises because 01 tne appear-
ance of incompatible factors within the empirical situation...;
incompatible not in a mere structural or static sense, but in an
active and progressive sense. Then opposed responses are provoked
which cannot be taken simultaneously in overt action, and which
accordingly can be dealt with, whether simultaneously or successive-
ly, only after they have been brought into a plan of organized-
action by me ns of analytic resolution and synthetic imaginative
conspectus; in short by means of being taken cognizance of. in
other words, reflection appears as the dominant trait of a situ-
ation when there is something seriously the matter, some trouble,
due to active discordance, dissentiency , conflict among tne factors
of a prior non-intellectual experience; when... a situation becomes
tensi onal.
"Given such a situation, it is obvious that the meaning of
the situation as a whole is uncertain. Through calling out two
opposed modes of behavior, it presents itself as meaning two in-
compatible things. The only way out is through careful inspection
of the situation, involving resolution into elements, and going
out beyond what is found upon such inspection to be given, to some-
thing else to get a leverage for understanding it. That is we have
(a) to locate the difficulty and (b) to devise a method of coping
with it. Any such way of looking at thinking demands moreover
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that the difficulty be located in the situation in queetion (very
literally in question). Knowing always has a parti cular purpose,
and its solution must be a function of its conditions in connection
with additional ones which are brougnt to bear, livery reflective
knowledge, in other words, has a special task which is set by a
concrete and empirical situation, so that it can perform that tasic
only hy detecting and remaining faithful to the conditions in the
situation in which the difficulty arises, while its purpose is a
reorganization of its factors in order to get unity." 1
"...Thinking would not exist, and hence knowledge would not
he found, in a world wi.icn presented no troubles...; a reflective
method is the only sure way of dealing with these troubles." Shis
doctrine of conflict as at the bottom of all thinking is widely
illustrated in theories of consciousness itself, which is variously
stated as arising from contradictions (Holt ) , some sort of an
equation of potential energy (Montague, Liunsterberg, et al), or still
more plausibly worked out in a motor theory by Professor ./ashburn,
summarized in the statement that "consciousness accompanies a
certain ratio of excitation to inhibition in a motor discharge
.
There are many ways to express consciousness as a result or
index of conflict. 1'he organic primitivity of conilict is basic in
psycho-analytic doctrine. "The stimulus is reality knocking at the
door for recognition. The endless flux of outside changes each
demands an answering change of like degree within. This balanced
progress of adjustment makes up the moving equilibrium which consti-
tutes the flow of life itself. Conilict is at the very root and
source of life , it is tne very stuff out of which life is made , and
lUewey, Assays in iixperimental Logic( 191b )pp.9ff. , bee also Chapter
IV.
2 V/ashburn.M.ff. . Movement and ilental Imagery ,( 1916 ) p. 25.

102-
the necessary precondition of progress . 1,1 Stated as a law, the
principle is known as Le Chatelier's theorem: "A system tends to
change so as to minimize an external disturbance." Or to express
this physical law physiologically it is Kempf's law. 11 A motive...
after its genesis, tends to express itself by forcing into con-
sciousness sensations of exogenous origin or sensory images of
endogenous origin which have the function of generating counter,
neutralizing reactions." [Chinking is hut one of the compensating
processes "by which equilibrium is restored. As fear prompts to
run away and secure safety and each emotion has its compensating
emotion, so "on a higher level are all those highly sublimated forms
of conduct which express the creative energy in artistic, literary,
and scientific productions."
A real problem is characterized by some degree of desire for
its solution, i^r. White's discussion of "Conflict" may well be
drawn upon to characterize ways in which an organism may meet such
problems. %..!Dhe activities of the organism that are brought about
to neutralize desires may effect an adequate and efficient relation
or they may not. The person who desires money andproceeds to es-
tablish himself in business and earn it has brought about an effic-
ient relating of himself to his environment, but the person who
wants money and does nothing about it but indulge in day-dreams
of what he would do if he had it is decidedly inefficient in his re-
lation to his conflict. Both, however, have dealt with the conflict
by bringing about conditions that tend to neutralize the desire,
tend to reduce the disturbance in the system brought about by the un-
Wfa it e . Wm.A .
.
Ilechani sms 01 Character g ormat; ion , An Introduction to
Psychoanalysis ! 1915 ) ,p.63«
gWhite.Qp. Cit .pp.6^-5.
s 0p. Cit .p. 66
.
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satisfied desire, one has reacted effectively, the ©thtr hue reacted
in a pathological way. In one case there was an efficient reaction
to the deniands of reality, in the other there was the building up
of a world of phantasy."
This universal principle of conflict is bound to sjiow itself
in the form and structure of institutions, especially in language,
and every act of thinking which finds an equ ilibrium, finds it only
to make it a member of a new antagonism oi contradictions, by which
further steps in thinking are stimulated.
"...At the psychological level the conflict is represented
by the two terms, the unconscious and the conscious, that is by
what these two terms represent, the unconscious representing the
inherent and acquired tendencies, tne conscious representing the
moment when they come into active touch with reality in an effort to
effect adjustment .""*"
This question of organic compensations which arises in con-
nection with the idea of conflict has its accompanying suggestions
to make about consciousness, itself, and its origin along the
boundary of past experience. Organic defect, in the case of in-
ferior or sub-normal organs has a systematic tendency to be correct-
ed by compensations. "Most compensations are in tne psychic tnough
not necessarily in the conscious field. Ho one is perfect, and hence
compensation is necessary for all. It makes for, ii indeed, it does
not make consciousness itself .. .Compensation has its limits and
when it breaks down we have anxiety..."
"...Consciousness itself is compensation and is the psychic
aspect of a deeper biologic law.... If the heart, digestive pro-
1
White.
t
0£.Cit.,p.71. Of. Dewey. Introduction to j]ssay_s in Exper-
imental Logic.
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cesses, lungs, muscles, are weak or go wrong, they come into con-
sciousness, and curative agencies are initiated. Pain is the cry
of the lower, older parts and functions of our organism to the
higher nervous system for help. ...The sense of defect prompts tiain-
ing and education to cure and also countless devices to hide them.
Culture corrects the errors of instinct and dress hides deformities.
Thus nurture supplements nature, and environment has to rectify
heredity. These processes const i tute eons ciousness , which is al-
ways more or less remed ial. Taine^" conceived it as a mutual re-
pression of opposite tendencies, any of which if not checked would
develop into insane intensity, ana he deemed the neuroses as
only the most intense form of it. Where these integrating and com-
pensating processes have more than they can do and break down,
whetner from strain of outer circumstances or because they find
inner resistences too great, so that the power to rectify and ad-
just is exhausted, abatement of the life impulse is felt, and this
sense of abatement is anxiety, diffuse or seute. It is the bi-
polar opposite of the pleroma 01 liie abounding, which all crave.
From this point of view, then, cons ciousness is incipient anxiety .
...from the genetic standpoint they (hope and fear] are the creators
of consciousness itself, from its lowest to its highest form."
The psychologists have somewhat minutely analyzed the purpose-
attitude and have represented its structiiral features in picturesque
ally
theoretical form. Incident /to a wider study of purpose, by Professor
1 Of. with Washburn ( Op. C it.) and other motor theories.
2 White, On.. Git.
,
pp. 249, 273-4 et passim . Quotes Eall.G.S.,
A Synthetic Genetic Study of i'ear , Am. Jour. Psychol. ,Apr
.
1914.
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Warren,^" the author gives an analytical statement of the distinctive
features of purposive states of consciousness. "A human act is
said to be purposive when it is preceded by an xdea representing the
situation which the act itself bring about." This idea of some
future situation is (1) the forethought . One other characteristic
factor at the beginning is (2) decision, wish, assent . (3) A feel-
ing of -potency is commonly associated with the forethought, a tenden-
cy to believe that the forethought itself has power to produce
the result foreseen. (4) One is directly concerned in the outcome.
One's purposes are not fulfilled by another. This consciousness of
self may or may hot be explicitly associated with the forethought;
but the self is always implicitly involved in purpose. (5) during
the progress of thought there is the feeling that certain thoughts
or perceptions are suitable or fit The fulfillment itself is
marked by a feeling-tone of fitness if the experience is in the locus
of attention. Some psychologists add (6) the fiat immediately
preceding the initiation of the action. The mental states which
intervene may or may not include purposive character .. .frequently
they do when the act is novel or complex. The consciousness of
purpose may be greatly syncopated. Accompanying desire may increase
the intensity of the fo ret. ought and thus render its accomplishment
more probable. Delayed execution is not due to lack of assent. The
assent factor is the only differentia between purpose and sheer
imagination. These statements are true particularly of purpose to
act
.
In ideational purpose the forethought does not exactly repre-
sent the outcome. . .The forethought is a problem : the fulfillment is
1
Warren . H . Q
.
.A Study of Purpose , Jour .Phil. , Psych. etc. , Vol. 15:
Nos. 1,2,3.
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its solution. The intervening process frequently involves long con-
tinued hard thinking. So long as this thought series does not
serve to fulfil the purpose the forethought remainB focal: I
am continually aware of my purpose to solve the problem....
...In motor activity tne assent attitude is found to he an
incipient kinaesthetic sensation which is aroused when our muscles
1
begin to he tense for the movement. When thought is succeeded by
actual movement, this kinaesthetic sensation becomes stronger. It
appears as a sensation of power or fcrce. A corresponding sense of
power is associated with the forethought even before the motor
activity begins, This is found to be a memory image of former kin-
aesthetic sensations which is aroused by association where the
muscular activity is represented. .. .Its presence does not guarantee
that the motor consciousness is really efficient.
The sequence of a tnought and a corresponding perception
const itutes the fulfilment of a purpose . (The order of cognition
is reversed in purpose). How has this come to be if not through
some selective power in the torethought ? Thorn&ike says "A thought
tends to be followed by the act which it resembles, because such a
sequence has proved biologically useful." The same reason applies
why a purposive thought tends to be followed by the perception of its
fulfilment. .. .Rational thought, like any other thought, is capable
of forming only the associations which experience has given. There
is no inherent power in the forethought to induce a rational con-
clusion. .. .The man who succeeds in an inventive enterprise succeeds
because he has a greater facility in combining familiar elements
into new complexes. .. .The only real potency that can be attributed
^Gf. Washburn's "tentative movementsj1
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to a purposeful thought is a strong tendency to continue thinking
about the problem....
...In every purposive conwci ousness some kinaesthet ic data
are present between the forethought and its fulfilment. The mrpos -
ive self is based on these.... The self datum is the least important
factor in the purposive experience. . .less characteristic than the
assent
.
less vivid than the p otency-feel ing . Still it should not be
ignored in the study of purpose since in some form or other there
is always a kinaesthetic self-reference in the fulfillment of
every purposive thought.
The feeling of satisfaction and relief is found in connection
with the memory image also ... .There is, however, a combination of
recognition and satisfaction which is peculiar to the fulfillment
of a purpose idea. . . .which attaches to the correspondence between
the forethought and realization. It is the judgment of relation
with an affective tone attached - the sense of fitness . . . .If the
experience corresponds to our memory of the forethought, the assoc-
iation produces a judgment of fitness. The accompanying feeling
of fitness is due to the facilitation of reaction which this assoc-
iation brings about.
...In mental problems the forethought does not represent the
solution, but merely some characteristic of the solution. How we
come to judge certain steps as fit and others not... hinges on the
nature of rational thought.
Reasoning is a particular kind of association 01 ideas, more
restricted than casual associations. The succession of thoughts in
a logical train. . .tallies with reality again and again. .. .le ads
continually to fulfillment of the forethought. This persistent
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correspondence tends to build up cumulatively, in connection with
"rational" thinking, a judgment of litness wilch we have no oppor-
tunity to build up in the ordinary hit-or-miss associations.
The fitness factor has three charac teritst ics : (1) It attaches t
the final outcome and to certain intermediate steps in purposive ex-
periences. (2) It does not appear in all... only in ccmpjicated
situations. . .also only where the fulfillment is impeded.
1
But an
implicit fitness or unfitness appears to characterize purposive
experiences generally. (3) It is psychologically distinct from
the forethought , the characteristic mark of which is its future
reference, while the ii t ne s s-unii tne s
s
experience involves a sense
of correspondence or disparity . It is not merely a judgnent, but
involves an hedonie element as well.
The distinctive feature of the purposive consciousness is
thus seen to be an inversion of the usual temporal order of certain
members of a series of experiences. In the purposive consciousness
the idea precedes the perception, the general precedes the particu-
lar. The extent of this inversion is recognized in the judgment of
fitness.
This account of purpose-thinking has been given largely in
Professor warren's own phraseology, but quotation marks have been
avoided because the amount of omission and condensation often fails
of full justice to the original in spite of actually quoted pass-
ages. The terminology here furnished serves us in the terminology
of 'project' where an attempt is made to treat the pedagogy of
purposive thinking.
^Cf. White, as ouoted on "Conflict."
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It has lor some time been a truism of psychology that percept-
ion is by 'wholes' and has for a shorter time "been realized by
pedagogy that learning is profitably by wholes. "A piece of ice looks
smooth, white, hard, and cold: we realize that only the whiteness of
it is the result of present sense stimulation, and that the hardness,
smoothness, and coldness are trie effects of former experiences with
the sense 01 touch and temperature. Now the way in which we iorm
such combinations of sensations into perceptions is evidently not
so much by adding bit to bit to iorm a mosaic, but by digging one
bit after another out of an original whole.... it is the fact that
an object can still be responded to as a whole that keeps the special-
ized movements together in a single system, and thus gives the ob-
ject its unity." ... .Of the motor responses thus linked together by
their common outlet, the compatible ones become simultaneous sy stems"
which they tend to become, if possible. . ."while the incompatible
ones become successive systems. . .related to those parts of the ob-
ject which must be attended to in succession." The advantage of
hands and language is that objects can be moved and reactions se-
cured from a whole group. "There is almost no limit to the complex-
ity of the system combinations which can be formed through having
a single motor outlet for an entire combination." The value of
organizing learning into systems both simultaneous and successive
is shown by Washburn
1
in the context of the passages just quoted
and particularly in the chapter on "The Problem or Purpose."
Against distraction, which seems to have a tendency to simplify
the system that is formed, large systems have certain resistances
^Washburn.M.ff. .Movement and kental Imagery , pp . Is4- 5
.
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peculiar to themselves, and these apply to large problem systems of
learning as well as to simultaneous systems. The first factor of
security against distraction is tne amount of effort or resolution
that is put forth to keep one's mind on the porcess to be attended
to.... "But often, of course, it is the interest of the material
that holds distraction aloof." And it is here that Washburn's
motor theory seems to express itself in such terms as to make it
a direct explanation of that intrinsic character of a purpose which
identifies it with what Dewey calls an "interest." "Now interest
always means that some large already lormed movement system is hack
of the material attended to, and that its momentum, so to speak,
is such that tne associative dispositions not involved in it will
be inhibited. The advantage is always with the older and more
complex systems.
"Levy-Suhl used the ability of a well-established system of
associative dispositions to resist distractions as a test 01 the
normality of the mind, insane and normal persons were allowed to
start a train of ideas suggested by themselves, and when it was
well under way, they were interrupted by pronouncing to them an 'ir-
relevant word. Only a hopelessly abnormal mind meekly accepted
this distraction and followed the new line of thought without
reference to the old. A curious instance of the effect of the
problem or purpose involved in an experiment is shown by the fact
that Baldwin, 1 trying experiments by practically the same method,
found that his observers, who were all normal, usually accepted
the new train of thought almost at once. In his experiments the
Baldwin, B.T. .Associations Under the Influence of Different
Ideas, Harvard Psychol. Studies, Vol. 2, pp. 451-4V5, ( 1906)7
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first train of thought, on which the interruption broke, was suggest-
ed by the experimenter instead of being sell-suggested. The v/hole
attitude 01 the observers was therefore tnat of attending to anything
that might come from the experimenter, instead of really allowing
an associative system to get possession." 1 In otner words we have
a situation in one case not dominated by the pedagogue, and in the
other the typical student- at titude - readiness to desert anything,
and come to the teacher innocent of any beginning of thinking;
schooled to set up new systems at the dictation of tne teacher, in-
stead of incorporating into soundly established systems what tne
teacher, like any other help to learning, may bring that is new
and appropriable. So far as we have gone with the problem of col-
legiate learning, t] e present practice reflects a policy of allow-
ing the teacher and his 'systems 1 to be an accident so far as iore-
sight in adapting compatible systems and avoiding ineompati bles is
concerned. This seems to furnish tne specific terms 01 the pre-
cept that teachers should know their individual students. A minimum
of proper procedure must be tne avoidance of propounding systems
which are surely not to find a place in those of tne students as
we may generalize the experience of a given group of persons; but
an active aspect of the obligation to know the students states
itself as an obligation to know something 01 what experiential
systems individual stud.ents have available. This is not a feature
of c las s-te aching, but a necessity of individual project-learning.
This must be what we mean by urging the importance of tne teacher's
helping to select tne best lines of individual research lor students.
To give such help he must canvass the pertinent experience of the
student; better still, must help the student to canvass his own
^Washburn , Op
.
Pit .p.

apperceptive possibilities lor choice of pro ject-tneme.
It is not possible to follow Washburn into the nevert heless
pertinent discussion of the mutual influences 01 old and new systems.
Bui; the law of the influence of old systems upon new as exemplified
in phenomena of memory images as they alter with time is worthy of
statement because it in a way universalizes the pertinent lacts
of perception. "Whenever in a movement system, it is possible ior
an old associative disposition, based on much repetition, to take
the place of a new one whose strength lies rather in recency than
in repetition, the substitution occurs. This is of course precisely
the fundamental law of perception."
1
Even in this general chapter on purpose we have not yet come
to any close terms with tne thing which actually constitutes a
problem-idea. But it prepares the way for an exposition, finally,
under Professor Washburn's term "activity attitude," of what seems
to me one of the most significant suggestions psychological theory
has ever offered to pedagogy: a theoretical statement of the poss-
ible physiological mechanism of purpose, resolution, effort, and
what is ordinarily called, voluntary action. In this plausible ac-
count of the way in which mechanisms may very well exist whose
function should yield what has otherwise an atmosphere of mystery,
we may have, I believe, in time, a revolution in some of the as-
sumptions of a doctrine of work. We take up next a discussion of
certain phases of the pedagogy of problem.
Washhurn , Op.cit «p.!47
.

CHAPTER VIII
THE PEDAGOGY OF PROBLEM
A minor, but important, pedagogical distinction is too in-
frequently made, and still less frequently enforced in practice.
Algebra and geometry furnish aspects of this distinction, if we
note the degree in which problem-thinking is actually involved in
their "problems." The threshold of thinking lies above the so-
called "problem" in geometry which is a printed demonstration or
construction on the page of Euclid, uo solution 01 any kind is de-
manded though thinking is expected and the task required ranges from
mere memorization to considerable thinking. The thinking in geom-
etry is in "originals." One may commit to memory with or without
understanding and successfully repeat the demonstration, bubordinate
"problems" may arise in the process of understanding the problem -
if the student tries to understand it, but these minor difficulties
do not constitute extended problem-solution. The student has no
chance for arriving at Q.E.U. or Q.E.F. as a true eureka of his
own. By the same tests, an original lies well above the threshold
of thinking, as constituting a genuine problem demanding solution.
The difference illustrated here may be called that between mere
understanding and actual problem-thinking. The "problem" in algebra
exhibits similar distinctions, if. the method of attack be studied.
Pot pedagogical purposes we cannot too carefully scrutinize
tiie difference thus roughly illustrated between real problems
and exercises, which may involve lesser subordinated cits of think-
ing, but are not themselves the solution ox problem. The dis-
tinction is clearly realized by many authors at least as one 01
113-
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degree, "but this attention we are giving to purpose as a protracted
influence in thinking is hound to eventuate in a more adequate
notion of the nature of collegiate study, whatever limitations
it may have in elementary learning. Having asked myi elf the
question: Is problem-solut ion something that does not simply char-
acterize thinking in general, hut is it a test of an advanced type
of thinking? I have been interested to find such distinctions made
as seem to me fully to justify setting out prohlem-thinking in
a class by itself.
Instruction is commonly represented as a didactic exercise
in imparting information. Not only is this characteristic of the
great bulk of elementary instruction, but it is implied in the
treatment of high school teaching as an art. There is repeated
assertion of the necessity throughout for stimulating active think-
ing as necessary to the assimilative process, but assimilation
of things predigested is implied in the tasks often, where not
avowed in terms of methodic advice. The distinction deserves to be
made, must be made for collegiate purposes whether we take Dewey's
extreme view of the relation of information-getting to thinking,
or merely note the distinction. "Information severed from thought-
ful action is dead, a mind-crushing load. .. .Thinking is the method
of intelligent learning. Obviously the mistake may easily be
made and overlooked here that the thing taught is eminently problem-
matical in its form, may even proceed by the orthodox canons of
^-Dewey
,
Phi 1 o s ophy of Hiducation ,p.l79 . In How We Think , p. 204
Dewey says: "The Herbartian method makes no reference to a
difficulty [as a necessity of problem-thinking} , a discrepancy
requiring explanation, as the origin and stimulus of the whole
process. As a consequence, it often seems as if the Herbartian
method deals with thought simply as an incident in the process
of acquiring information, instead of treating the latter as an
incident in the process of developing thought."
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forra which are set forth in the books as the unmistakable signs
of problem. "Problem" may even "be "bristling everywhere, the
procedure of a class exercise may satisfy all the exactions of
precepts on questioning, each step may be in response to challenge;
and yet nobody, except perhaps the teacher, be charged by the in-
sight of his own thinking at the outset with a problem which he
consistently hammers away at, and of which he accumulates increas-
ing degree of solution. Self-deception easily accompanies the
recognition of the attitude and knit-brow of thinking, where the
perplexity may range from an effort to find out what the teacher
wants to an effort to work out the uits 01 pseudo-problem that
take the form of inquiry. The demonstration of a "problem"
already "worked out" is such a false-problem, which is really an
exerc ise in the form of problem. Such expressions as tnese swarm
in the pages of didactic pedagogy: "assimilation, " problem solv-
ing :! -meaning the working of so-called problems in algebra where
the "problem" is not the thinking implied in the !un-stated"
problem, not largely in the "statement " of the problem, which is
a guess at "the case" it comes under, nor yet in the "solution,"
which is the manipulat ion 01 symbols of quantity and operation;
nor finally, is the problem in the testing of performance which,
instead of being a testing by comparison with real things, is a
"testing" by observation that the thing seems to "come out even"
or better yet corresponds with an "answer" in the back of the book-
1Ihere is no attempt here to quarrel with the idea of a genuine
pedagor ical value of the algebraic problem, which is given in
English to be 'stated' in equational form and then, of course,
worked out as an exercise, it is only suggested that the amount of
fragmentary puzzling over the items enumerated is usually in ex-
cess of the amount of independent pro hi em, which is problem be-
cause it starts with a desire to know instead of docility to be
trained by exercises.
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There is certainly much variety in type of exercise but thinking
would "be meagerly or at least fragmentarl ly represented. There
is here, however, as there scarcely is in the non-original
geometrical theorem and its demonstration, variety of demand upon
resource and ingenuity, but here, also, there may not be 'problem'
in the sense in which we are usi^.g the word - still less real
problem - solution. Other phrases which abound are "selection,
"
"reading," "exercise," "questioning," "getting information,"
"finding answers," "formulating questions," "discovering problems,"
"awareness of deficiency of information," "seeming to give final
answers," "intellectual initiative," "research," "looking forward
for corollaries," "making one lesson introduce another," "finding
use to which principles may be put," "looking forward for possible
uses," "studying by the use of standards," "preparation of a
lesson," "execution of a certain task," "amount of effort students
need to expend." "Progression is a test for effective training,"
"ability to go on with the next line of work," "intellectual
demands made in courses," "mastering a given subject," "progress-
ion of intellectual demands within the course," marked by (1)
"ability to comprehend a coherent narrative," (£) "to understand
the physical facts which influence history demands power of com-
parison and associative thinking," (3) "mastery of evidences -
critical evaluation of the original sources," (4) "critical
comparison of the different authorities." "The first stage of
science is to collect a few simple facts with a certain degree
of accuracy," "The second stage of science is to try to develop
some sort of general principle" "The third stage of science is
verification, and so on." "We need careful analysis of the
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mental processes which represent progress within the science."
"We need a list of the different kinds of mental activities that
students are called upon to go through in each of the sciences
and in each of the humanities to realize that there is always some
memory-wi.Tk essential to comparison and reason which come later
in the subject." "furthermore the student should realize as well
as the teacher that there is sequence from memory to reason."
"The simplest stage in German is the stage in which the student
learns by translation." Other expressions are "selecting ideas"
"elaborating major ideas," "elaborating a theme." "Having gained
some -TLOwledge, the student should be trained in generalizing
it" by "anticipating later problems," by "generalizing experience
through reviews," by "crystallizing earlier studies in more com-
prehensive forms.". . ."Having learned the subject in its details,
the student is now in a position to take a more general view of
the whole subject.". . ."Principles too broad to be included in a
single exercise ought now l±n review} to be subjects of his
thought .".. ."Broad general viev/s...are results of all specific
courses when the student has really mastered the subject matter
that he has been going over." "Be able to remember ideas."...
"The people who do not work enough are either constitutionally
phlegmatic or they are districted with outside engagements"— or
it is for some other reason?
These are some of the expressions that characterize discussion
of learning when the point of view is that primarily of imparting
information by didactic processes - making persons 'understand'
things, we shall be able, in a moment to show that authors,
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nevertheless, make this distinction and it needs only to be pointed
out, then, that thinking, as real pr oblem-so lving may be demanded
as characteristic, at least of collegiate learning, while inform-
ati on-getting or understanding and remembering, is a much Inferior
and altogether subordinated process - inferior as many of the
quoted phrases imply, because preliminary and necessary to the
other, but not so significantly interior because preliminary, as
closely associated by intimate inclusion with the higher process.
It would be a serious mistake to argue the separation of inform-
ation-getting from problem-solving in practice, just because we
are trying nevertheless to distinguish the two beyond the poss-
ibility of their confusion.
We have several traits of thinking, 'rational' thinking,
which may be tried to see if they apply to the process of 'under-
standing' or information-getting. They are not necessarily co-
ordinate, but inspection of their applicability may be made best
in a tabular exhibit:
Attitude of Learner in Info rmat i on- Ge1 1 ing and in Thinking
Has a question
Has doubt
Skeptical attitude
capable of credulity
Belief by test
( Underst anding)
Ho
wo
Ho
Yes
iMo testing
thought of
forethought ' Mo - No plan except
the teacher's
(Problem solving)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Hot if a
good
problem-
solver
Testing
one of the
steps
Yes - prob-
lem stat-
ed
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Decisi on
Wish
Assent
'.Feeling of po-
tency 1
Personal feeling
( "empathy"
)
Fitness - unfit-
ness
Attention
Interest
Resistance
Dependence — in-
dependence
Ho - none implied
.None implied in the
process
Uone implied in the
sense here in-
tended
Im'o , nothing demanding
it: attitude
passive
mo (teacher may produce
it in a measure)
nothing in mind for such
reference
Passive (except by power
of teacher)
Yes
Yes - genuine
problem in-
volves feel-
ing
*es - the guar-
anty of the
problem-
attitude
Yes
Yes
Yes
Active (by
hypotnesis)
buch as teacher can create Identified
Overcome as teacher can
Conventional type
with "interest?
in Dewey'
s
definition of
the word.
Provided
against in
the 'tension 1
of problem
Independent-
thinking
Other types of distinction might be more or less reliably
tabulated, but the purposes of such a comparison are better served
in the tabular exhibit of apperception involved in adult thinking,
and in less mature types, given on p. (TO*
There seem to be two ways to slight the distinction between
mere accumulation of information by didactic instruction and the
organic process of learning orough developing individual interests,
smaller or larger. One of these is well illustrated by Dewey's in-
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sistence upon selection of essentially interesting actual ex-
periences as the only teaching situations. This receives the assent
of many teachers though by some as an impracticable ideal, and by
many it is accepted as an ideal to regulate as mucii of practice
as possible. The otner way maizes the distinction, actually or
by implication, and treats the great bulk of educational effort
under the presuppositions of an obligation to "impart information."
The dist inction ,for our purposes, has little to say about the
practicability of producing universally in elementary education •
the ideal situations of Dewey, in wnich real social situations
snail furnish threads of assured interest. The only question left
is that of the practicability of organizing collegiate study
largely into such individually selected, pertinent tasks, as
shall furnish the collegiate student what uewey demands for all
pupils. The facts in favor of such a proposal are, (1) that a
foundation of experience (including information) is already at-
tained, whether by ideal or awkward methods; (2) that the primitive
racial and tribally social habits may be taken for granted, so
far as the instructional obligation we acknowledge is concerned;
(3) that the individual is therefore selected for this advanced
undertaking as he would fairly be selected for any other thing
not individually or socially necessary, and finally (4) that the
basis of selection admitted in the premises is that he is ready
to use acquired experience as 'context' for new intellectual ven-
tures. These ventures, then, it is maintained, are to be not
didactic as if written upon a blank page, but organic, because the
individual is able to engage in initiative projects, in which
^Dewey, Philosophy of .aducati on
,
p. 56
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further information is to be rationally accumulated as necessary
to the thinking or the purposeful problem. It is hardly to be
expected that .Dewey would make this distinction, for the reason
given, but other writers, who treat sub-collegiate pedagogy make
the distinction clear.
The author
1 from whom I have collected the foregoing quoted
expressions, as applying largely to the daily grind of instruction,
sets forth the distinction as follows in a moment. (Doubtless
from many sources this distinction could be verified to justify
our demand that collegiate education may choose heavily from the
real problem-tr.inking type of procedure).
But first, to show that the terminology itself, to which we
are adhering by no means prevails in pedagogical literature,
though I think Bewey would not call 'examples' or 'exercises,'
or 'puzzles' or 'drills* "problems." He might demand problem-
solution of a child too young to conceive it, but he would never
mean "working out a 'problem'" by "problem-solution." A symptom
of this confusion of terms is found in the reiteration of the
word "application." By "real problems" a teacher often seems to
mean those which he himself fully justifies because they deal with
tilings irnown to be familiar in the learner's environment, or ne may
even mean simply problems which 'apply' principles he wants to
teach. Of course, these may fail utterly uo become in any sense,
a pupil's own problem. "The school has undoubtedly been remiss
in its attention tc the phase of mental life which we nere call
application. Application is, however, a most difficult mental
process, and needs to be learned just as the original principle
1 Juad,C.H.,The Psycjwlqgjr of high School Subjects.
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itself has to be learned."...
"...Successive examples. . .should be treated as the opportunity
on the part of the teacher to cultivate the attitude of application.
The cultivation of tills attitude will oe defeated 11 tne instructor
starts out with the explicit statement that each of the cases to be
submitted contains the particular factor under consideration. Thus
if one gives fifty examples of the first law of mechanics, and ex-
plicitly states at the outset that these fifty examples are all
manifestations of that first law, he will not give his students the
same degree of training that he would have given if he had mixed
those examples with examples 01 the other laws of mechanics and
allowed the student to discover which of the laws of mechanics
appears in each case."
"...In algebra it is a fundamental mistake to give to students
all of the examples under a given principle, with a definite
statement to the effect that all of these are examples of a
single type. The student fails to get the mental training in this
case which is desired. .. .Students leave school withoiit the ability
to make applications as a separate mode of mental activity. The
teacher ought to recognize in all of these cases that the mere
solution ox the problem is of slight importance if tne student does
not acquire that higher power of discovering tne mode of procedure
which is appropriate in each case. The solution of the problem is
mere routine. The classification of the problem is a form of gen-
eralization." 1 Scarcely less naive than the supposition made by
the exhorted teacher that the "solution of tne problem is mere
routine," is the supposition that giving a pupil a c nance to assort
1 £E fii*« p. 422.

puzzles is cultivating "that higher power" wj.ich i8 called "the
attitude of application." Certainly none of this has anything
material to do with "problem-solving." What it has to do with
tiiinking is incidental, fragmentary , connected with "problems"
which are quite subordinate to the tninking involved in real
problems'. Even if the so-called "problems," mere exercises at
the best, are not arranged under one principle, they fall under a
few at most. They engage instead of the "i.igher pov/er" called
"attitude of application , " sometning very much like the attitude
of tne child who listened with what tolerance he could summon to
a long-winded explanation of a "problem" in interest, then asked,
"but, do you multiply or divide?" It would still remain to be
shown that giving a student a chance to assort puzzles has much to
do with "training" him to "apply,"
The passages here quoted are closely connected with an
assumption that the student is, nevertheless, doing some extraor-
dinary mental stunts in picking out examples that fall under a
"general principle." Such principle is not identified as a
principle, if it be a true 'principle,' with any one 01 tne ex-
amples in whole or in part, but "is the product in the individual's
mind of a comparison 01 all these different particular cases.... The
power of making this comparison and of arriving at a general mode
of procedure is a higher power than the power of solving the par-
ticular problem. This fact, that the recognition 01 the general
principle is a higher type of power than that which is involved
in the solution of particular problems, appears again and again in
the training of students. There are many students who know how
to solve a problem if they are told which process to employ, but
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they do not know enough about the problem to select the process
which is appropriate to the situation in hand. The mastery of the
general principle is therefore a new type of mental achievement."
This "mastery," however, is so imperfectly conceived, so
partially conceived that it is called acquiring a "general habit,"
There is no evidence forthcoming, first that -cne student who learns
the trick of subsuming a process under a head has done much in
the way of improving intellectual habit (if there is any such
thing), while he certainly may have learned this trick without a
considerable entrance into real problem as an engagement in think-
ing. The mastery of the general principle would certainly be a
new type of mental achievement, but there remains to find any
more evidence than comes through assumption in doubtful use of
terms that any considerable beginning has been made in it by this
kind of "solution ox problems ''plus guessing where tney belong.
If the student is really "learning - to extract from a variety
of experiences a general principle or rule - the discovery 01 this
general principle or rule is a new performance," but it is at best,
a part only ox all that is involved in real problem-thinking.
"The cultivation ox thxs power of generalization is the most im-
portant achievement in the student's education. It will not come
without special endeavor on the part of the student and on the
part of the teacher." It might well be added that training for
it will scarcely come from a mere recognition that a principle is
a generalization to wnich all are urged to be sensitive.
Professor Judd has here put his finger on the "new performance'
or the "new achievement," the discovery of a general principle
or rule which is necessary but not by any means all of -chinking.
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Besides the foregoing uiiferences in terminology , tnere is
further discrepancy of that sort, but still more important there
seems a failure to "apply" that insight itself to cases of real
problem-thinking. His illustrations of* "methods of inducing gen-
eralization" seem to be all of them, devices for applying the
princi pie of finding principles rather than examples of problem-
thinking - a sort of practice-drill in picking out principles from
unassorted matter guaranteed to conceal certain principles within
it. They betray the teacher rather devising methods of didactics
than scheming to involve the student in real learning situations.
If, in other words, my deliberate purpose is to "devise situations"
to "present co tne student with a view zo furnishing him the op-
portunity of applying his verbal formula" (miscalled, for these
purposes an "ideal" ) "and making generalization," tnen the word
"situation" has almost nothing in common with what Dewey means by
an educational 'situation!. One "situation" is a mere device to
help convey the teacher's lesson, to solve the teacher's problem.
The other use of the word 1 situation 1 is technically significant
as name of the student's setting for a. real problem. Generalizatior
is
is an important element of problem- solving, but it /one element
among many, and, that not what could properly be called a 'didactic'
element. A kind of a drill-game called "hunting for the prin-
ciple" must be what professor Judd fancies the teacher proposing
to "lead to an attitude of mind which can be described as the
generalizing attitude." If one could isolate this mysterious
entity he would have in his tweezers a mate to "the habit of
verbal analysis,'; vhich is "a general habit dominating all the
detailed habits of mental life." This one seems the nurse of a
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whole brood of another entirely different "breed, 'detailed'
habits the kind 1 think we should be most likely to recognize as
actual habits keeping the meaning which has always been used for
habit until the new genus, "general habit" was invented to mother
the orphans. But seriously, the proof cited that "there is uich a
generalized habit of scientific analysis, which can be cultivated
through the study of all the sciences" is the statement: "Science
is a system of thought. Science is a body of generalizations.
To construct this system of thought and these generalizations is
a step in intellectual development beyond the mere acquisition of
the impressions out of which science may grow." 1
These statements could be thought to have pedagogical sig-
nificance, if it were true that the constructed system of science
were a mold a teacher could be thought of as taking and setting
over upon the clay of the student's mind to duplicate such
system in detail. Exclusive attention to the formative mechanism
of instruction, framing it up in such doubtful psychological terms
as "generalized habit," or "science is a system "which is to be
constructed as a step in an individual's intellectual development,
can only mean that we are taking no serious account of the fact
that building up the student's mental world may have nothing in
detail in common, certainly no identity, with the world's science
whether taken as an actual system or as a figure of speech.
"...Experience shows in the most discouraging way that a
student may know his algebra and geometry and not Know how to apply
mathematics to physics or to certain practical shop problems.
Evidently one is not performing the same mental process when he
1
0p_ . Cit .pp . 4o4 , 344
.
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masters a mathematical formula and when he uses it. This suggests
the study of the psychology oi applioati ens." 1 Jo put it only
so is to remain satisfied to leave the cart "before the horse. If
the only alternative of sublets without applications is a psychol-
ogy of applications we are still short even on our conception of
rational pedagogy, to say nothi ng of actual improvements. It is
only because we have prescribed algebra and geometry without actual
problems that we are ever able to conceive of "applications"
as a remedy. Shall we ever be able to see that to "master a
mathematical formula" before applying it is as unthinkable as to
propose a study of the dictionary to one who has made no study of
language contest? A formula is an expression of process. Process
is a performance. There is really no such thing as practicing a
performance before we do it. We may, of course analyze all the
meaning out of it, and perform its partial processes out of con-
nection, but the term "mastery" in no way applies, and to suggest
such mental disorganization of process would be recognized as
pedagogical ineptitude if we were not utterly used to it as the
history oi our practice.
It is not strange that the prevalence of convention in text
books and other tools furnished us as teachers is strong. We are
timid enough in making a suggestion that the attack might well be
different. "It might be questioned whether the text book in
geometry ought to give these analyses at the beginning. Certainly
the recognition on the part of the student of the motive for these
simple forms of analysis is not complete until he has gone farther
in his study. On the other hand no student will begin to analyze
10p_.0it.p.25.
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his experiences until some one sets him thinking about the proper-
ties of figures. i/Vhen the child begins to play with paper and
pencils and iinds that he can draw a great variety' of lines, he
is working toward the statement that an infinite number of lines
can be drawn through a single point, but he is not likely to hit
upon that particular idea until he has cultivated a large exper-
ience with lines and with points. On the other hand the scientist
who has made a careful examination of the properties 01 ctuferent
geometrical elements comes to realize the fact that this statement
with regard to lines and points is the logical foundation xor
many of the more elaborate discussions and analyses of space,
i'lie writer of a text book, therefore puts this logically simple
proposition at tne beginning of his science.
Two similar paragraphs on the problem oi pedagogical arrange-
ment extend the apologies for placing definitions first, for giv-
ing demonstrations and theorems that are ;!mere repetitions and
elaborations of the definitions"; urging that ''the geometrician
undoubtedly holds that the student's time would be greatly econ-
omized if he could only take up the subject in tne order which
the mature science recognizes as most advantageous for the develop
ment of the later, more elaborate, propositions. Perhaps it is
worth the effort to get as many of these obvious analyses as
possible made, even if it becomes necessary to reestablish the
definitons by later reiterations in more detailed form, i'he
student may gain something by the preliminary statement, even
though he does not gain all that he might: but the teacher of ex-
perience knows how little some students really absorb the iirst
time they encounter these simple analyses, etc...." I'he import-
10p.Cit
.pp. 52-3.
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ant tiling to be admitted is what is tacitly implied here, that there
seems to he no suggestion by the text-book maker or its user that a
pedago: ioal privilege extends in any considerable dimensions to
the student who is to "absorb" geometry like that which was the
privilege of the geometrician or the text-book maker, namely, to
have a problem which needs to be solved. "In some cases a statement
of the definition will induce the student to perform the desired
mental process; in other cases, elaborate reasoning may nave to be
resorted to before tne student is made to see the truth and its
importance." 1 In any case, whatever good judgment and ingenuity
is exercised together with patience and docility tne problem of
the teacher of geometry is to impart it, and the only problem of
the student is to learn it. There is practically no question
of anything in it that may be called problem.
The "supposed scientific analysis of space, which is the
aim set by the teacher of geometry for his work" is conceived of
as a set task of the teacher with every probability that the
student's experience with the vital processes of space perception
will be logical exercises instead. "The student should, in some
way gain an insight into the methods employed by the author in
solving his problem. Whenever it is possible more than one solution
of the problem should be presented, and the merits and demerits
of each solution should be discussed, borne comments on method
should be introduced into the text itself. The only possible
justification for giving a student a solution is to train him in
methods of solving problems economically and in rigid iorm."
2
"Three different spheres of experience in geometry are first,
1 Op. git. p. 55.
2 Op.CTE.pp.62-63.
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space perception: second an abstract system of logical steps con-
stituting proof: and third rules of practical pr ocedure . . . . The
teacher sees now that knowledge of theory, knowledge of the prac-
tical procedure, and direct percepts of space are all separate
problems to be worked out; and furthermore he sees that the student
must be trained to pass from one to the other ... ..«iore instructional
energy should be deovted to training students in these transitions.
...Only through the fuller cultivation of all these methods of
thought can the student gain the advantages which come from each."
1
One is prepared to realize that for Professor Judd ideas
are something that can be "put into the mind," and even good
habits well put in will 'transfer'. "Knowledge that does not
transfer is inflexible and inert. It is badly remembered and was
badly acquired. It shows that the mind is capable of taking in
highly specialized ideas.". . ."Reasoning is the rearrangement and
2
recombination of ideas."
What has been done in the way of improving method in algebra
even in the way of making it "practical" is reflected in the ap-
plause Professor Judd gives a new text-book, which "by its free
use of problems and equations, furnished the student with the
means of developing his ideas of the fundamental processes. To
go through half a book on a subject with nothing but abstract ex-
amples of the processes that are to be used later is a great tax
upon the interest and attention of the student. The change which
of
has been introduced is undoubtedly/value in building up and main-
taining the student's insight and interest.". . .Its "emphasis on
space is in the interest of application of the science of algebra
1
Op.Cit .p. 67.
20p. Cit .p.75.
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and also in the interest of clearness of presentation ol' tne various
algebraic processes studi ed. . . .This disposition to unow tiie student
concrete tacts related to algebraic equations is one of the most
important innovations that has been made in the presentation of
mathematical sciences to secondary-school students. Algebra is
remote from the ordinary subjects of real experience; consequently
the discovery that space is at the same time a direct concrete
experience and a means of expressing abstract relations is important
to the teacher who is looking for some kind of experience which
can always be used in explaining and applying algebra." 1 The text-
book is quot ed: " 'Some informational problems have been included
with the intention oi stimulating interest and not with the idea
that such problems are practical or that they arise in every day
life, or that it is the function of algebra to teach history,
geography or other subjects? .. .The trouble is that algebra is
usually taught at a time in the high school when examples from the
scienoes cannot be readily borrowedCij In this connection note
that our authors maire this statement (p. IV); 'A large number of
'motion' problems are given, which, witn many problems based on
physical ideas and physical formulas, should give much desirable
correlation with the subject of physics. A very large number of
problems are based on geometrical ideas, and as the needs of
geometry largely decided the choice oi the exercises in radicals,
it is hoped that a close correlation of algebra with geometry
has been secured.'" Then a remark of Professor Judd's shows why
there is still some occasion for characterizing our schools and
p
colleges as "back eddies oi the \vorld":
lQp Cit. pp. 109-3.10.
^Samuel Butler, The Way_ of All Flesh, p. 25 7 , speaking of English
universities of about 1850
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"Why should not material of this sort, which is perfectly natural
and legitimate, be used to the exclusion of the artificial
problems that have really no connection With either science or
life? If necessary let us precede the algebra problems by an
explanation oi these phenomena which can be adequately dealt with
by algebraic methods. It may prove wise for us to develop some
simple notion of mechanics in the first years of the high school
and postpone algebra to a later .period." A postponement of al-
gebra, as he himself suggests, is not aside from the answer,
which answer to his question, turns far aside from the practices
we have too long sworn by to give up at a suggestion. An answer
to the question is another question: Why precede algebra with
something to give it content? Why refuse to take content wi th its
process as we do in real life? In language-studies we have about
given up the heresy of "composition" without content. Probably
because that was the most palpable abuse. The real reason why
we have to talk of "correlating" things that belong together
seems to be the hard-and-fast .rule of practice which condemns a
child to algebra in one grade and geometry in another and physics
two grades farther on, apparently because these sciences are
serviceable to engineers and others who have a chance to make a
reasonable use of them. Because algebra, as algebra, without too
much waste of algebra's precious time by "practical" problems and
"correlations" must be elaborated as a separate science in a cer-
tain grade, there is nothing for Professor Judd to do but welcome
the palliatives which gradually come in as improvements in al-
gebra 1 s methods. The high calling of a teacher of algebra is
about summed up in this way: "The teacher of algebra is con-
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stantly working, therefore, to keep alive and in operation a long
list of principles of operation which students are constantly
omitting. The omission means an error, and an error means iailure
to reach a solution." And it might as well he added as the
student '
s
high calling in the same connection: Failure of solution
means failure to pass.
Professor Judd's Chapter on Science, (XIV) finds a richer field
for students in genuine prohlems. "...The first stage in cultivat-
ing the attitude of mind which is to he defined as scientific
is that o± discovering prohlems rather than that of seeking solu-
tions.... The difficulty with most of the science text-booiis and
with much of the laooratory worK is that the effort of the teacher
is devoted to giving the student results. Science in its completed
form is a statement of solutions of prohlems. Science in the
personal form in which the student needs to acquire it consists
in the stating of problems in such a way as to give the student
an appreciation of the reason why anybody should try to work at
the subject. There is notrdng more fatal to mental life than the
learning of solutions of problems which are wholly artificial
to the student and not appreciated by him as having significance
either for himself or for society." One is compelled to raise
the doubt whether so strong a statement can be true here and have
no force in algebra and geometry. "Applications of science con-
stitute a special phase of study" here too, instead of starting
with problems and finding science. "The chief business of science,
"3
whatever its subject matter, is to train students to see problems.
ipp. Cit
.
Chapter V passim
2^.Cit. p. 330.
SQp.Cit. pp. 332-3.
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One might rather say that it would need teaoher'
s
help, doubtless,
not science's, to see problems, and that the solution oi' problems
would in due time involve science, and that scientiiic statements
would be tilings to end with rather than begin with, so that science
might be "a statement of solution oi' problems." Instead of
saying "We must discover devices which will arouse the problem-
seeking attitude, and we must then focus this attitude upon the
common-place eurrouno.ings of the students," (always grooming,
nursing, stimulating, preparing , a jaded mind 1.) it might better
be put: Meet native curiosity with situations where problems are;
foster adequate solutions and get 'science' as a by-product. All
authorities on thinking tell us that there is very little of
it actually done in the world, and that it is done by very few
people. Still fewer are tne geniuses that actually discover
problems. We seem to be making extensive use of text-books, but
one wonders, sometimes, what teachers are regarded as being for.
Even the laboratory has often tended chiefly toward letting the
teacher dodge the issue of his relation to the student's solution
of real problems. But we have discussed that in another connection
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CHAPTER IX
A MOTOR THEORY OF PROBLEM
ontext
The psychologist's rigid definition of process leads him to
simplify terms to their elemental uses. By 'context' he means the
margin surrounding the focus of attention. In this defiiiition he
limits himself to cognitive elements. The pedagogist is also
interested in a description of thought but craves much explanation
in the interest of practice. The growing edge of experience where
its fabric is being woven as cognition is our object of study, but
it has other elements
1
which are oound to be involved in a study
of conduct. We have given some attention to thinking and its
problematic character, in the last two chapters, have proposed
in chapter six 'project' as the collegiate form it may take, and
shall have occasion to scrutinize the collegiate principles of
project in the next chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to
seek objective terms in which to express to oneself how a problem-
idea may be thought of as working. For purposes of expression of
pedagogical ideal the proposal is, then, to employ the help of
experimental and theoretical physiologists as well as psychologists.
To the psychologist context is of interest as the setting of
a more important focus: to the pedagogist, as to the logician,
context is richer, if possible, than the focus of attention. It
is the field of the moment's activity, and as it has the deter-
minants in it of the moment's attention, it has a sort of priority
to everything else of the moment. The momentary form experience
takes, whether by combination of determinable associations or not,
3-Dewey, assays in Experimental Logic , ( 1916 ) pp. Iff
.
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is t nevertheless, the thing that establishes the judgment of the
moment. "No judgment of perception can be understood in its real
meaning unless taken in its context. The reason for the expression
both in form and in content can be understood only from the context.
Criticizing the inadequacy of logical theories to deal with the
variety of possibilities of such a moment of judgment, Pillsbury
says further: "We have seen throughout that the same mental
operation may lead to one of several expressions according to the
social situation, the distance of auditors, their preparedness, etc
.
Similarly we can understand the connection of the elements in
the mind of the speaker, only if we consider the entire situation
from which it arises, the entire movement of thought in which it
developed. Each of the theories that were examined is inadequate
in part because it has not asked what the connection between the
parts of the judgment is in the actual setting in which it arises.
Instead they all ask what the connection might have been in any
situation. To this no single answer can be returned. It might be
any one of the forms of connection suggested, it may be none of
them, but depend upon some chance succession of words. All of this
leads to the one result that the nature of predication can not be
defined in a single statement. Predication may assert any one of
several connections. One can say which one is intended in any
particular case only by a study of the actual purpose at the moment
of judging. This may be known at first hand or from the context."
1
This one question of what predication of judgment may be made at
a moment of experience serves to show that it is in context that
the momentary form experience takes determines what happens and
1Pillsbury f The Psychology of Reasoning : Chapter on Judgment md
Language
,
pp. 168-9.
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and is itself determined by what asaoc iati vely mokes up that
moment's context. Taken in terms of a moment of experience, con-
text is the inclusive name for everything that makes up mental
activity. As to what shall come out of a context, "The selecting
force is to be found in the purpose and the related circumstances
of the situation, together with more remote experiences of the in-
dividual so far as these are not included in the purpose,"
1
The
act of summoning past experience to cooperate with the purpose of a
present situation in making a meaning for an object is given the
name' extroversion 1
,
by which the psycho-analyst means an outward
flow of the person's interest to objects or events by which they
have the meaning for that person at that moment which the use of
2
that moment makes,
3
Pillsbury says further: "What I have been arguing ±or is
that the individual consciousness contains a system or systems
that are on exactly the same general plane as this system of
knowledge as it is formulated in the sciences. This system springs
up in the individual mind in a way that is fully as difficult to
trace as the development of the scientific conception of the world.
...Wherever it is found, it will be adequate to the experience
of the individual. When developed it is what the individual calls
his real world....
"...While the system in its. entirety can not be conscious
at once, it is always present as background of consciousness, and
all experience is in terms of some part of it. The system is
effective more as a possibility of reinstatement than in what is
actually presented. When one part is presented there is felt the
iOp.Cit.p.^.
2WhiteTWm.A.
.
Mechanisms of Character Format! on , p. 220.
30p.Cit .Conclusion pp. 276-299
,
passim .
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possibility of the reinstatement of all that remains. .. .Any con-
sciousness of the system seems to he nothing more than this accepted
capacity for reinstatement. In fact, any hit of experience is
nothing more than the consciousness that accompanies the point
of intersection of open paths of associat ion . . . .Conee iousness is
of the whole with emphasis upon the part, never of the part alone.
...The consciousness of the system seems to depend very largely
upon the connections that are established between part and part,
connections that are reflected in consciousness over wide areas
even if the particular mental state seems to be of limited extent.
"Granted the existence of this system of knowledge, all
thinking is in terms of it. Thinking grows out of it on the one
hand and on the other serves still farther to develop it. At
any given moment it is the starting point of thinking and controls
thought, and at the same time each end attained by thought serves
to develop and enlarge the system...."
Lack of space forbids extended use just here of the termin-
ology of a thoroughgoing motor theory to express objectively
sometning of what may take place in context. Washburn's chapter
on 'simultaneous movement systems ,1is full of illustrations of
what is conceived of as taking place on the margin where perception
and learning are going on. The superior capacity of humans
is in their power of holding together the parts of their experience
by making reactions to a whole group of such parts as a single
group. Beasts with hands, and still more, men with hands and
language, have the unique capacity of unifying motor responses -
which is "not only to hold together into a system our responses
1
S ashburn , i,i . g . .Movement and Mental Imagery, Chapter VII.
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to the various aspects of a single concrete object, but we can in
a similar way form systems out of the aspects or features which a
number of objects have in common. We can form those systems Wi:ich
are the bases of general ideas or concepts.... When material is
learned with the help 01 any kind of aid preferring to the learning
of nonsense syllablesj it belongs to two or more movement systems
when the learning is complete: one the 'new system which has been
established, the others the old systems which functioned in the
learning. Its recall when the point of correct recitation
has been reached is due to the combined effect of all the systems,
the newly formed and the older ones...."
Context is, then, the momentary background 01 consciousness
in which anything mental takes place. Its richness or poverty
will be reflected in the mental product of its focus. Stimulus
for perception will find response in associative tendencies,
and such ideas as context allows will be the result. In context
determining tendency meets stimulus to result in emotion and action.
What happens as belief, knowledge, or action, happens by virtue
of the way earlier acquired tendency of the individual is able to
express itself in the consciousness of the movement. He who has
experienced little, being able therefore to doubt little, will be
able to learn little. In context experience feeds upon the new in
the moment to grow, and new context for the next moment is inevit-
able. The real significance of context as a productive margin on
which knowledge may grow is not in the days of social, but in the
days of individual, acquisition. The mental merit 01 the child
and the tribesman is the negative merit of belief. Belief the
psychologist finds to be a negative, not a posit ive, act . Complete
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belief is characteristic of almost complete ignorance. It iB a
virtue only i or the uses of conformity , mere adaptation. As such
a virtue it has place only where enlargement of /mowiedge is not
sought. Its virtue is only conservative. The function 01 the col-
lege is not conservative. Thinking must imply improved contexts;
contexts improve for purposes of growth in thinking only beyond
the "borders where belief holds static sway. Context has a widen-
ing significance when its normal function is that of an individual
whose ,-iiowledge is sufficient to range always beyond the border
of credulity on a margin where context is always tne edge of a
new fabric whose texture is that of real thinking,
"We are made, so to speak, for belief, credulity is natural.
The undisciplined mind is averse to suspense and intellectual
hesitation: it is prone to assertion. It limes things undisturbed
settled, and treats them as such without due warrant, familiarity,
common repute, and congeniality to desire, are readily made measur
ing rods of truth. Ignorance gives way to opinionated and current
error, - a greater foe to learning than ignorance itself. A
Socrates is thus led to declare that consciousness of ignorance
is the beginning of effective love of wisdom, and a ves Cartes
to say that science is born of doubting." 1
. #
. "These two processes, of doubting tne familiar, and imag-
ining tne unfamiliar, are correlative, and form the chief part of
the mental training required for a philosopher,...
"The naive beliefs which we find in ourselves when we first
begin the process of philosophic reflection may turn out, in the
1i)ewey , Phil o sophy of Mucation, pp. 9 2-3, 222 ; bee also
Pills bury, The Psychology of He asoning , Chapt er i I, Belief; and
Washburn,Movement and cental Imagery , pp . 2UO-1
.
1 I
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end, to be almost all capable of a true interpretation; but they
ought all, beiore being admitted into philosophy, to undergo the
ordeal of skeptical criticism. Until they have gone through this
ordeal, they are mere blind habits, ways of behaving ratner tnan
intellectual convictions. And although it may be that a majority
will pass the tost, we may be very sure that some will not, and
that a serious readjustment of our outlook ought to result. In
order to break the dominion of habit, we must do our best to doubt
the senses, reason, morals, everything in short....""*" It has
continuous pertinence to our theme to note that the easy-going
"belief" which it is the business of doubt to attach from the
first - or as soon as context of sufficient content gives room for
doubt - is a very different thing from the "intellectual con-
viction" which comes as a product of thinking. The force of this
distinction appears throughout the discussion of problem and
purpose, where doubt is one of the most important constitutent
elements of thinking, and where easy-going belief gives way to
doubt, and the end of the process is conv icti on . Belief is shown
to be not even a psychological datum, but the absence of doubt,
which _is something; whereas conviction comes after doubt has done
its work. It must be noted, however, that no usage seems consistent-
ly to make this distinction, ana the word 'belief 1 is used rather
2
in the sense of that belief which comes as intelligent conviction.
Affective Aspects of Purpose
Pedagogy may make but cautious use of psychological terms with
which psychology has itself done so little as with 'purpose', iAost
^Bertrand Russell, Scient if ic luethod in Philo sophy , pp. 258-9
.
^See Dewey
,
Beliefs and Realities , Philosophical Review,inarch, 1906
.
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of its terms are borrowed end its interest in practice compels
pedagogy to announce tne use it expects to make oi' them. In the
pedagogist's 'context 1
,
as we saw a moment ago, much more was al-
lowed than the psychologist's cognitive elements. Similarly
purpose and effort, and 'feeling' itself, we must give notice of
our intention to use as terms which apply in what we call practical
situations. Hot simply their description, or exposition, is our
task, but their use
,
as all language is employed, as terms which
have already been appropriated. 'Affective coloring' characterizes,
for example, the mental processes the psychologist calls 'effort'.
The pedagogist has not yet fully decided what he means by 'effort',
but he knows at least whether he thinks there is 'feeling' in it.
For him the word 'effort' must apply to something connected with
'work 1
,
a word the psychologist has no use for. Similarly 'pur-
pose' is not 'purpose' to pedagogy except as purpose to do some-
thing, (ideational purpose, to think a problem out to solution, is
equally 'doing something 1 in the sense intended). This wide
difference in the use of terms is necessary, though it may at
times he hard to observe. The pedagogist 1 s 'context' is a good
illustration of terms so appropriated by pedagogy, but not yet un-
equivocally defined.
"An intermediary stage for knowledge (that is for knowledge
comprising reflection and naving a distinctively intellectual
quality) implies a prior stage of a different kind. • .social, af-
fectional, technological, aesthet ic , etc . • . .It is a type of exper-
ience which cannot he called a knowledge experience without doing
violence to the term 'knowledge', and to experience. It may con-
tain knowledge resulting from prior inquirieis; it may include
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th inking within it cell"; but not so that they dominate tne situation
and give it its peculiar flavor ... .The distinction between tne two
types of experience is evident to anyone who will take the trouble
to recall what he does most of the time when not engaged in medi-
tation or inquiry.
"But since one does not think about knowledge except when
he is thinking
,
except, that is, when the intellectual and cogni-
tional interest is dominant, the professional philosopher is only
too prone to think of all experiences as if they were of the type
he is specially engaged in, and hence unconsciously or intentionally
to project its traits into experiences to which they are alien....
He thinks of things as either totally absent from experience or
else there as objects of 'consciousness' or knowing. This habit
is a tribute to the importance of reflection and of the knowledge
which accrues from it....
"...The intellectual element is set in a context which is
non-cognitive and which holds within it in suspense a vast complex
01 other qualities and things that in the experience itself are
objects of esteem or aversion, of decision, of use, 01 suffering,
oi endeavor and revolt, not of knowledge." 1
The most palpable criticism of collegiate student-work, the
one least likely to be combatted, is that, to say tne least, the
student-work itself, if by that we mean attainment tnrough study,
has not yet successfully capitalized the enthusiasm of tne ordinary
student. Plenty of precept might be marshalled forth from the
pages of elementary pedagogy with a hope tnat some might be found
to rectify collegiate practice in this matter, because of general
application; and there is doubtless to be a great improvement
"^Dewey, Assays in Experimental Logic ( 1916 ), pp. Iff.
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through revision of precept. We have here only to subjeot the
suggested idea of 'project' to scrutiny for a test of its service-
ability under each main heading. The aiiective life of tne adoles-
cent is peculiarly rich. The possibility of attaching the things
the adolescent needs to do to the great strains of emotive tension
bound to run through his experience seems on the face of it a
plausible suggestion. This practical aspect of tne question sug-
gests inquiry into the nature of the connection of the affective
life with the intellectual. The study of character from the point
of view of the sentiments is a comparatively new field in which
much is to be expected as it opens up. i'or our purposes we essay
the limited inquiry into the account project will have to take
of the part the feelings can be relied upon to play.
We need waste no time defending a doctrine of hard work,
whatever controversies have had to be waged over "soft pedagogy"
for children. A normal adolescent will do hard work of some kind
before he passes on to maturity, ana it may devolve a constructive
burden of proof directly upon any activity that proposes to enlist
him that it is worthy to bid ior that expenditure of energy. It
is almost axiomatic that nothing will get a fair share of the in-
definite margin of his surplus energy unless it gets more than
his conventional assent. One thing the college seems now to suxfer
from is the readiness with which that mere intellectual assent is
given. The community is scarcely moved by any serious skepticism
of the almost universal desirability of collegiate education.
How much it suffers from deep conviction of the urgency of tre-
mendous devotion as the price of the collegiate privilege is a
more serious question. We speak in another connection of the
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chance of waste of youthful ingenuity allowed to evaporate because
met with no cordial response in the way of work to do which demands
it. Perhaps still less to he proved, it may nevertneless be as-
sumed that the waste of enthusiasm is enormous. The complacency of
the ordinary collegian toward the things ne conceives himself chief-
ly privileged to aodge would be a matter of amazement to the logic-
al "visitor from Mars," though our present attitude is that of
smiling comment. The saving feature of such attitude is our aeknowl
edged ability to make our best jokes over what most profoundly
afiects us. If we cared as little to enlist the collegian in his
business, as our jokes over his lack of seriousness might be taken
to indicate, the joke would scarcely be on the puzzled visitor from
Mars.
The nature of a purpose as that which controls a protracted
adventure in thinking or doing, to an end - the pedagogy of purpose,
is not yet represented in an extensive literature. Elementary
pedagogy has done something with it but higher pedagogy whose
problem it really is has not yet extensively investigated this type
of problem. An aspect of the protracted problem must engage some
attention. The identification of education with etnics, where
they are, in common, studies of conduct r keeps the problem of values
uppermost throughout, ror the study of ideals as one of the most
important of the acquired controls of conduct we are indebted to
Professor Bagley's Educational v alues . The distinction of "ideals"
from "ideas" is the guide to our investigation of this aspect of
purpose. This definition supplies the differentia of fundamental
importance. An idea is an image plus a meaning, -but an ideal is
an image plus a meaning plus a strong emotional or affective color-
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ing. . .meaning by this no more than that, "upon psychological
analysis, the conscious 'stuff that makes up an ideal is more
vitally infused with a pleasant or unpleasant feeling-tone than
is trie conscious 'stuff that makes up the idea.... In general,
ideals are the prime, the basic, the fundamental controls of con-
duct. Ideas are the subordinate, the interpolated controls, ide als
determine purposes : ideas guide to the reali zat ion of purpose .
Ideals dominate large experiences or large adjustments. Ideas
control the smaller segments of experience, the adjustments that
are incidental as means to the desired or idealized end.... The
efficiency of ideals is largely dependent upon the emotional force
that lies back of them - upon the directness of their reference
to felt needs." The application of this principle in elementary
conduct is direct and cle ar. .. ."Ideals, as well as determining
purposes also serve as standards or criteri a for conduct in the
realization of purpose. All of the recognized 'virtues' represent
particularly this type of ideal. Honesty, personal honor, chastity,
patriotism, altruism, self-denial, cleanliness, - all these are
ideas which must be strongly and effectively emotionalized in
order to serve as conduct controls. They have, it is true, an
intellectual or ideationial content, but this may be relatively
simple. In any case, it is the emotional factor that is import-
ant .
"
But Professor Bagley's discussion of the part ideal, as an
emotional force, plays in an ambitious purpose is brilliantly
illustrated by his study of a great achievement, such as Peary's
idea of reaching the Pole, (which thousands of men might hold as
an idea ) , but which becomes an ideal by being "infused with a
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powerful emotional force which made the idea directive over his
conduct during the long series oi' efforts and trials and inter-
polated experiences. ul
Unfortunately we can, as yet, only roughly observe this fact,
without knowing with any exactness how much an emotional attitude
contributes to an intellectual purpose. Our study of thinking as
rational problem might be thought to be better separated from that
of feeling, but one cannot go far with such a topic as purpose
without discovering that it is less than half conceived while we
divest it of the motive of ideal. Resort to motor theory is not
out of place as help to express what we thus observe.
This aspect of purpose is given exposition germane to our
pdiscussion in the chapter on "Inspirational functions > " whereit
is shown that "an ideal or a prejudicial attitude may be engendered
through forces of different types, but this vitalizing emotional
element is always the essential ingredient. Self-interest is
probably the most effective source of such standards, because self-
interest is only another expression for the most fundamental and
basic of all instincts, and every emotion must have its instinctive
core . . . .It is the combination of these two forces that constitutes
an ideal. The intellectual elements furnish the meaning of the
ideal: the core of instinct gives it force and vitality." The
essential ingredients of a purpose, then, whether to pursue
effectively a problem in action or thinking are intellectual and
emotional and the emotional especially are traceable to instincts.
Instinct is the firm substructure of whatever may be built up in
human character, but it is especially in evidence in that aspect
of thinking which exhibits itself in purpose. We may scarcely
agley,W.C.
,
Educational Values
,
Chapter IV.
20p. Git .Chapter 'XI.
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hope to oonstruot an idea of purposive thinking which shall i'ail
to show the deep marks of racial instinct - especially as these
show in strong feelings. The pedagogy of feeling lies largely in
the future, as witness the repeated efforts to conceive of moral
instruction through intellectual processes chiefly. The emotions
are not only themselves still to have due attention with reference
to their own claims, but evidently no pedagogy of thinking can he
conceived apart from the pedagogy of the feelings.
Though the psychology of the feelings has awaited its turn
after cognition, the emotions are now sufficiently an object of
interest in psychological literature to warn us to narrow our
attention to those aspects most evidently germane. Yet it is
probably wise to realize that any important activity like pursuit
of purpose in solving problem gets a large part of its character
from the feeling element in it. "Until recently there has been a
tendency to give feeling but a small place in formal education.
The emphasis was placed on mere intelligence, particularly on mere
knowledge. We know, however, that facts as sue n have no value in
the control of conduct . It _is only when they have some worth ,
when they appe ar valuable to the individual , that they lead to
action . There must be a glow of feeling, a desire for some form
of approval, a prejudice, that attaches itself to the mere fact
and gives it a sanction.""1"
We shall not make an adequate statement of the intimate
personal character of 'project' unless we provide for its being
entered into with the kind of zeal youth is capable of .Exhortations
to incentive are empty, but to attach a thing to instinctive
10p. Cit. pp. 98-99.
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chords of enthusiaetio interest, if it be plausibly done, is to
avail of a power the college has a right to bid for. There is tome
evidence that what the student feels to oe a "sci ent if« method" of
doing a thing is a legitimate appeal for his devotion. The activities
of students which now engage enthusiastic devotion have been
shown to be the things which are actually done by effective methods,
like base-ball and some types 01 student-managed social activities.
One at least has a chance to decide whether he likes a thing if
the thing is well done. Doing a thing by the right method is not
only efficiency, but according to Dewey, is what we mean by 'in-
terest 1 . Perhaps a reason why the student is now so impartial in
his choice of the things that do engage his enthusiasm by close
attachment to his instincts and his powenul emotions, is because
his relation to courses provides no mechanism for the exploitation
of his emotions. Teachers are sometimes enthusiastic, but teachers,
as we have seen, have their mechanism of purposive absorption.
What may be the nature of that personal core which seems to
be demanded for the student? I think it must first be said that
there is no hope for the continuity which is necessary to make a
student unless a way may be devised to make a person and his own
mental life the basis of that continuity. How the active thinking
of individuals creates 'scientific 1 as well as 'normative' judg-
ments, and supplies the only conceivable basis for continuity is
profoundly shown by Professor Dewey in an essay entitled The
Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality.
1
The
principle there aiiiiounced as the postulate of continuity of exper-
ience is a convincing assurance that the experience that establish-
1
Decennial Publications University of Chicago, J?irst Series,
Volume 111,1903.
!
160-
es the charecter of judgments still more emphatically declares the
personal
,
individual character of such experience. Nobody else's
continuity can "vicariate" for me. There is only one continuity
of experience for me, no matter what metaphysics may want to do
with it, and that is the continuity I know as mine. Whatever sub-
ject, or science, or course, or other experience may already he
the possession of my teacher, nothing corresponding exists for
me until my active experience builds it up. There is something so
warm and intimate about the motive we are identifying it seems best
classified as affective; I believe it is even instinctive.
The pedagogy of avocation"1" is pertinent. Recalling the fact
that collegiate education as we are treating it is conceived of
as liberal, hence cultural and personal, motives operating within
it are wisely rated as preferably personal, individuating,
characteristic. This is of the nature of avocation, a pursuit whi or-
is peculiar in the strength with which it entices my enthusiasm,
takes the right of way and subordinates my other interests, may
make itself, for the time, the structural core of my current ex-
perience. As empatliic, it displays that converse of an ordinary
cognitive experience's pattern: Its core is not sensational but
irnaginal and its context is of sensations, that is, it has an e-
motional tendency to dominate. How it is not necessary to conceive
such a "hobby" (which is a good general name for an empathic pro-
ject) as takirg possession of one to have pedagogical efficacy.
One may, and often does, deliberately choose such a hobby, and use
it for recreative purposes. Something like this may constitute
the project which one chooses wisely because it presents an active
ibee Johnston and Others, The Modern High School . Chapter on
Education for Avocation.

personal way to carry the continuity of one's experience into the
territory upon which one has designs. It may be chosen as one
chooses a friend: not without an invitation to emotional attachment,
but certainly with keen appreciation of congeniality.
This 'hobby', expressed, for the sake 01 emphasis, in extreme
terms, 1 have been calling 'cycle', that is the alienist's
persistent idea or memory, or better what he calls an 'imperative
idea', or an 'obession'. The "adjustment constant with us while
we are in a certain mood," becomes pathological when that mood
tends to repeat itself either periodically as in alternating
and recurrent forms of insanity or to assert itself, not with a
fixed rhythm, but oftener and oftener because, for some reason,
so many associative paths tend to empty into it, that "everything
seems to suggest" our pet idea. Under 'context', as the cognitive
aspect of apperception we see that single, large apperceptive
'systems' build themselves up and get associative strength and
persistence by repetition. We have now in addition to note that the
emotive accompaniments seem also to be powerful adjuncts to this
tendency.
"Whatever the mechanism, ideas with strong emotional tones
(particularly fear, anger, jealousy and disgust), no matter now
absurd or repellent, or unjustified, and whether acceptable or
unacceptable, tend to become organized and welded into a complex
which is thereby conserved. The impulsive lorce 01 the incorporat-
ed emotion tends to awaken and give expression to the complex
whenever stimulated. The recurrence of such an organized complex
so far as it is reproduction is, in principle, memory, and an
imperative memory or fixed idea." 1
^-Prince.M. , The Unc onscious ,pp.27Y-8.
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"The patient with a well marked complex i'ormat ion finally gets so
that almost everything in life is assimilated in some way to the
complex."^ The corresponding normal state of attention seems to
me to be that of the expert or the specialist whose mind stands
peculiarly open to tiings that are pertinent to his specialty.^
A project implies such an intensification and spontaneous re-
currence of attention. I am inclined to think that a "persistent
idea" or its equivalent is a necessity as the continuous core of
real thinking.
We have seen in the discussion of purpose, how the principle
of conflict is held to he generative of consciousness. One way to
express this is in terms of what results when obstruction of re-
action occurs. "An instinct, when checked in its normal ex-
pression always sets up a disturbance in consciousness and in the
behavior accompanying it, and this disturbance is clearly an
emotion. But an acquired desire, when blocked, may also give rise
to an emotional disturbance. .. .An emotion never arises except under
conditions of unsatisfactory and incomplete adjustment."4 "Mere
unsatisfactory adjustment does not give rise to an emotion. There
must be added the fact that the behavior is not sustained in any
one direction for any length of time and that it is incomplete
in the sense that it fails to atiain any result, whether pleasant
pWhite,iiiechanlems _of Character fformati on,
p
. 187
^See Titchener.A Beginner'
s
Psychology, p. 98.
3See White, Op_.Cit., Especially Chapter IV, The Conflict, bee
Crile, The Origin and iiature ofthe Emotions , passim; and
Cannon
t W.B T Bod ily Changes in I'ain . hunger . Fear and ^age . for
the effects of certain psychical processes, ..otably emotions,
.on bodily activities.
4Colvin and Bagley, Human Benavi or
, pp . 7 a , 80
.
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or unpleasant. There is more or less supsense in behavior under
the stress of the emotion. It is uncertain and fluctuating. There
are rapid shifts in attention and, connected with this, relative
confusion in the thought processes. .Cle ar thought and definite
action kill the emotion. ...I do not rid myself of the emotion
until in some way by a definite act or by a train of ideas that
stand for acts, I become aware of the situation, and happily or
unhappily cope with it.... In accordance with the various facts
emphasized. . .we may define an emotion as a complex state of
consciousness of high affective coloring, involving an intellectual
and a will attitude: appearing under certain stress in a rapidly
developing situation, either actually present or ideally represent-
ed, to which situation adequate adjustment is temporarily
blocked; and accompanied by bodily sensations of considerable in-
tensity. In this statement are embodie.d the facts: (1) that an
emotion always has strong feeling elements; (2) that there is a
recognized object toward which tbre emotion is directed, and in the
presence of which some activity is demanded; (5) that there is
always a difficulty to be faced ana that this difficulty is
suddenly presented to the individual; (4) that the emotion may be
the result of a situation not concretely present but brought up
through imagination; (5) and finally that the organic sensations
accompanying the emotion are important elements in it.
1 0p. Cit .pp.6Q-8S» The idea that all consciousness, especial-
ly that marked by affective tension, results from the state of
balance of comlict between stimulus and inhibition is of specu-
lative interest in this connection. Besides the theory of Wash-
burn which yields the illustration we use, tne works by White and
Grile, with the references they cite, are of interest throughout.
Dewey, in showing that action with?.' a purpose takes time, during
which there is much redistribution of energy within the organism
to prepare a determinate course of action, and much accentuation
of consciousness, accompanying the tension as the adjustments are
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This presence of an emotion, a strong form of feeling ,is shown
by this passage to be well intended to mark a situation characterised
as 'tensional 1 . It is specifically illustrated in terms of motor
theory by citation of the effect 01 an emotion in dissociation,
in Washburn,Movement and cental Imagery , Chapt er XI. "...There are
certain circumstances under which the normal and natural form-
ation of associative dispositions fails to occur. .. .jj our different
conditions seem to be involved, general disturbance or shock
to tne organism, "as (3) when a person answers a telephone call in
the midst of being under strong emotional pressure and afterward
forgets all about having done so, or one forgets utterly tne
doings of tne few minutes preceding a severe injury; (2) the dis-
agreeableness of an experience seems to dissociate it from other
experiences, (3) concentrated attention, or (4) hypnosis is re-
sponsible for the dissociation.
"why should strong emotion of any kind, including shock, inter-
fere with the normal iormation of associative dispositions? An
emotion is a movement system of the greatest possible complexity.
When fully developed it involves practically every muscle of the
body. Svery bodily movement and every idea feel its effect,
either in the way of excitation or inhibition. Sow ordinarily,
when one movement system intervenes upon another one, the interrupt-
ed system, while inhibited for the time, remains in a state of
readiness to be resumed." Two stories, told in interrupting bits
maintain their own connections and carry over the interruption of
(1 - Continued)
"being coordinated into a unified attitude, *ays :. ."Normally
there is an accentuation of personal consciousness whenever
our instincts and ready formed habits find themselves blocked
by novel conditions."
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each by the other, if "the interrup tion has not been absolute.
Some parts of the complicated movement system set going by the first
sentence of story A continue in activity, even during the interrupt-
ion [made by introducing a beginning of story B ] : such purts,
namely as do not involve movements incompatible with those 01 -che
first sentence of the interrupting story B» Now the more far-reach-
ing and complex the movement systems started by story B, the less
possible will it be lor any portion of A's movement systems to
remain active over the interval. This would explain why a strong
emotion makes so complete an interruption, and prevents the forma-
tion of associative dispositions between the events which preced-
ed it and the events which followed it."
So, according to Freud, Washburn says, "association with
what is unpleasant, and lor that reason avoided in t nought, is very
likely one of the actual causes of interference with the normal
working of associative dispositions. To form an idea of how
this effect is produced we may first note that if a movement al-
ready belongs to a strongly formed movement system, it will enter
with great difficulty into any system that contains incompatible
movements with those of the xirst system." .. .If the minor in-
stances Professor washburn cites of interferences take place,
"how much more readily" she says "can a great and complicated
system like what the i'eudians term a 'complex 1 , a system of ideas
bound together by being connected with a strong emotion, produce
such int erierence. The suppression of a complex - that is of
the ideas connected with a disagreeable experience - takes place
through the presence of a stronger emotional or affective state
of the opposite character. The normal attitude of a healthy in-

dividual is an attitude of cheerfulness. Now an attitude of
cheerfulness is an actual static movement system [that is a com-
pensatory system, like that which holds the head erect by the con-
stant flexion of opposing muscles evenly balanced in their action;
not a 'phasic' system like that which move s an arm or effects loco-
motionj involving certain innervations. A person in the attitude
of cheerfulness is incapable for tne time being of a depressing
thought, for precisely the same reason that he cannot pronounce
t and g at tne same time: the movements involved are incompatible.
'How long, oh healthy reader 1 asks James, 'can you now continue
thinking of your tomb ? f "
Washburn's whole treatment of this subject of dissociation
as well as her chapters on purpose and on the formation of new
movement systems under the influence of problems is germane to
our purpose. Especially is tne conception of a static system
essential. Like those just mentioned, sleep she regards as such a
"movement system, an attitude - one of complete relaxation, the
inhibition of any muscular contractions whatever. This attitude,
like any other movement system, is brought about by the operation
of associative dispositions. It is suggested. When all the sur-
roundings, are favorable, including the external surroundings, the
quiet of the sleeping room, and the internal surroundings of
fatigue stimuli, then the attitude of sleep is produced, just as
a name is recalled when the associative dispositions leading to
it are set in action. How if sleep as an attitude is complete
muscular relaxation, perfect sleep will, of course, be unconscious,
because consciousness is dependent on motor contract ions •"{Wash-
burn's motor theory of consciousness is that it is expressed by

16?-
the ratio of stimulus to inhibition).
This interesting application of motor theory has been intro-
duced here, as Professor Washburn herseli' uses it, closely connect-
ed with profound emotions, which are themselves examples of
encompassing and dominating movement systems. A complete system,
like dreamless sleep, forbids all activity of the kind which re-
sults from a lack of equilibrium of stimulus and inhibition. After
giving a little more attention to the application of her theory
to the idea of problem we shall be reaay to discover what is
meant by 'activity attitude 1 , the one most important conception
of the theory for our purposes, and for the suggestion which the
theory itself all but makes and fully supports ,viz. , that the
pedagogy of project is an application of the principle of identify-
ing a purpose with a large, prepotent , static movement system, a
directed activity attitude.
If one were tempted to suspect that the motor mechanism,
sought to carry a purpose-idea, is an emotion-complex itseli,
a fuller study of Washburn's suggestions would disabuse one of
that notion and corroborate the many statements^" that strong
emotion is anything but cooperative with deliberate actions -
perhaps problem-thinking least of all. Her proposal, on the con-
trary, is that the thing available is rather a 'static movement
system 1 resembling the emotion-complex, in its capacity for domin-
ation, but not in its tendency to block the wheels, her theory
has been introduced here under her discussion of dissociation,
(1) to show its general relation to theory of emotion, (2) to
exhibit - by the extreme example, sleep - what she means by a
1bee Thorndike, educational fsycnology , Vol.lI.pp»226ff . for the
influence of emotions on improvement in learning.
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'statio movement system', and (3) to introduce the material
suggestion for our purpose which we take the liberty of appropriat-
ing to the uses of collegiate pedagogy. fhe mechanism which offers
itself to pedagogy's demand for help to carry the purpose idea
wiiich we call a project is a persistent movement system capable
of rendering such service, and free from such otner service as
'phasic' movement systems are constantly called upon to render—
'static' systems, able-bodied, but on the reserve list.
Activity Attitude
Problem and purpose treated under a doctrine of 'project'
involve the questions of activity, effort, will, as well as the re-
lation of these to aim and purpose, attention and apperception.
Classes of attention, 'passive', 'active' and 'secondary passive'
1
are fully discussed elsewhere. "The business of the school is to
overlay the lower apperceptive systems with those of higher de-
gree." 2 We may bear in mind that it is not childhood nor boyhood,
nor earlier adolescence that we deal with, but later adolescence,
with many intellectual traits that are virtually adult, moreover
it has been provided in the premises that whatever may be pro-
posed as reasonably to be expected of collegiate students in the
way of devotion to tasks, shall be what may be demanded of persons
chosen for a particular kind of work. It is a special type of
work demanded of a chosen class of persons. With these provisions,
I venture to propose collegiate work in pursuit of well organized
individual projects as a type of work which suits -che requirements
of 'secondary passive attention'.
We have, as I believe, a theory of effort wnich justifies
^Bagl ey t .tiducat ive Process . p. 9?
^bee table at the end of this chapter

"= 1 1 1 —" =
this proposal. The claim for it made by its author is: "The
theory here suggested is the first, so far as 1 know, to explain
how a bodily attitude like that of effort can actually "be the cause
of improved mental work, by prolonging through its own persistent
nature the influence of the problem on the associative processes.
Before stating this theory, however, it is desirable to nave a fair
background of definition from different psychologists of their
idea of what 'effort' is. "The characteristic conscious accompani-
ment of voluntary [active] attention is a mass of strain sensations,
sensations which, taken together, constitute the feeling of ef-
fort....All attention involving conflict of motives tends to arouse
diffuse contractions of a number of muscles, contractions which
are in themselves of no great effect upon the attention process,
but which are accepted as an indication that some force is active.
They make us feel active, are said to constitute a sign of the
activity of the will. So far as we now know, they are not a cause
but an effect, they are a sign, not of a new force, but of a con-
flict of conditions. That they have no good effect is evident
from tne fact that they do not accompany the most effective at-
tention, and, when they a pear usually die away as soon as the
highest stage of efficiency of attention is attained, voluntary
attention is produced by social pressure and is accompanied by
strain sensations. All strain sensations taken together constitute
what we call effort."
2
"To have an interest is to take things as entering into such
a continuously developing situation, instead of taking them in
isolation. The time difference between the given incomplete state
1washbum,Lovement and Mental Imagery , p. 16 2. Somewhat minute
study of this book~wo~uld be essential to a complete understand-
ing of the author's thesis or ours. See especially Chapter vn.
2 Pillphury, fundamentals oltej-^LPP' 262-4 ' Also P* 2 - 5 '
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of affairs and the desired fulfilment exacts effort in transform-
ation; it demands continuity of attention and endurance. ihis at-
titude is what is practically meant by will." 1
"Secondary active attention thus appears as a stage of
transition, of conflict, of waste 01 nervous energy, though it
appears also as the necessary preliminary to a stage of real j^now-
ledge.
"
"If the strongest stimulus always forced itself into the
focus of consciousness. . .sustained effort and all that it implies
would be hopelessly out of the questi on. . . .We still follow the
strongest but not the strongest external stimulus" .. .though"tne
contrasting stimuli from the outer world always tend, to distract
the mind from other processes. This tendency expresses itself in
a movement which must be inhibited, Thus originates the efiort
that characterizes this later development of attention. It is al-
ways a battle as it were -gainst nature - a constant struggle
against fundamental forces. .. .The capacity for work is the capacity
for sustained eff ort . . . .The important elements fef an attentive
state} are muscular and strain sensations." 6
Professor Washburn4 asks the question: "Is it possible to
explain directed, controlled, purposeful thought, without intro-
ducing any new principles and laws beyond those which govern the
mutual relations of associative dispositions?" It is to her
affirmative thesis that we must give attention for statement of the
psychology of 'activity attitude 1 . "The question for us" she says
"i£ evidently, 'What is the physiological basis of determining
^Dewey
,
Phi 1 o so phy of aducat ion
, pp. 161-2. See also p. 405.
gTitchener,A Beginner ' s Psychology tp « 99
.
Bagley,The Educative Process
,
p. 97
.
"Op. Git.
,
p. 151.
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tendenci esY 1 If associative tendencies or dispositions are "based
on lowered synaptic resistances between tne kinaesthet ic centers
excited by the performance either tentative1 or full, and the
motor center belonging to another movement, upon what are determin-
ing tendencies "based":' And a necessary step toward the solution
of this question is as evidently a consideration of what con-
stitutes a problem idea." She answers that its distinguishing
characteristic is the persist ence of it s influence . Some ideas as
for instance those with emotional suggestion nave stronger second-
ary functions that others, that is, tendency to persist, whetner
tney are problem-ideas or not. Besides these secondary functions,
memory after images (acting for limited time), and perseverat ive
tendencies (the spontaneous tendency of an idea to recur), are
aspects rather than explanation, of the problem. The suggestion
that a problem idea has a stronger 'reproductive motive', another
renaming rather than explaining: also the suggestion that the
relative permanence of a problem idea's influence is due to a
combination of associative tendencies, i. e. , to 1 constellation'
,
though going further, is still not sufficient. This latter explan-
ation answers better for complicated problems where it naturally
1Tentative movements are, in Professor V/ashburn's theory, the
imperceptible muscular movements invoked as a necessity of her
motor theory— furnishing actual movement with its reflex motor
tendencies when a larger movement is riot present as a regulative
principle.
"Every visceral organ is supplied by sympathetic fibres,
which work antagonistically to the autonomic,
"Hence it may be stated that the normal progress of function-
ing of visceral organs is a well regulated interaction between
two contrary acting forces?
"The viscera are not in a state of flaccid inactivity until,
called upon to respond to some stimulus, but in a state of
balanced contrary innervation which makes response more prompt
and easy in either direction. Like the muscles of an athlete
they are in a state of tension - tonus - capable of responding
on the instant to demands of either offence or defence."
White. Mechanisms of Character i-ormation.p.68.
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takes some time to work out the movement, than for a EdLmpld,
but protracted mental task.... "We do not add because v;e have
got into the nabit of adding, but becnuse we formed the 're-
solution' at the outset to add. In this resolution something
more than ordinary associative processes, whether simple or
complicated, and something more than the perseveration of
associative processes, seems to be at work. Thus we find sever-
al authorities implying that there is an affective or em otional
aspect to the problem iaea. 1 Claparede declared that logical
thought is distinguished by the presence of a 'sentiment of the
end 1. Meumann says that the capacity of fixing attention on
the idea of the end is connected with affective life . . . ."We
have had this in mind in our last section. But the most im-
portant aspect of the question is stated as follows by Washburn.
"We shall take it for granted that the most essential thing
about a problem idea, as distinguished from other ideas, is
the persistence of its influence, and that to explain this per-
sistence we need to invoke something over and above ordinary
associative dispositions: in other words that an associative
tendency becomes a deteimining tendency through the operation
of some factor that is not itself an ordinary associative ten-
dency.
"Let us take a very simple case of the operation of aproblem
idea, that where a person is instructed to direct his attention
towards a particular aspect, say the color, of an impression
that is to be given him, and to note whether the impression
contains a particular color, red. How according to our general
theory, the words of the instruction set up the tentative
lbee References cited by washburn at end of book.
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movements belonging to the color red. These tentative movements,
however, ore not set up merely for an instant, but persist until
the impression to he judged is actually given;or if they lapse
momentarily, when there is a long wait between the giving of the
instructions and the presentation of the iiirpressicn, they renew
themselves spontaneously. We may call tentative movements which
thus endure and recur, pers istent tentative movements. I t hi nir we
shall find them characteristic of all cases where a problem idea
is operative; of all cases, that is, where mental processes are
directed and not random.
The important fact about a problem-idea is, then, the per-
sistence of its influence. The appeal we are making for individual
project as the normal method of collegiate learning is an appeal
based upon the supposition that such a problem may persist as
an individual's intellectual task. It is clearly a matter of pro-
found importance whether our doctrine of effort to sustain problem
must be one of vague hope that something will sustain it, or may
be more substantial. It amounts to the question whether 'effort'
is the name we give to physiological strains which accompany other
activity, or whether 'effort' may be the name of a definitely
conceived type of activity which is itself at least part of the
cause of problem-persistency. "All students of the learning pro-
cess report the great influence of effort, the determination to
improve," Professor Washburn says, in introducing the claim of
her theory as we quoted it on p J.59 . "Now the natural causative
influence of effort on learning has usually been regarded as due
to a more or less mysterious will process, of which the bodily
attitude characteristic of activity or effort was merely an ac-
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oompaniment ."
We have noted the important distinction between random think-
ing and thinking which is that of persistent problem, also that
associative tendency accounts for random thinking. Many efforts
have been made to account for the transformation of mere 'assoc-
iative tendency 1 into 'determining tendency'.
From many sources comes the suggestion that the mechanism
of such persistence is emotive. One sees at once the primitive
importance of spontaneous tendency to activity and the chance
afforded for choice of activities of great strength as carriers.
One feels next the iorce of the suggestion that primitive me3hanisms
are ready in the major emotions. But their non- availability for
this service is the first thing made clear. The suggestion is
productive, but not by the acceptance of the emotive camp lex it-
self as such a carrier. It is powerful enough, dominating enough,
pervasive enough, perhaps purposive enough (if we accept the right
theory of emotions). That a major emotion may be wide-spread
enough to carry so large a thing as a persistent purpose, and that
it may be free, so far as other demands upon it are concerned,
leave it, nevertheless, not the kind of carrier sought. It is not
so evidently insufficient as inappropriate, as the nature of the
actual vehicle of a persistent idea shows.
To be prepared for what Professor Washburn finally offers as
what we have called the 'carrier' of a problem-idea, it is
necessary to note here what she offers instead of the emotive
complex as such a vehicle. Two kinds of 'movement systems' are
distinguished: 'phasic', as those which govern locomotion or the
translation of a limb through space, and 'static,' systems, like
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those whioh secure posture by the action and reaction oi' opposing
muscles producing equilibrium. An extreme example of an elaborate
static system was £iven in our last section. A much fuller ac-
count of such systems than we can give is necessary tor a complete
understand ing of the theory. It has to be noticed here that the
static system requires the simultaneous and cont inued innervation
of a whole set of muscles. Two causes limit their duration,
fatigue and "the occurrence of a stimulus which demands of the
organism, a motor response 'prepotent', that is having by inherited
arrangement the right of way over the motor innervations involved
in the static system. In the case of those typical static move-
ment systems, the external bodily postures, such as standing or
sitting erect, a stimulus leading to actual movement tends to be
prepotent over the static system stimuli. An internal static
movement system, not invovling the muscles of locomotion, would
be less liable to interruption from prepotent stimuli. If an in-
ternal static movement system relatively permanent by virtue
of its essential character, can be associated with, any other motor
excitation, it would have the effect of making the latter persist-
ent, and constantly tending to renew it. In other words, if the
motor exc it at ion on which an idea is based can be associated with
an internal static movement system , it will acquire the persistence
needed to transform the idea into a problem idea ."
Next the 'determining tendency 1 itself is proposed by Ach
1
and skilfully analyzed,,
2
but according to Washburn "no suggestion
l-See Washburn's chapters VIII, IX, and i, and especially references
at the end of the book. -
^Compare Ach's analysis of determining tendency in detail with
Warren's analysis of purpose-idea. For the aspects of personal-
ity involved see (Jalkins , M.W.,in a review of warren in the
Journal of Philosophy ,i^sy chologi cal and Scientific Methods,
April 12,1917.
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as to the possible psychophysical basis of this activity of the
self is offered" Similarly she finds Ivleumann' 8* inner assent' .al-
though it adds the necessity for the consciousness that this inner
assent is the real cause of the voluntary act, and that without
the inner assent the act would not be performed, inadequate. "The
inner assent is the symptomatic manifestation of 'an elementary
active reaction of the Ego'. Again we are left wholly without any
clue as to the physiological process involved." The problem needs
soraetning larger, more inclusive, more insistent, and, most of all,
something more clearly accounted for in physiological process than
the 'determining tendency' merely.
"The fact is that in order for an idea to be accepted as a
problem idea, and in consequence to obtain relatively lasting in-
fluence upon associative processes, it has in ordinary language
to appeal to a need, a desire. All desires are ultimately connect-
ed with the great motor outlets of instincts. If we examine
introspect ively what happens when an idea arouses a desire that
cannot immediately be gratified, v/e find, I think, that motor ef-
fects of either or both of two different kinds are produced. The
one effect (not necessarily first in time) is that we 'feel rest-
less !, 1 uneasy ' . The restlessness seems to be produced by diffused
and shifting motor innervations, which apparently have no useful
connection with each other, and seem rather to be the effect of a
common cause than to form a true movement system. The other effect
that may be connected with the arousal of desire I shall call the
activity attitude . In its intenser degrees it is revealed to in-
trospection as the 'feeling of effort', which is recognized as
the accompaniment of active attention. Introspection further indi-
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cates that it is not due to Shifting innervations, hut rather to
a steady and persistent set of innervations. It appears from intro-
spection, also, to he in its intenser forms a "bodily attitude,
involving a kind of tense quietness, a quietness due not to relax-
ation hut to a system of static innervations. We should then class
it under the head of 'static movement systems'.
"The writer would like to suggest that a prohlem idea "becomes
the starting-point of effective and directed thought towards its
solution only when the incipient motor innervation which the
prohlem involves connects itself, not simply with general rest-
lessness and uneasiness, out with the steady innervations of the
activity attitude. Through their inherent and characteristic per-
sistence, as members of a static movement system, the prohlem
innervation is kept from lapsing and may continue to exert an in-
fluence upon associated motor innervations and to arouse imagery
which hears on its solution.
"We must indeed if such a view he accepted, go a step beyond
introspection. The 'feeling of effort', the form in which the
activity attitude reveals itself most clearly to introspection,
is connected not with smooth and easy thinking hut with interrupt-
ions and obstacles to the course of thought. If such obstacles
are insurmountable, the activity attitude either resolves itself
into the shifting movements of restless desire, or drops into an
attitude of relaxation. But if the obstacle is successfully sur-
mounted, the activity attitude, we must suppose, does not cease
because it is less evident to introspection, but is most eiiective
in securing the persistent influence of the Aufgabe when the kin-
aesthetic sensations to which the activity attitude itself gives
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rise are not themselves the objects of attention. In fact just in
proportion as it is evident to introspection, that is, attended to
ior its own sake, it is less effective in securing the persistence
of the problem system. Is this only an other way of saying that
thinking implies active attention and that active attention is
characterized by the presence of the consciousness of effort, or
the feeling of activity? Yes but it is saying more: namely
that the motor innervations underlying the 'consciousness of effort 1
are not mere accompaniments of directed thought, but an essential
part of the cause of directed thought. It is the static, mutually
reinforcing innervations of all organized movement system which,
associating themselves with the incipient innervation set up in
connection with the problem idea, keep that excitation effective
and prevent it from lapsing. What is required to transform an
idea into a problem idea or Aufgabe is the association of tne in-
cipient motor excitation which it involves with some excitation
relatively static and enduring in its nature. And a determining
tendency is an associative dispositi on one of whose exciting in -
fluences is the activity attitude. "
This theory of physiological basis for problem and its per-
sistent effort, though too fragmentarily sketched, is adopted for
its object iveness in proposing plausible correlates of mental
processes. 'This for a practical purpose, ihat it may be worth
where children as learners are closely dependent upon constant
suggestion and encouragement from teachers is a question not
broached. What part it may play in the interpretation of the
motives of cooperative social action is equally left out of con-
sideration. Its pertinence here claimed is to the kind of think-
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ing whioh implies the continuity which we call personal. That con-
tinuity is expressed by problem moving toward soluti n. Such
problem may not be conceived as problem without persistence and
progressive solution. The essence o±' such continuity seems to
me to be a '
p
r oprium ' , a quality which makes tne issue one ' 8 own.
Its persistence and development may not be conceived in abstraction
from the activities of a person called a thinker, we seem simply
to have taken account of such person's equipment for t/linking when
we identify physiological mechanism which may be available lor
holding, carrying and trying to solve the problem— which is think-
ing.
We have seen that learning to think implies apperception of
an increasingly higher degree as one proceeds. The following
tabular conspectus of the most important facts under lying the
three sections of this chapter must not be taken too strictiy.it
is ratner because we are interested here in a phase of higher
education tnan because any strict lines can be drawn between periods
that we rougnly list characteristics of elementary, secondary and
higher education. In fact, because we are interested in the pro-
gression of apperceptive types rather than in periods with
definite delimitations in which the types shown might be supposed
to be exclusively characteristic, the terms 'earlier', 'middle'
and 'higher' are used. The main purpose is to exhibit the
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TYPES OF APPERCEPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL-PROJECT PERIOD
COGNITIVE ASPECT
8
Earlier
Natural environment
Instinctive, low de-
gree systems
Natural interest
syst ems
Plays
,
games
, 1 asks
Beginnings of t rank-
ing
Curi o si ty-pro "b lems
general ( instinctive)
contexts
Unconscious self
Existence-margins
Non-concept ive
Perceiving growing
into conceiving
for life's sake
Otter credulity
Experience slight
( instinct in-
stead)
Meanings m "ac-
cidental" sit-
uations
Little discovery
in method to im-
prove practice
(p.l70]l
Focal mental pro-
cesses many
Not strongly pro-
tected by inhibitions
thought goes on in
active attention! like
recollecti on, con-
structive imagination,
selective and voluntary
act ion)
. Middle
Social environment
social project-sys-
tems
human-interest sys-
tems
Group-social pro-
jects
ihinking in con-
formity
Human-interest
pro blems
Social-human con-
texts
'Socius' self
Human margins
Growing concepts
(human needs)
Conceiving as gen-
eral mental ef-
fici ency
"Folk-ways" and
"motes"
Experience human-
ly greatly in-
c re as ed and
used for social
learning
Meanings determined
by human assoc-
iati ons
haphazard discovery
in method to im-
prove practice
Higher
Individual environment
"Pr ofessi onal , "high-
degree systems
individual special sys-
tems
Individual, intellectual
,
pro jects
Independent thinking
Scientific problems
Professional contexts
Self as a 'system'
Knowledge-margins
Concepts as 'systems'
Concepts used as 'sys-
tems' for special
knowing
Convictions
Experience increased
and assorted: con-
densed and condens-
ing
meanings resulting from
intent ional si t-
uati ons
Much intention to im-
prove method
Focal processes few:
vivid
strong inhibitory pro-
tection
"Not needed," and is
rarely undertaken.
Persons think only on
the level required .
Only a few persons
think , as few imagine
and act sagaciously
(pp. 26 Iff.
)
LPage references to Titchener,A Beginner ' s Psychology .
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Pseudo-social
Living
Selfish emotions
ItiUch feeling and
sensat ion ( with
primary, Bhifting iX]
Instinctive de-
termining ten-
dencies pre-
dominate
ieolings not in-
tellectual in
their connection
wot organic exper-
ience for their
basis(p.217
)
Least resistance
Instinctive! in-
dividual- e oc ial
)
attitude
Restless spirits
Unsolicited will
(not subor-
dinating lower
to higher)
Animal activity-
attitude (mere
activity)
Use of motor pro-
cesses to pro-
tect
Random movement
Inhibitions
slight , instinct-
ive
(Reinforcements 6.0.
slight , instinct-
ive
Associations with-
out intention
AFFECTIVE ASPECTS
Genuine social
Human life
Altruistic feelings
kuch feeling
at ion, more
(sec. at.)
and sens-
organiz ed
ACTIVE ASPECTS
Effort (push-pull)
Convent i on al- s oci al
attitude
Generally directed
action
"Morally solicit-
ed will" ( Subor-
dinating to moral,
i.e. customary,
tribal, social-liv-
ing purposes)
Restraint of undi-
rected activity
Use of motor pro-
cesses to
"value"
Directed movement
Inhibitions con-
ventional
reinforcements
conventional
Associations from
general situations
Supra- social
Individual life
Scientific disinterest-
edness
.Little feoling or sens-
ation (derived prim-
ary attention)
Acquired determining
tendencies of intellect-
ual kind.
Intellectual feelings
Rich organic experience
for basis of in-
tellectual feelings
nope and relief in
p ro bl em
Stra in ( hold)
Indivi dual-purpose
attitude
"Studying type" activ-
ity only incidental
Purpose-directed will
(Subordinating to
systems integrated on
an intellectual
purpose )
•
"Activity afuitude"
definitely directed;
held by
4
' tentative move-
ments
Use of motor processes
to condense , concen-
trate.
Vicarious movement
Inhibitions definitely
determined by 'sit-
uations'
Reinforcements due to
specific' determin-
ing tendencies
Associations intended
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Association brings
its 'situation'
wi tli it
Biological accident-
al 'set'
Associative and de-
terming tenden-
cies weak
'Suggestions' ap-
pealing to' de-
termining ten-
dencies ' rare :
hence connect-
ions on the same
plane. Organisms
cannot lead or
follow, choose or
reject, work or
play -.not suggest-
ible
"Weak will'; at mercy
of every fresh
suggestion
Sense-fee lings large-
ly on the deter-
minants of action
(p. 25b)
.
Small range of ex>
perience gives
small possibility
of conflict of de-
termining ten-
dencies: also chance
for little habit
of dominance by a
significant de-
termining ten-
dency
May_ not be 'situational 1 Intentional, purposive
Human-accidental 'set* Determining tendency
associative and deter-
tendencies strength-
ening in real sit-
uati ons
Progress in balanc-
ing the forces
Wishes and desires
characteristic.
Higher than sense-
feelings
Contexts of actions
simple and few -
little decay of im-
pulsive movements
Simple contexts of
sensory-motor
or ideo-motor
"typical actions "
Associative and deter-
mining tendencies \
subject to concentrat-
ting effectiveness
'Suggestions' ricn,
hence 'determining
tendencies' abundant,
widely a cnooser
.
Planes of connections
' Systems' (pp. 212, 24)
"Strong will" - ten-
dencies deep-Leated
and persistent
Wishes and desires with
ideas and determin-
ing tendencies! di-
rection )
wide experience gives
many chances to grade
interests, hence to
find determining ten-
dency which may dom-
inate for some good
reason. (Deliberate
project does this in
an orderly
,
purposeful
fashion) .Well wrought
and persistent pro-
ject cultivates the
habit of dominance
by a rationally con-
sistent determining
tendency.
Contexts of movements
many
,
complex , subtly
determined. Much de-
cay of movement con-
Texts
Contexts complex by
enrichment of 'sit-
uations' from extend-
ed experience. Many
variations enrich
possibilities in sug-
testions

lviuch absorption^
with impulsive
acts
Many unequivocal-
ly determined
acts
Pract ice
Guess after guess
(on a riddle)
trial and error—
animal and
child— let the
in/pulse tnat
happens tryi
Habits not yet af-
fected "by phys-
iological
changes (like
getting strong-
er) during prac-
tice
Habits now requir-
ing attention
Habits may be formed
by a "wrench," in
this plastic stage
Habit may stand less
in the way of
practice
fatigue lowers the
level and lessens
the duration of
attention. Less in-
telligent guard
against fatigue
Balance of impulses.
.b'ree ideas necessary
to select, uoubt,
hesitation, select-
ive attention,
cnoose
•
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Much freedom from
absorption with im-
pulsive aote
Much conflict of im-
pulsive tendencies
- selection necess-
ary. (One learns to
settle disputes of
conflicting ten-
dencies )
'Volitional' activity
prop er. Act ivity find
passivity in con-
flict. An idea
opposes an impulse,
reinforcement im-
plies innibition
and vice versa .
"Every suggestion
is two-iaced."
habit is affected by
certain physiologi-
cal changes which
affect practice
Habits now to be used
(basis of new ac-
quisitions )
habits not so easily,
but more intelligent-
ly, formed
Habit may be con-
sciously avoided in
the interest of
practice
Knowledge of effects
of fatigue on
practice may regu-
late it.

PART III
PRINCIPLES Off COLLEGIATE EDUCATION
CHAPTER X
SCRUTINY OF THE PRINCIPLES
G-ener al survey
We have given attention at some length to the general applica-
bility of Dewey's philosophy of education, now first available as
a system, to that aspect of collegiate education v/hich is our es-
pecial interest. Our ultimate problem is to formulate some of the
working principles of collegiate instruction, which we have al-
ready interpreted to be primarily principles of later adolescent
learning. Kfe have further narrowed the scope of our inquiry to
include only the purposes of a cultural, or non-vocational, college,
that is, a college which deliberately proposes to extend the
liberal outlook of those who may profitably choose to broaden their
intellectual foundations rather than build a professional super-
structure immediately. ,;e have already uttered the initial caution
that such a proposal specializes our purpose, and consequently de-
mands a choice of persons adapted to such a specialization, fte
have attempted to justify a doctrine of 'project' as the most im-
portant application, in such an institution, of the form which the
work of collegiate students in problem-thinking ought to take, ifor
this purpose we have studied the psychology and pedagogy of problem
and project, and have still to show some of the more intimate
connections of theory and practice. ihere then remains the state-
ment of the principles derived, and suggestion of general precepts
believed to be justified.
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We have prepared then, for the conclusion that we may formulate
principles and state the corresponding precepts of procedure,
tentatively to he sure, but with such finality as the philosophy
chosen as hypothesis argues for a structure of practice, further
guarded and corrected by an appeal to psychology and other sciences
where pertinent as the corrective cautions they must he. uur
purpose is primarily practical, the philosophy is confessedly prag-
matic; fidelity to such a philosophy permits us to submit it con-
stantly to test of its validity ior practise 's sake, but permits
us also to bank upon the assumptions we make until they answer to
test and yield accepted principles of action. In the nature of the
case, the reason for presenting the philosophy first and noting
its general application to our problem as we went along justifies
finally as sequent procedure the test, especially by psychology,
of the principles which our philosophy seems to warrant as in laying
down.
Row when we turn from the philosophy which makes it a natural
part of its business to find and state principles of practice, to
a testing use of sciences like psychology, we must recognise prin-
ciples of attitude which science, as contrasted with philosophy,
declares its right to take. If the main purpose of philosophy
is fairly represented by what we may call an interested attitude,
an attitude best represented, perhaps, by the consideration of
values, over against this we must approach science as having a
purely disinterested point of view, active only in the pursuit of
faithful description
, though engaging, at least for its own pur-
poses, often, also in explanation of phenomena. It makes hypotheses
to be sure but rather in the interest of completer description than
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even more elaborate explanation: strictly speaking not at all in the
interest of working principles. But the hypotheses science makes
for its purely descriptive and measurably explanatory purposes may
serve a plausible philosophy none the less for its practical pur-
poses, which are, of course, to test and validate its working prin-
ciples. To be concrete, psychology is so carefully defined by sane
of its best students as to include only a description of its pro-
cesses. Mental processes suffer painstaking analysis under intro-
spective observation, and synthesis is but a reciprocal proof, as
it were, of the accuracy of the analysis. Bervous mechanism is
known to be a correlated chain of phenomena. In fact there is no
objection to saying that mental phenomena are the function of the
nervous system, but the science of neurology is left to describe
its own phenomena. This vigor of definition of science consistently
aims to place psychology in no sort of possibility of a partizan
attitude toward any practice or science of practice. It is merely
indifferent to "applications" of any sort. But nothing forbids the
use of its facts by any one who is competent to try them for their
fitness as regulative of principles of practice. In fact we are
speaking only of the most extreme position of the psychologist,
that of the psychologist whose theory or hypothesis is laid only
in pursuit of adequate descriptions. Fortunately for pedagogy and
other practices clamoring for scientific basis, not all psycholo-
gists have failed to elaborate theories which aim to rationalize
the individual facts as discovered by observation into a coherent
scheme of relationships with themselves through conformity to re-
lation* with equally coherent neurological theory. A chief part of
the service, ?/hich may be rendered by the scientist who is willing

to theorize his science, to the person who wants its facte and their
bearing, but who is not himself able to practice its observations,
much less to elaborate their explanation, is the service rendered
by a theoretical schemati zati on. A test of our competence to use
such a theory must lie first of all in our realization of the fact
that it is a hypothetical scheme, secondly in our realization that
it primarily belongs to the psychologist who thus makes en approach
to explanation of his phenomena, and thirdly in our realization
that its availability for our purposes must depend upon its ac-
ceptability for psychology's purposes, and that there are cautions
still to be exercised in using a theory intended for explanation as
a theory for the regul ati on of practice .
A class of phenomena which psychology may decline to use for
its purposes, while philosophy and practice have no data without
them, will serve to illustrate the difference in point of view and
in respective problem. The only interest psychology may have in
'meaning 1
,
for example, is in noting that it is not mental process
and in consequently relegating it to the field of logic. Though
psychological experiment may exorcise meaning, the datum it has thus
set aside remains for psycho-neurological theory a phenomenon by
itself candidate for elaborate schematic representation, but for
logic and other practical sciences still remains after that a
phenomenon for an entirely different sort of observational and ex-
perimental treatment. What me aning remains, or is, for the practical
sciences of logic and pedagogy is set forth as follows in Dewey's
Philosophy of Education. The context from which we quote itself
means much more than we are using the passage to illustrate. Psy-
chology, in other words, means much to the philosopher, (as our
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drowing upon it implies) al though the psych ologi st
'
b vigor of
definition of his own field makes philosophy no part of his scien-
tific interest. Witness the philosopher's presumption in making a
definition for Lis purposes which diametrically opposes that of the
psychologist, who probably must be allowed the prior right to de-
fine this term: "The difference between an adjustment to a phys-
ical stimulus and a mental act is that the latter involves re-
sponse to a thing in its meaning: the former does not." The im-
portant distinction is that philosophy, as jJewey uses the term,
as a practical science has every use for 'meaning' where psychol-
ogy may discard meaning from consideration. Further justice must
be done to the use made in this context of 'meaning', that it is
not only the differentia of a 'mental act* properly so called, but
that it is the differentia of the social learning which distin-
guishes 'education 1 from 'training'. To quote (p. 38);
"It will be recalled that our main proposition had two sides.
One of them has now been dealt with: namely that physical things
do not influence mind (or form ideas and beliefs) except as they
are implicated in action for prospective consequences. The other
point is persons modify one another's dispositions only through
the special use they make of physical conditions. Consider first
the case of so called expressive movements to which others are
sensitive: blushing, smiling, frowning, clinching of fists, natural
gestures of all kinds. In themselves, these are not expressive.
They are organic parts of a person's attitude. One does not blush
to show modesty or embarrassment to others, but because the capil-
lary circulation alters in response to stimuli. But others use the
blush, or a slightly perceptible tightening of the muscles of a
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person with whom they are associated, as a sign of the state in
which that person iinds himself and as an indication oi what course
to our sue. The frown signifies an imminent rebuke for which one
must prepare, or an uncertainty and hesitation which one must,
if possible, remove by saying or doing something to restore con-
fidence.
"...Mind as a concrete thing is precisely the power to under-
stand tr.ings in terms of tue use made of them;..."
The purpose of this quotation at this point is to indicate
the justification ior defintions in terms of point of view and pur-
pose, either in science or practical pursuit. An that is further
demanded is consistency in the use of definitions in their re-
spective fields. It is in the nature 01 the respective points of
view and purposes of practical disciplines like logic, ethics and
philosophy in Dewey's sense on the one hand, and of psychology as
defined by iitchener on the other hand that in the former group
we should find principles of pedagogy, while the science of psy-
chology should be appealed to as directive and corrective. Dewey's
philosophy is eminently practical in essence and purpose. As such
it constantly deals with values. Its own value, it is fair to ex-
pect, is practical. The tests of its value may well be practical.
It is itself hypothesis of the problems of education as practice.
It may be set dogmatically at the outset in any such problem and
held to the proof made by the test of application. In so testing
it we act in accordance with its fundamental principles. Science
administers no actival precepts. In the sense in which, we adopt
the term philosophy, it consists primarily of such precepts.
Professor Margaret F. Washburn, of Yassar College, has elab-

160-
orated the theory we have seen of description and explanation in
psychology in which mental processes are very plausibly treated as
the correlates of movements in the nervous system. All the main
types of mental process are treated and expressed in terms of a
scheme of movement complexes represented as actually taking place.
Kaaoy of these grow up logically out of others and the whole scheme
hangs together in such a way as to involve some Knov/ledge of the
whole scheme to understand its application to a set of movements.
But our hypothesis is that thinking is not only not a process that
can he isolated from other mental activity, nor he thought of as
absent from most of the other mental pnenomena, but that its
characteristic activity is sufficiently that of maturity to make it
the central issue in collegiate education. On this assurance, or
even upon this hypothesis, the logic and psychology of thinking
become of immediate moment to the consideration of a pedagogy
whose main purpose is to foster thinking. As our first purpose
was, then, to adopt a philosophy according to which to find the
precepts of collegiate education, our second was to attempt a
knowledge of the processes which must be known to understand think-
ing, in order to state, in the third place, at least so many of
the collegiate precepts as pertain directly to the cultivation
of thinking.
But when we deal with thinking the above order is not merely
an order of procedure, but structural in the order of sciences
and hence logically necessary. In discussing structural levels
Professor Brown says: " uur place in nature suggests that the study
of individuals as restricted by participation in group entities
may be vastly more important than the study of groups themselves,
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that is, the materials for the explanation of the group laws may
be at least as important as the laws oi the groups that are ex-
plained.
. .
.
"...Rationality of conduct implies a new study in which ideas
as ideals furnish the subject matter." 1 We do not at first take the
philosophical, ethical, pedagogical point of view, though that is
our ultimate purpose. Rather, as here we take the psychological
and logical, even with some study of their underlying sciences.
Afterward we may take the pedagogical ('normative') point of view,
and try to state its precepts, which are forward looking, ethical,
deal with aspects of ideal and motive; we may study the prospects
of improving the actual conduct of thinking.
Thinking, then, a characteristic human activity has the several
aspects indicating avenues of approach. It is psychologically, ac-
cording to some an activity bated upon an elemental thought pro-
cess, but this is open to much theoretical and experimental ob-
jection and is of secondary interest only to our purposes. At any
rate thinking is an important chapter in psychology suoject to end-
less observational and experimental study. Logic devotes itself
largely to the regimentation or proof of thinking, and the philos-
ophy we adopt finds thinking the central activity of individual
development and even makes it one of the chief agencies causally
operative in the human stage of evolution; attaches thinking so
inextricably to the train of activities which work out cosmic pur-
poses that it is not only the object of logic as a study, but
only another name for ethics and theory 01 education. It constitutes,
^rown.H.C.
.
Structural Levels in the Scientists' World . Journal
of Philos. , Psychol. , and Scientific Methods , June 22 ,1916, p. 344.
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then, not only the theme of Professor Dewey's Philosophy of tfdu-
.
oation but the subject of a logico
-pedagogical work on "How We
Think." These offer themselves for our purposes, not to traverse
the same ground in any way except where such survey of a part of
their area is necessary to establish the precepts that pertain
to the perfection of the learning process in college. We find in
other words in the psychology and logic of thinking the facts about
thinking which urge the precepts to be observed in securing ade-
quate thinking, that is, in its pedagogy.
The force of logic as what 1 have called the regimentation of
thinking, or the science of the practice of "good" thinking is ex-
pressed in a delimitation of the term adopted by Professor Dewey.
This quotation serves also to declare the pragmatism of his doc-
trine of thinking. In the broadest senses "logic" deals with any
thinking, in the narrowest sense only of the stringently proved,
but: "Logical, however, is used in a third sense which is at once
more vital and more practical; to denote namely, the systematic
care, negative and positive taken to safeguard reflection so that
it may yield the best results under the given conditions. If only
the word artificial were associated with the idea of art or expert
skill gained through volunatry apprenticeship (instead of suggest-
ing the factitious and unreal), we might say that logical refers to
artificial thought."
"In this sense, the word logical is synonymous with wide-awake,
thorough, and careful reilection — thought in its best sense."
Which, in another connection, he says "is that which considers the
basis and consequences of bel ief ." . . ."The consequences of belief
upon other beliefs and upon behavior may be so important, then,
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that men are forced to oonsider tne grounds or reauone ol their be-
lief and its logical consequences. This means reflective thought**
jthought in its eulogistic and emphatic sense. .. .Active persistent
and careful consideration of any "belief or supposed form of icnowled;
in the light of tne grounds that support it, and tne furtner con-
clusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought." The
central factor of reflective thinking is that it brings evidenc e
as ground of belief. But these are "the more external and ob-
vious aspects of the fact called thinking " "Certain subprocesses
are involved in every reflective operation."
"These are (a) a state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt;
and (b) an act of search or investigation directed toward bring-
ing to light further facts which serve to corroborate or to null-
ify the suggested belief." This state of doubt with all that it
means as attitude for thinking is now a common-place of pedagogy
as "problem." It is not a product of logical deduction but an ob-
ject of direct psychological observation. The Aufgabe, or "de-
termining tendency," the "set" of the mind toward the perplexing
element in what is about to be is, though of recent development,
now a common—place of psychology. These are "simple elements," as
it were 01 thinking as an activity: (a) the challenge (b) the
search. Without challenge, obstruction to play of lancy, forked
roads, alternatives, occasion for pause to choose, there is no re-
flective thinking. Acceptance of the challenge, attempt to answer
it, "sets up an end and holds the current of ideas to a definite
channel. Every suggested conclusion is tested by its reference to
this regulating end, by its pertinence to the problem in hand....
demand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying and guid-
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ing factor in the entire process of reflection.".
. ."The problem
fixes the end of thought and the end controls the process of tnink-
ing.
"
Much of Lewey's "How We Think" would serve the college student
(for he is old enough to use it) as a hand-book of invaluable in-
formation upon his calling as a student i.e. a thinker, but that
the college student is not ready to use it is part 01 the excuse lor
enlisting its help toward stating the precepts 01 college study.
The rest of the reason is that we are not yet ready to begin with
the student, tnough he needs the help, but are taking for granted
the teacher's need, the teacher's professional interest in the teach-
ing enterprise as his, and his readiness, rather than the student's,
to make a close study of the principles of collegiate study.
Following tne chapter "What is Thought," come. "The Heed for drain-
ing Thought," "natural Resources in the Training of Thought,"
"School Conditions and the Training of Thought," "Means and 2nd
of Mental Training: tne Psychological and the Logical." Part two
deals with "Logical Considerations" and Part three with "The
Training of Thought."
In further pursuit of tne factors of problem we find under the
discussion of discipline and freedom, a statement 01 tne inevitabil-
ity of problem in correct method. "Any mind is disciplined in a
subject in which independent intellectual initiative and control
have been acnieved. discipline represents original native endowment
turned, through gradual exercise, into effective power. .. .discipline
is positive and construct ive. . .Gone eived in intellectual terms...
as the habitual power of effective mental attach, it is identified
with freedom in its true sense. ... independent exercise. . .not mere
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unhindered external operation ... .not casual discharge of transitory
impulses... a multitude of stimuli keeping up.
. .spontaneous Activity.
...Direct immediate discharge or expression of an impulsive ten-
dency is fatal to thinking. Only when tne impulse is checked and
thrown baok upon itself does reflection ensue." But "search for
artificial or external problems is superfluous.
. .for "every vital
activity of any depth and range inevitably meets obstacles in the
course of its effort to realize it sef. . . .The difficulties that
present themselves within the development of an experience are,
however, to be cherished by tne educator, not minimized, for they
are the natural stimuli to reflective inquiry. Freedom does not
consist in keeping up uninterrupted and unimpeded external activity,
but is something achieved through conquering, by personal re-
flection, a way out or the difficulties that prevent an immediate
overflow and a spontaneous success ."... "To cultivate unhindered
unreflective external activity is to foster enslavement, for it
leaves the person at the mercy of appetite, sense and circumstance."
These passages introduce tne general platform of problem-attitude,
which is more fully described in the psychology than in the logic
of problem.
Further, in "The Analysis of a Complete Act of Thought," chap-
ter six, the common elements found in all types of thinking show
"five logically distinct steps: (1) a felt difficulty; (2) its
location and definition; (3) suggestion of possible solution; (4)
development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (5)
further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or
rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbel ief . . . . ine
difficulty resides in the conflict between conditions at hand and
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a desired and intended result, between an end and the means for
reaching it.... The object of thinking is to introduce congruity
between the two.., .The problem is the discovery of intervening
terms which when inserted between the remote end and tne given means
will harmonize them with each other .'*.. ."The essence 02 critical
thinking is buspended judgment: and the essence of this suspense
is inquiry to determine the nature of the problem before proceeding
to attempts at its solution." "The suggested conclusion f oint 5
J
so far as it is not accepted but only tentatively entertained con-
stitutes an idea. Synonyms for this are suppositi on
,
conjecture,
guess
,
hypothesis and (in elaborate cases) theory." CPoint <tj "As
an idea is inferred from given facts, so reasoning sets out from
an idea. .. .Reasoning has the same effect upon a suggested solution
as more intimate and extensive observation has upon the original
problem." In the fifth place, "Conditions are deliberately ar-
ranged in accord with the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to
see if the results theoretically indicated by the idea actually
occur ... .Thinking comes between observations at the beginning and
at the end."
"...The trained mind is tne one that best grasps the aegree
of observation, forming oi ideas, reasoning and experimental test-
ing required in any special case, and that profits the most, in
future thinking, by mistakes made in the past. What is important
is that the mind should be sensitive to problems and skilled in
methods of attack and solution."
The chapters which follow in How We Think, treat the technique
of inference and the logic of judgment and understanding.
Turning to the Philosophy o_i education, the treatment of think-
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ing emphasizes constantly the one paramount fact of its essentially
active character, which is enough in itself when understood to
revolutionize student attitude toward collegiate work. It is our
main purpose to so scrutinize this dogma, as to test its pertinence
"by trying to understand what method must do to satisfy the require-
ments for initiative in thinking, the performance wnich satisfies
the rules of tninking by actual pursuit of the stages oi problem-
solution. It may easily he seen to he vain to repeat the truism
that thinking must he one's own, that problems must be one's own,
that the characteristic attitude of thinking may not be secured hy
exhortation, that the attitude is one of active attack hy the thinn-
er, that he must be in a state of suspense, which is the state
from which reflection will proceed to solve problem, that he must
have his own reason for engaging in the activity which alone can
solve problem, unless a proposal is made for method oi attack which
shall in its nature imply the activity of the thinker. That such
proposal argues in general a method of research, an "inquiring to
which acquiring shall be secondary" goes without saying but now
often goes no furtner than the saying. The assumed prerogative of
the graduate students to monopolize 'the method of research' is
bound to be questioned in test of the assertion that "all thinking
is research, and all research is native, original, with him who
carries it on, even if everybody else in the world already is sure
of what he is still looking for."
We are interested then in what problem means to the psycholo-
gist, and what it may, finally, mean as the key to collegiate
general method; and we may, at this point, so far take it for grant-
ed as the center of pedagogical interest as to state our specific
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thesis. It is that to secure 'problem 1 in the student as con-
trasted with the problem of any teacher- whether of sublet matter
and its organization, diaactic or instructional method, acquaintance
with students and their knowledge and preparation to do the work
implied, or whatever a teacher's problems may be- separate attention
must first be given to the student, who is to be taught to think;
that such attention must be the first and most important business of
the collegiate teacher, no matter what other problems he has; and
that (this is the main hypothesis) the demand that the student shall
conceive problem as the initial necessity for signiii cance in his
work implies organization ox method on that basis primarily; that
such organization or method requires a presumption ox what may be
called 'project' as the normal method of student-procedure. There
follows then tne task of stating the character of 'project* some-
what in detail as a way to work which shall satisfy the demand for
problem from the student's point of view.
i'he .Educative Coherency of Pro ject
The problem of collegiate education as limited for our purposes
may now be stated in terms of 'project', and the remaining solution
ox tne problem be allowed to rest in an adequate exposition of pro-
ject. The educative coherency of 'project' as we use the term for
our narrowed purposes may be expected to depend upon its definition
as individual project. 'The collegiate educational problem, as in-
dividual, yields the project which represents the way in which the
individual's world of knowledge grows. Two worlds only need be
conceived, that of science as also a growing world, the product of
cooperation, but not essentially social or a party-product, simply

not personal, to use a rough distinction between it and the in-
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dividual >b world. It is only the world of the individuals growing
experience that may be said to have educative significance. The
intent of the graduate student's specialized 'project' is declared
to be a "contribution" to science and a primary interest in the
student's education is nominally, at least, waived— certainly
sufficiently so to exclude such 'project' from the classification
sought for the undergraduate's educative project. On the otner side
most other uses, colloqual or technical, are as easily excluded,
irroject as applied to a cooperative enterprise, large or small, is
in its essence differentiated at once. The "government project"
is typically one that is so far from being educative, that it is
even characterized as being one that in its nature, for its effic-
iency, "ties individual initiative to a typewriter with red-tape."
A use 01 the term in school, however, with which our use will not
become confused, is of the constructive cooperative project in which
modern methods of machine- industry are exemplified in tne division
of labor 01 a group of pupils. An individual's part in such an
enterprise might suffer ideal organization into Us project in our
sense, and thus exemplify genuine social aspect of project, but
for our purposes such a use of the term is only measurably relevant.
Our project is better illustrated by the project in physics or by
the individual's project in elementary agriculture, with the ad-
vantage to its type of much opportunity for concreteness and action,
but with the educational lack, for our purposes, of articulation to
a "world" of tninking which it must amplify greatly, and a lack of
unhampered facility in opening up that world and expanding it on any
appropriate side. All degrees of educative possibilities may be

190-
conceived as overlapping and reciprocating with practical u^ee
more-or-less apart from educative purposes. l n fact it always de-
pends upon teaching-- power as to whether any project shall contribut
more than an incidental educative result.
Project as an Assimilative Measure
Courses in special subjects are organized on the basis of
specialism, rheir pursuit by the student of liberal collegiate
purpose is partial in its result, therefore. The specialism which
gives us such courses is pedagogic ally subject to criticism in
the liberal college, it is subject to criticism even from the
teacher's point of view; more so from the student's point of view,
iheir salvation from miscarriage is in the sagacity with which the
actual student's point of view is realized and protected. I'his de-
pends primarily upon the use of project, or some other device which
will necessitate the normal student's point of view, and upon such
device as an assimilative measure - an organ of student- adapt ati on
.
it is in the nature of project to adapt the course, which has
been organized to satisfy the logic of a science, to the learning
uses of an individual. It is in the nature of project, following
the lines of the individual's normally "unscientific" experience
as it has been, to keep the lines open which connect things
"phenomenally" instead of separating them "scientifically." it
must not be unscientific but if it honestly starts with experience,
it begins only with such analyses as experience is ready for. i'hat
is to say, the method of project is assimilative rather than dis-
junctive, the method of actual phenomenon rather than of laboratory.
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ln an experience, irrelevant condit
i one have not yet been removed
for experiment's Bake. Phenomena are natural, not artificial,
several departments of "science" are embraced in one phenomenon,
not segregated into their respective sciences,
.uch is our unin-
structed or partially-instructed experience, and except for the
specialist, it largely remains the typical experience even of the
educated person. He is not educated to the laboratory bit, for his
purposes, through it. fl ow project is his, way through
. Project keeps
his best foot out of the laboratory to keep him in the presence
of phenomena which the laboratory only helps to make intelligible to
him. *or Mm project is the safety-valve of method, if nothing more.
It is the corrective in method which gives the course to him instead
of giving him to tne course. Too many college students are as badly
lost in a course as an earthworm that has failed to };eep one end of
himself in the mouth of his burrowl
This means that project is not ideally conceived of as a per-
fected laboratory exercise in which analysis departs, for the iso-
lation of principles, constantly farther from the synthesis of
heterogeneous conditions which make up most situations as they are
in life. Analysis-synthesis is a reciprocal process both in nature
and in experiment-proof, but unanalyzed situations are the kind ex-
perience furnishes us. Now the course may be depended upon to dis-
sect, to analyze and exhibit principles. It is tempted to sleights
of skill to get things rapidly onto the slide where they may be
beautifully exhibited. Its corrective for the individual student is
the project. The only educative use for the slide and the principle
for him is as culmination of experiential process of his own in which
analysis has been mildly made by himself and principle has been seen
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at work, as now the demonstration exhibits it more completely made.
In this sense of project, uewey's chapter twenty-two, The Individual
and the ]Vorld, is the philosophy of project. The philosophy of pro-
ject, as we are using the tern, is the philosophy of the individual
student's collegiate work.
Men whose own work, sometimes the only subject upon which they
make public speech, falsifies the utterance, say to college students
"You will forget in two years all you learned in college." This is
utterly untrue or an astounding comment upon the thinking done or
not done in college. If it is true in any sense it puts collegiate
learning in a class by itself which stamps it with imbecility. It
is not true of similarly extensive experience of normal human
beings under any other known circumstances. If it is true that a
person can take a collegiate course in physics, for example,
without providing himself with knowledge by which he may read in-
telligently studies in physics in scientific papers, something must
have operated in an extraordinary way to prevent the normal develop-
ment of his experience. An article in Science on some of the dis-
coveries of Pasteur, undertaken at a stage where its interpretation
would be a genuine problem to orie,crosen by a student just to under-
stand, would be a good example of a simple project, if used to
vitalize the student's approach to serious study of the science in-
volved. Set as a problem thirty years after, one's power of inter-
pretation would probably show the absurdity of the remark quoted.
So great is the disrepute in which pedagogy is held in some quarters,
that men otherwise reliable will jeopardize their reputation lor a
mere chance to controvert axioms. If there is any truth in the
expectation that college courses will go "into one ear and out the

other, the mere suspicion of it oan demand no less than that we
investigate the relation between a teacher's purpose in a course
and his conception of his students' purposes with reference to it.
If they may not he truly conceived as identical, a tenable doctrine
of the student's point of view is at least demanded. The teacher
and his course may come after. Though the teacher may have his own
projects, germane to his relation to the course or to his own
studies, project, as we employ the term
;
is limited to its use to
characterize the manner in which the student makes his way into the
knowledge which, has been organized by the teacher into the course.
Students ' Projects the Test and Proof of a Gourse
Granting the legitimacy of the teacher's task of presenting
a course in a science, the implication of project is the implication
of the student's problems duly subordinated to that prime purpose
of his own also, to pursue such a course. The very tests and proof,
then, of the propriety of giving and taking such a course will be
in the manifold ways in which projects may be related to tne course.
Any human le arner is manifesting a number of instincts which scarcely
characterize in themselves anything extraordinary. The human world
is as full of learning as of any activity we know. But the collegiate
student is engaged in a unique pursuit - the business of making that
learning as perfect as human ingenuity can render it. If what
happens under such conditions— adulthood, (nearly ) , self-choice, self-
purpose
— yields an indifferent result, many reasons are at least
conjecturable, but failure of teacher and student to "connect" may
be safely picked as the most plausible, and the reason for this fail-
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ure may well be expected to lie somewhere in the region of im-
perfect apprehension of the possibilities of "a course" as their
common ground. How it may be their "common ground" without being
their "meeting place" is exemplified often enough to demand some
at tent ion.
The teacher's purpose in a course may be taken for granted, but
that a student shall have any purpose fit to be listed as such is
by no means assured without the most careful prevision. Until
there is at least some legitimate purpose, the course is in no
adequate sense to be regarded as belonging to the student. It is,
as is often taken for granted, "Such-and-such a teacher's course."
Purposes may neither be taken for granted nor be despaired of.
We dogmatize safely as to their necessity, but we are no longer
left altogether in the dark by the psychologists as to what purpose
are nor as to how they functionate, and we have given some atten-
tion to the psychology and pedagogy of purpose as preliminary to
a more intimate study of the collegiate pedagogy of purpose.
A purpose precedes a problem or brings one or more in its
train. We may diagnose for purpose and in time be able to pre-
scribe. If a student finds himself in the attitude of "spectator"
rather than "agent" in a course even he himself may know something
is wrong. He has no occasion to aim until he is filled with a
purpose to hit the mark. He has no aim until, as Dewey says "an
activity has become intelligent." The course is no real part of
his purpose until it is "made a factor in determining present ob-
servation and choice of ways of acting." "A true aim is opposed
at every point to an aim which is imposed upon a process of
action from without. The latter is fixed and rigid: it is not a
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stimulus to intelligence in the given situation but il an ex-
ternally dictated order to do such and such things. Instead of
connecting directly with present activities it is remote, divorced
from the means by which it is to be reached. IriLtead of suggest-
ing a freer and better balanced activity, it is a limit set to
activity.
"

196-
CHAPHSR XI
TH1 PRECjiPTS OF PROJECT
gftjjgnarg of Principles
1. Collegiate teaching may be shown to have an institutional
integrity, if we differentiate types of college according to
educational purposes.
2. The integrity of cultural collegiate teaching is in its
devotion to subject matter and method appropriate to the purpose
of integrating one's individual growth outside of the requirements
of social adjustment, hence of common elements, hence, of the
social conventions which make the curriculum of 'constants'. It
is equally distinguished from the claims of vocational training,
except as they subordinate themselves to its cultural purposes.
3. Collegiate teacnmg is that which is appropriate to tr.e
period of an individual's growth when he may build up the structure
of individual thinking in which studious pursuit of Liberalizing
problems has been prepared for by adequate exploratory experience.
It is in the school which makes students by cultivating the gen-
uine arts of the student. It may use vocation, but ijs more proper-
ly, while it lasts, the actual pursuit of the 'calling' of
student. It is less preparatory than parallel to vocational
study. It should be the highest education, strictly as education.
4. It is liberal1 in every sense implied by that term, when
it has itself been freed from the historic implications of classes
not free. A perfect ideal of democracy could not interfere with
the institutional cultivation of collegiate learning. The restraints
Pewey.How We Think
, pp. 145-4.
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upon universal participation are both such as arise from the in-
equalities of imperfectly attained democracy, and from human in-
dividual differences.
5. Hence the perfection and operation of the institution
so devoted are judged to be justified by the discovery of the ac-
tual educational function to be performed. 1
6. The principles of teaching, then, to be explored are
such as are appropriate to this stated purpose.
7. Such principles may be suggested by any plausible
philosophy of education, or otherwise assumed, to be exploited as
hypotheses, until fully tested by any science upon which they may
be based.
8. Such principles are constituent elements of" the science
of collegiate pedagogy. (Rules of procedure which they are
found to justify may be called"precepts"of pedagogy).
9. such principles may all be embraced in the sciences
?/hich are fundamental to pedagogy. They constitute science of
education because assembled as foundation of the specific art of
teac ning.
10. When tested by methods approved by tne fundamental dis-
cipline which yields them, they may be embraced in the science of
the art which needs them.
11. iiach such principle may be set down, therefore, as
hypothesis of the problem which it is, until justified or rejected
by the research that tests it.
12. Social integration may be acknowledged to be the evo-
lutional mode which a sort of involution imposes with the in-
tellectual influence man brings into evolution. But this racial
1
.Dewey, Op.cit
.
. Chapter a, Concrete and Abstract Thinking.
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integration, effeoted by social ooneisienoy, involves especially
an equally inviolable individual integrity as its counterpart. It
is the office of higher, as individuated, education to eiiect tiie
most perfect possible developmental integrity of the individual.
The correlate of the demand lor a "wider diffusion of intelligence'
is the demand for a higher minimum for the individual willing to
advance the t pe of attainment. Conscious evolution or involution
has no other way to set its necessary stages.
13. A marked incident of the later stage of man's apprec-
iation of evolution was his realization of the value 01 types of
activity as well as types of form. Types of activity best repre-
sent the flexibility of either evolution or education. The race
is tenaceous of types of form, represented humanly by the con-
servatism of sociality, exemplified in elementary, racial, edu-
cation. The individual cherishes the possibilities 01 ilexibility
of more easily changing activital types. In the individual and
his higher education is the possibility of progress. Only higher
education which is tree from the conserving necessities of pro-
fession is available ior the strictly educative purposes of in-
dividuation. Like the brain, which is the last, highest, most
complex, most differentiated mediating organ, farthest removed
from the periphery, most mediated by refiex organs, longest cir-
cuited, most directive and initiative organ, most differentiated
in function, most efficient in integration, greatest economizer
of effort, sees ends and sets off economic, instead oi wasteful,
lines of discharge of energy, so education is the last, highest,
most indirect organ of progress. The remoteness of education
^ward, Lester F«
^Ward and Sherrington.
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frora its end is what makes it a late arid hjgh process.
1
This in-
tegrating, individuating, iunction is especially the function of
higher education.
14. Methods of approach to the problems of collegiate
pedagogy include appraisal of the pedagogy of elementary and
secondary education as developed, and observation 01 the phenomena
of professional education.
lb. The psychology of childhood and adolescence, and es-
pecially of learning, may be expected to correct doctrine and
contribute principles.
16. Especially may study of tne history of the exploitation
of imperfect or false doctrines oi psychology and pedagogy be
expected to shorten the processes of development of collegiate
pedagogy.
17. These observations oi mistakes may shift emphasis
from certain types oi theory invoked r.istorically to defend tra-
ditional practice, (like the dogma of formal discipline), and
save time by discovering aims and the means to accomplish them.
18. Collegiate pedagogy may start, then, with a doctrine
of co nt ent and intrinsic value as the philosophy of aim.
19. The history of pedagogy has at last produced a readiness
for the light which psychology is increasingly able to shed upon
the tacts connected with learning.
20. Pedagogy is ready to work to the presumption that its
prime objective is persons as learners; the intricacy of the
problem of learning duly subordinates the art of teaching.
21. This subordination of tne art of teaching raises its
Much condensed from unpublished lectures on i'he liatural Hist ory
of Education.

dignity and importance by the same token.
22. It is suspected that differences between tne problem
oi teacning collegiate adolescents and elementary pupils, for ex-
ample, justify the differentiation of principles 01 collegiate
learning and teacning
,
23. This may not lead to an assumption that learning, com-
ing-to-know, thinking, is not a unified activity possessing, as
well as yielding, continuity
.
24. But such continuity does not iorbid convenient dis-
tinctions in stages of development which give clearness to in-
quiry. Such distinctions help to define collegiate pedagogy.
25. ouch distinction may properly relieve collegiate
pedagogy from serious consideration of processes, like sense-
training, winch are not impossible in its stage but are irrelevant
to its purposes.
26. Granted that the learning, which it is the teacher's
business to facilitate, is for all practical purposes the intri-
cate process of thinking or coming-t o-know (allowed to include be-
coming skilled, as not a separable tning] pedagogy will involve
a philosophy of thinking.
27. By the same process of observation as that which ex- •
eludes sense-training from serious consideration, collegiate peda-
gogy may be seen to have the most important aspects of t hinking
as its field.
28. All the functions of teachers, the teachers themselves,
and all instruments and instrumentalities may be evaluated with
reference to their facilitation of learning, successful thinking.
(This might be fair, even if other values were also to be tested
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for) .
29. iiven who the teacher is, the matter of hifl own charac-
ter, the processes of his own knowing, the organization of knowledge
which constituted his own education, may all be appraised, for
this purpose for whioh he is not only person^but teacher, in terms
of the relationship ol all to the teacij.ng.
30. This constitutes a peculiar function, but one which both
exacts and compensates. If the teaching is as vital as the learn-
ing must be, the very modifiability of the teacher in connection
with the teaching-1earning is a contribution to, rather than a
tax upon, his character. This is typical of the intimacy and
difficulty of the teaching-learning process.
31. The philosophy of thinking conspires with psychology
to make the attitude of inquiry trie most important mode, and its
expres sion in problem the most important characteristic, of method
of learning.
32. By definition of problem, the academic college is a
problem, because "the elements taken as they stand" are "'con-
flicting."
33. By the methods of modern society, this problem demands
an institution and its interpretation. In most senses such an
institution is yet to be habilitated.
34. On the platform of these principles the particular
principles for such an institution may be stated either as self-
evident or as subject to demonstration.
35. The logical order of development of such principles
is (1) student (2) pedagogy of college and teachers (3) in-
stitution. Or in terms of this study of the principles of colleg-
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iate pedagogy:
I. Subject matter of the study is (1) tne c^l^£i^_8tudent
as learner, which develops (2) collegiate p_gdagogy.
II. kethod of the study is that of subjecting certain hypo-
thetical principles of collegiate pedagogy to the tests due tj.em
from tne underlying sciences in wnich they belong, to establish
their pertinence as such principles of collegiate pedagogy. (These
principles might also have been studied as they are exemplified
in the practice of good teachers. They are, in fact, at least in
part, conceived by observation of practice. The method is, then,
theoretical, rather than experimental).
III. A theoretically complete system oi principles (axiomatic,
empirical, and theoretical) would be a platform for perfected
practice. Such practice would be conceivable only as put in force
by an institution. An institution implies
IV. Teachers, as the necessary human agencies of conceiving
the meaning of subject matter and applying tne principles oi metnod
to constitute the work of the college.
V. Not additional in the sense of being for any different
purpose, but as supplemental for the purpose oi lorming an in-
stitution, is all 'instrumentality' which 'agency' (personal) uses.
This embraces (for the saice of completeness added here):
71. (1) Administrative organization, existing to preserve the
conditions of learning, for which exists also (2) teaching organ-
ization. (Administrative organization is to make an institution
to facilitate maximal efficiency of teaching, lor which also
teaching organization exists to produce maximal learning efficiency
Learning efficiency is the institutional end).

VII. A complete scheme of collegiate science would include
such material instrumentalities as housing and equipment, with
their hygiene.
36. The implications of effective learning imply choice of
candidates and principles of l imitation of numbers. The practice
of selection has hitherto been governed by more artificial con-
siderations, but may be shown to be better founded on the observ-
ation of pupils in high school with specific reference to the
habituation they have shown capacity for which is the necessary
preparation ior rne active-habit development which good collegiate
performance will demand.
37. It may be capable of demonstration that the "social
sanctions" that hold in less highly selected school populations
may be in a measure remitted in the interests of real collegiate
purpose. Several considerations may relax the "social" demand.
(2. g. .necessity lor isolation, initiative, self-dependence, re-
sponsibility and other qualities may be necessary to tne collegiate
type of learning.
)
38. It may be possible to snow that tne collegiate age is
the time of nascencies essential to individual types of work
and learning of just tne right degree of immaturity and readiness
for responsiblity to make "students' 1 instead of "apprentices."
39. The college may exist to cultivate the problematical
aspects of scientific living, and may establish habits of thinking
which are essential to the mental growth of the persons who are
to do advanced thinking.
40. uertain essential qualities of thinking, especially
those prominent in the nigh type of thinking to be cultivated as
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collegiate learning demand special study, as ior example, the
meaning of "problem'1 in the psychologist's study of thinking (as
well as in the logician's study of thinking.)
41. Sin06 collegiate education is to be regarded as an
education for individuation, its implications must be scrutinized
(sociologically) on the side of a definition of democracy, and the
relations of the individuated person to democratic society. This
may involve the selection of subject matter for collegiate edu-
cation for citizenship, ^election of subject matter for this
purpose must not violate the prior expectation that it will be
adequate to the cultivation of thinking. The presumptions are in
favor of method as the conservator of good thinking when "method "
is not regarded as something that can be abstracted from genuine
content
•
42. Collegiate pedagogy will have to reform the notion
of mind which has prevailed in unscient ilic use of the dogma of
formal discipline ana other partial, or imperfect, or wrong, doc-
trines based upon imperfect psycnologies.
Precepts of ' Project '
1. It may never mean the teacher's task of organizing a
course, nor his task of instruction; connected with either of
which, however, teacher's projects are conceivable.
2. Granting the legitimacy of the teacher's tasx of pre-
senting a course in a science, a general definition of project
implies a problem of the student strictly subordinated to that
prime purpose of his own also to pursue such a course. The mani-
fold ways in which project may be related to course are the tests
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and proof of the propriety of giving such a course.
•
.
3. As the course implies completed work by a teacher: pro-
ject must always start with presumption of the student's utterly
different point of view. This difference is, at least, in the
item of completeness. The only problem the teacher may have is to
teach what he has already organized. The student's problem is not
of that sort, but to learn what for him cannot yet be organized.
The two points of view can never be the same.
4. It follows that the teacher cannot ideally set the
problem nor organize the project, though he may be, should be,
better able to do it. It must be in the nature of project that
its device is developed as the learner's way to learn.
5. It is consequently not, ideally, in the nature of pro-
ject That it should be possible to completely furnish its structure
of procedure ready-made, nor in fact that its procedure should be
complete beforehand as a scheme.
6. Project may not be conceived as being initiated by the
student out of complete ignorance, complete lack of experience.
It is, in other words the method of finding the apperceptive
capacity of the student.
7. If the student is not prepared to construct pertinent
project he is not prepared to pursue the course. It is the suffic-
ient test of the individual student's readiness for the course
proposed.
8. The project is the individual student's "way into" the
course. It is the method of adapting the course to him as an in-
dividual. Project is active. If the student cannot pursue the
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route of project, he cannot do the work of the course.
9. Conversely (to 8) a "course" is not a course unless its
organization implies individual work, i.e., individual approach
to the course through the active thinking of individuals: which is
project.
10. If project is necessarily (see 4) to be constructed and
planned by the student whose project it is, it must by so much
the more be the individual's choice of method of attack.
11. It is part of the teacner's business as planner of the
course to furnish abundant suggestion of problems which tne course
implies. Ability of individuals to recognize these as problems
at the outset is some measure of their apperceptive readiness for
the course.
12. An initial qualification of the teacher, then, is power
to bring into view at the outset a maximal number of the problems
the course may be expected to solve, which, are so stated as to
"appeal" to the well prepared. The test their mere statement makes
is a legitimate test of the individual's experiential preparation
to take the course.
13. It is a fair test of tne teacher's preparation that he
finds many of these problems still rood for his own thought. It
is clearly a stamp of inadequacy in many a course that the teacher
is no longer a student in it - that it has no real problems for
him.
14. Another test of the vitality of a course will be current
with its procedure. If no problems arise which were not stated
in the premises there is a guaranty of stagnation. It seems un-
likely that a single problem taken at the outset should be the

only and final "avenue of approach" to be followed by the in-
dividual as "his way in." A "term thesis" might be sufficiently
prolific in its spawn of germane sub-problems to answer this re-
quirement; and such an ideal in its selection would not be bad;
but it argues extraordinary foresight or good luck that original
problems should not subordinate themselves inductively to larger
problems which could not be stated at the outset.
15. One's past experience is his apperceptive 'context'
at the beginning of a course. He is well-prepared, if it is rich
and functions readily. But a course is itself under obligation
to make definite connections lor the individual with this ex-
periential mass. If a problem is a problem to me, that is the
credential of my readiness; but it has no particular road in which
to go forward without project. My ability to make it project is
the real proof of my ability to enter into the course. Project
then becomes my expanding context, in a way, for the whole lore
of the course. I "go in" on project, by virtue of project's
adequacy as the rational continuation of my previous experience.
If this project is well chosen and constructed it becomes an
open avenue to broad areas of the course. A well-chosen term-
thesis, regarded as genuine project in a course, becomes the in-
dividual's context, which is but a technical terra for the mean-
ing
,
perhaps of the whole course,- for him.
16. To the psychologist "meaning" is the context of thought-
or better — of thinking. Without project or something that
amounts to it, it is a matter of no particular moment that time
goes on or a course "proceeds." With genuine project each individ-
ual has a course because ne is cultivating a context for it. It
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apparently often happens that no one really "goes through" a
course but the teacher, and the course may be a shabby farce to
him, though once real, because he has worn out the context that
was once alive and carried it. It is not impossible that, except
for new courses, there is no salvation for a teacher himself ex-
cept in new projects for himself,
17. Project is the item of method which typifies the most
significant generalization that can be made as a distinguishing
characteristic of collegiate education. Without such supplementa-
tion to ideas which have prevailed as that which project gives in
reciprocal completion of the ordinary idea of a collegiate course,
the college has not found its center of gravity. The cultural
college has no primary purpose to serve but to integrate the edu-
cation of individuals. Atomic isolation of departmental courses
seems very unlikely to effect such integration. Perhaps the
least that can be done is to force the issue of integration by
disallowing the orthodoxy of methods that presume isolation. Courses
of specialists as now given encourage isolation, while teachers
either neglect or decline the obligation to serve as integrative
agencies for individual students. Legitimate projects may follow
the same lines of cleavage, but it is in the nature of project
to start with a whole of experience which gives no color, in it-
self, to the finality of isolation. Separate sciences are agen-
cies of economic inquiry; to the purposes of scientific inquiry,
they are necessary, and so to the ultimate purposes of the real
student, but the catholicity of view which project requires is
much more conducive to the immediate educational needs of the col-
lege student as an individual than is the specializing tendency
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of the separate sciences. Without genuine catholicity we apparent-
ly shall not dispense with the false distinction between "science"
and "humanity," though the fiction is utter, and the crying need
of the liberal student is obliteration of its false demarcation.
It is in the nature of genuine project to disregard such dis-
tinctions no matter in what subject its course may stand. The
graduate project is a still more specialized pursuit than are the
courses themselves in the department in which it is prosecuted.
But the undergraduate's projects through which he enters into the
riches of a liberal education are ideally expressive of a hurnano-
scientific unity not conceivably to be had except in the integrat-
ed education of an individual.
18. The attack made through project, which implies no in-
herent superiorities in lields 01 iinowledge inherited from false
cultural distinctions, which makes its estimates ox value other-
wise than by traditional prestige of any science, that consequent-
ly presupposes the right of no subject to be the favored carrier
of culture, and finds what values subjects can contribute expressed
finally in terms of their usefulness .-such attack holds the field
for the integration of human individual culture because it has
sincerely disallowed the assumption that culture resides in subject
of study instead of in persons. We have much evidence that
culture secured by awkward presuppositions has, because of the
very ineptitude of the doctrine, but the more strongly declared
its human character. There is some evidence that correct method
has evinced itself even when it has not been credited, and much
evidence that in the midst of the ineptitude or perversity of
pedagogies, real problem has declared itself and genuine project
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has happened to be the fruitful method followed.
19. It would be unfortunate to so exaggerate the pedagogical
serviceability of project as method as to set it over against sub-
jects of study. To do so would be to imply too little appreciation
of the significance of the sciences as they delimit themselves.
The organic value of subjects of study as represented in courses
and in teacher's syllabi is iully implied in presenting what seems
like a wholesome supplementation. Experience comes to the student
in real situations. The class lecture scarcely furnishes a situ-
ation in this sense, but is the normal supplementation to such ex-
perience. The teacher can help organize, and generalize, only
such experience as the student has actually had.
20. hethod of collegiate work is a new field. It is worth
while to note carefully where it may profitably copy, where it
has new aspects not represented in lower schools, and where it may
make new history. There are some presuppositions which ought to
be looked into. One is that certain subjects nave a monopoly of
appreciational opportunities, for example, and that this character
of subject matter dictates appropriate methods. The presumption
that subjects of study determine methods is more plausible where
learning is passive and teaching carries the method. It marks
artificiality as contrasted with the point of view that situations
conceived or adopted by students as the medium of their learning
give wholes less to be characterized by particular, than by variety
of, methods. Llethods are artificially selected when determined
by anything else, as compared with their determination by problems
themselves. A problem is only half a problem if its problematic
character does not help to determine the methods to be applied.
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It is the more educationally important If the methods work them-
selves out as intrinsic to its problematic character. As a real
situation instead of an artificial subject it will be strange if it
does not involve many methods and ingenuity in their selection.
One thing project ought to do is to liberalize method, break up
its tendency to become stereotyped, and discourage the partiality
which disqualifies method for whole situations.
21. By inept pedagogy a good deal of the native inventive-
ness of childhood and youth has been lost. In college we do not
even bid for it. When project begins to amplify itself it may take
on some of that vitality which begins to iniuse itself into the
"commercialized" projects of vocational schools. To presume it a
distinction of cultural education to estrange itself from the crude
verities of every day living is but to throw light on that point of
view where ignorance of the world while in college is exchanged for
ignorance of college as soon as one is out of it; but it is, worse
than that, the false idea of safety which throws the best ammunition
into the ditch. A boy in the shop connected with his school may
immeasurably enhance the educative value oi his project by making a
morris chair salable for fifty dollars. How do we knew that other
instruction than that in manual skill might not enormously increase
its seriousness by being made to "bring sometningV? It is not
proved that democracy might not be considerably profited by solutions
which disinterested college students might have brains as .veil as
leisure to work out. The schemes worked out for their collegiate
politics are earnest oi their ability.
22. It will be easy to misunderstand project. A project's
meaning will not be simply one of the points of view from which a
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given situation may be looked at, but ideally a project is the only
way in which just that thing may properly be done. A project
is not only something to be done but a metnod Off doing it. It is
not a dogmatic and arbitrary way but a way inherent in tiie tiling
to be done. This is why a project is educative in its nature, a
way to do and learn something. There is no choice against it ex-
cept not to do it. Part of a problem is the method of solving; it.
Method waits for problem, and is determined when the problem is
correctly stated. Project will close the controversy between di-
rect and indirect learning and open as many questions about learn-
ing as there are possible projects. Learning must be intrinsically
interesting to a person oi normal curiosity. Project will legit-
imize any kind of learning that is appropriate procedure of project.
23. Project exemplifies the difference between "teaching
subjects of study and teaching persons." If it is in operation,
attention is given to individuals as motive for teaching- subjects.
Individuals are not known because pedagogical doctrine says they
must be, but because what we intend and try to do as teachers
forces the issue of knowing tne projector of a project in an in-
evitable way. Its necessity to the accomplishment of our lunction as
teachers makes reason enough for knowing individuals. This con-
stitutes the difference between teaching persons and teaching sub-
jects. What shall a student who has a mathematical projeet
learn? and what shall his teacher teach nim? Neither will have
to consult a formal schedule to imow while the project is demand-
ing certain knowledge for its performance and solution.
24. It is worth stating, subject to proof, that project
tends to answer certain fundamental requirements in tne psychology

of learning. The values of "whole method" are certainly not to be
sacriiiced when the procedure, by its nature, nas its unit created
as a wnole, rather than selecte d as a whole. In learning to
memorize by parts or by wholes explanation oi' the preierability
of wholes is not far to seek when the facts have been demonstrated.
The explanations may or may not be the right ones, and their zalue
depends upnn their general plausibility, but an important difference
between such wholes and tne whole of project may be a still more
plausible theoretical reason for tne superior learning value of
project. The whole which facilitates memorizing is for its
purposes apparently only an artiiicial whole in the sense oi its
avoiding setting up unprofitable associations which hinder v/hen
parts are gratuitously abstracted from it. It has doubtless also
much positive advantage (depending in amount upon the unity in it)
in establishing intra-associations oi its own completeness. These
repetitions gives occasion for stamping in by whole method, where
part-method repeatedly breads some of them. But this degree of
the unit's wholeness is a somewhat speculative factor, and is in
any case a wholeness intrinsic in the given matter and not a
wholeness for whose actual creation the learner has been in any
way responsible. "Wholes lor purposes oi education are not,
however, physical affairs. Intellectually the existence of a
whole depends upon a concern or- interest: it is qualitative, the
completeness of appeal made by a situation." The whole oi a poem
which I memorize I more or less perfectly use to facilitate its
memorization. It has meaning and I more or less periectly appre-
hend it. The whole of a genuine project _is meaning which it has
for me largely because its unity is my conception of it as a
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problem. Whatever learning value the 'determining tendency' of
problem has is in project by hypothesis, while it is absent from
a memorizing task equally by hypothesis.
25. There are some interesting contrasts on the lace of
the difference between teaching by lectures or lessons or in any
units wholly the teacher's, even by projects which are the teach-
er's, and teaching by students' projects. By appeal of an in-
trinsically interesting concrete illustration, (itself by the
meaning of that phrase, a separate unit) the teacher holds the
attention of his class. When it is finished that attention re-
laxes and the burden is tnrown back upon the teacher, facile
passive attention resigns in favor of the effort of active attent-
ion, which now the auditor must give or be lost. The teacner in-
deed has a 'project' for which he has made Himself responsible.
Is deiect of learning to be found in this fact and what it implies
of default in the student? The person who has a project is the
person v/ho snoulders a task and feels its obligations. Is the
problem of shifting the task which must be shouldered, if learning
is to take place, conceivably one which exhortation may effect, or
even an unremitting stream of brilliant illustrations bring about?
The pertinence to the main issue is always problematical in illus-
tration or exposition. There are two possible defects at least
in teacher-project. One is that the responsi bi iity has been as-
sumed by the vrrong person; the learner is absolved. A graver fault,
if possible, is that, instead of the initiative task of framing
thinking ior himself the learner is charged only with the doubtiul
obligation of accepting and trying to appropriate another's frame
of thought. The teacher may temporarily secure oblivion to this

natural resistance by clever devices, but he may pay t, a .eavy
penalty of occupying tne focus, to be sure, but with matter of
only measurable relevance. Most minds seem to be willing to be
fully occupied only by the projects which feel 1 iice their own.
Mental proprietorship seems inseparably connected with the attitude
we are calling project-attitude.
26. Learning requires that the learner shall eventually
organize ior himself what he learns. Without project of his
own he is dependent upon uncertain, unreliable, and unsupported
"native-interest." This tax may fall without a motive in himself
and even v/ithout an occasion in himself for meeting it. There may
be default ox individual motive; there is sure to be default ot
n
the cooperative effort of himself and teacher, which project gives
him and,through him and his motive, draws from the teacher.
27. Project dispenses with much of the artificial incentive
otherwise invoked. V/ithout it we lack the occasion for making
one a measure of one's own attainment. We get all the disparate
results of mass effort and try to measure by the generalized
standards which are all we have left to jucige by. We measure the
attainment of neither the best nor the poorest nor the impossible
"average individual." We apply common measures to incommensurables
and do justice to none. Project is tne one way to make the in-
dividual the just measure of his own attainment. The occasion
for measuring him in terms of others largely disappears and stand-
ards are saved from the folly of attempted impossible general-
ization. The integration of collegiate work upon the individual
student is unthinkable except in terms of project as inuividual
procedure. The consequent type of organization for a college will
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prove to be largely contingent upon the possibilities of project,
28. "Secure initiative!" is not a solution, but itself
a problem; but it is significant in connection with project that
it is especially appropriate to collegiate age and stage of develop
ment, to say nothing of tne lact -unat its kind 01 initiative is
just what the collegian is otherwise deprived of. The collegian's
college residence is often a notorious deprivation of the most
wholesome types of self-dependence, which would Lave been his in
an alternative employment of those years. His age and maturity
and especially nis capacity for project raise its pedagogical
value to the highest point.
29. It only needs noting that the use made oi the word
project serves to distinguish a type. In elementary education
the need or help from the teacher, tne lacK of individual init-
iative, tne need of cultivating situations essentially social
as the normal environment of childhood education and other con-
siderations conspire to demand social rather than individual pro-
jects. Again oi individual projects we must distinguisn that of
the graduate specialist. .but a graduate specialism can and often
does depart progressively from tne claims oi personal culture.
It may be, and it may not be, in reality, an educative procedure.
Project as we use the word is in essence educative, establishes
its center in an educative situation and subordinates all its
elements to an educative purpose. Its problem is real problem,
not soluble by team-work, not a problem oi mere adjustment but of
individual development effected upon individual resp nsibility, in-
augurated on individual initiative and sustained by individual
power.
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CHAPTER XII
THE INTEGRATION OF THE COLLEGE
An Example of Project
The purpose of this chapter is to indicate a type of college
that could satisfy the demands of individual project as leading
principle in collegiate student-method. Various items of proced-
ure representing the idea of individual project and otherwise ex-
alting the principle of coherent and protracted individual re-
sponsibility are observed in the practice of a few colleges al-
ready interested in experiment. Reed College, for example, re-
quires an undergraduate thesis and gives an oral examination in-
tended to assure a much more persistent grasp of some one field
than is ever implied in courses "finished," dismissed, and for-
gotten. To assure an economic devotion of its plant and faculty,
it consistently tests for power to do such things, and admits only
persons believed to be both able and willing to do collegiate work
worth while, nothing about such a type of work conflicts in any
way with a purpose to make the college a vital institution;
rather the contrary, if we keep collegiate work true to the doc-
trine we have been follov/ing of the essentiality to each other
of subject matter and method. The whole story of the brain as an
integrative organ is by no means told when it has simply account-
ed for self-preservative adjustment to the impinging environment
of the organism. To be a collegiate student in any fair modern
acceptation of the term involves method which is an integrative
factor of a kind that makes the person "a part of the world, shar-
ing its vicissitudes and fortunes, and making itself [the organ-

£18-
ism] secure in its precarious dependence only as it intellectually
identifies itself with the tilings about it, and, forecasting the
future consequences of what is going on, shapes its own aotivities
accordingly. If the living, experiencing being is an intimate
participant in the activities of the v/orld to which it belongs,
then knowledge is a mode of participation, valuable in the degree
in which it is effective. It cannot be the idle view of an un-
concerned spectator." 1 The individual's education cannot be
fairly conceived of except as the integrative factor in a progress
ive continuity of process.
But before stating the main features of such a college as
individual project seems to demand, a summary of the doctrine
of project in concrete terms will help to objectify the aim of
such method. In the last chapter a partial list of precepts
was given. A project of my own was to go through Dewey's Phil-
osophy of Education with the single purpose of collecting pre-
cepts arising from the cognitive aspect only of learning. Collect
ing, assorting, studying these, using them to test each other and
to test the whole theory, while the whole theory was used to test
and re-test them, made this a problem that exhibited features of
a project. Better than to take space even to list these scores
of precepts of learning (which must largely remain my_ project),
a small grcup of the most coherent and brieily statable precepts
may be given and their application illustrated.
The teaching problem where they are to be applied is this:
A class is beginning the study of comparative school systems. It
is desired to find the 'context' of individuals for such a course,
^Dewey, Philosophy of Education
,
p. 39 2-3.
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and to supplement individual context by appropriate individual pro-
ject, suggested "by the teacher but chosen (so far as possible)
by the individual student. A part of initial procedure would be
to post a large number of questions like those which follow, to
be read over and finally chosen and checked on tne bulletin board
by individuals. (Promptness in writing his name opposite the
question he chooses widens the individual's choice, of course).
1
I quote a passage wttich gives sample questions:
"Among proposals for educational reform agreed to by the
executive of the national Union of Teachers, and recommended for
adoption at the close of the war, are the following:
Education to be free through all its stages, including the univer-
sity.
Education to be compulsory from five to eighteen, and every young
person to be required to snow that he is receiving in a recognized
institution education sufficient and satisfactory.
Local education authorities to make by-laws providing for full-time
attendance to 14/, and to have power to require full-time attend-
ance to 15 or lo, but in each case partial exemption lor benefic-
ial employment.
(Followed by several other proposals of similar tenor).
These topics from a single source are to be supplemented by
a great variety, preferably collected, like these, from actual
sources. The first one of these may serve the purpose of illustrat-
2
ing the precepts which now follow.
1. To secure thinking is to secure the bringing to con-
ISchool and Society .May 5, 191 7, pp. 553-4.
2They" are numbered for subsequent reference. The numbers follow-
ing some of them refer to pages in Dewey. These precepts come
chiefly from the chapter on thinking.
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sciousness of some disposition with a view to btrai
r; ,.tening out
a perplexity, by conceiving the connection between ourselves and
the world in which we live. (399)
2. The power to see any fact as general will result from good
teaching— general because used to give meaning to a new experience
Habits of seeing things as not isolated, but connected with the
common experience of mankind, are the fundamentally important
habits of thinking, ( 399
)
3. Problems for students should not be 'problems of science',
that is such as would occur to one already initiated in the
science of the subject. (259)
4. A matter of study may h«ve any sort of value depending on
the situation it enters into as a means. It should be studied
for its intrinsic contribution to the experience of life. If a
student responds, his response
_is use. (283)
5. It finds its motive in the same way.
6. 'The first stage of contact with any new material of whatever
sort must inevitably be oi the trial-and-error sort. (181)
7. The first approach to any material must be as unscholastic
as possible.
. .as devoid as possible of routine and capricious
activity.
. .as nearly connected as may be with existing habits that
will call out effective response.
. .that is, not haphazard nor in-
consequential activity. It must, involve a good problem. ( 182
)
8. It must be recognized, how much is problem and what is in
the situation that is not problem.
9. It must be the student's own problem.
10. The materials of thinking must be discerned, as not thoughts,
but actions, facts, events, and the relations of things. (184)
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11. The difficulty of the problem must be great enough to
challenge thought... small enough to leave luminous
.
familiar
spots from which helpful suggestions may spring.
12. The subject matter for reflection may be supplied by
memory, observation, reading, communication— any psychological
means that will yield data. The specific features of the problem
in hand must regulate the relative proportions oi data from differ-
ent sources. (185)
13. To secure a well trained mind there must be (1) an
abundance of resources (2) a habit of going over past experiences
to see what they yield.
14. Thinking must then supplement 'data' with 'ideas'. Data
are 'facts'. 'Ideas' are active mental principles— suggestions,
inferences, conjectured meanings, suppositions, tentative explan-
ations. (186)
15. Careful observation and recollection determine what is
given. They define and locate the question.
16. Projection, invention, ingenuity, devising, must supply
it.
IV. The result must be a leap from the known, an invasion
of the unknown. A. thought must create .. .must be novel, involve
inventiveness
.
18. What is suggested must be i amiliar in some context:
The novelty must be in the different use to which it is put. The
operation is novel, not the materials. ( 188)
Bear in mind the purpose of the course, which is to learn
something about school systems by comparison; and consider the
eligibility o± the first proposal quoted as statement of a problem
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for a student making a beginning in such a course. In soma Bohool
system somewhere there is a proposal now that "education snail be
free through all its stages, including the university." A teacher
of the subject knows that this statement made in untechnical
language is nevertheless capable of taking its part through prac-
tically every phase of every main inquiry in the course. The per-
son who sincerely sets himself to know the facts implied will
know the subject matter of trie course. This is what is meant by
the individual student's project being "the student's way into
the course." When he has canvassed the questions involved in this
one statement he will have traversed the ground the course proposes
to traverse, but with his own context . (l)^It states a perplexity
which is to be straightened out. To complete its solution (at
least in the case of -chis project) is fairly to canvass the most
important features of school systems. (2) Until the fact (of free
education) has been generalized in terms implied by the purpose of
the course it is a iact in severe isolation, no matter how un-
technically stated, jfiven the layman who knows what the words mean
does not now what the statement means until he has generalized
the iact by such study as the course implies. (5) It is not a
'problem of science' at the outset, but inevitably becomes such,
which is but to say that he ceases to become a 'layman' and in
these facts becomes a 'scientist'. (4 and 5) To know what free
schooling means is to know about something intrinsic to experience
of current lire. It must be responded to because it has its motive
in it. (6) With ignorance of everything but the barest meaning
of the words one has, nevertheless, the suggestion for the simplest
^lumbers refer to the precepts above.

excursion into xacts to find the pertinence of "free" to "systems
of education." (7) The statement is unscholast ic , nothing can make
it scholastic except the legitimate terminology of the course pro-
posed. It is a challenge to any "well informed" person. It is a
good problem for anybody. (8) No better beginning could be made by
anybody proposing to take the course than to inventory his context
by these unscholast ic statements, ho better first aid could be
brought to the teacher, who otherwise moves uncertainly in unknown
depths of ignorance, or wastes his efforts in shallows of ready
knowledge, which to repeat, is hut to invite ennui . (9) It is the
student's own problem if it reflects his ignorance from the surface
of his sincere purpose to learn. (10) We start with facts, events,
and the relations of things. (11) The problem has difficulty
enough even for the teacher, but is ideal matter for project, be-
cause it is not too difficult as a beginning for the student;
challenges anybody's thought, but has "luminous familiar spots from
which helpful suggestions may spring."
(12) Having adopted as one's project the question of free
schooling in systems, one is ready for data. Information is "the
bridge of the mind... from doubt to discovery." The want of in-
formation and the search set up to get it are the signs of problem
and the intention to solve it. Suspense, uncertainty, doubt,
problem: then thinking with its purpose to conclude suspense. It
must be found possible to make hypotheses toward this end. Doubt
must be utilized. Thinking demands after (a) proDlem, (b) the
observation of conditions, ( c) the making of hypotheses, (d) test-
ing hypotheses. With these one is committed to the issue, has
concern with it, takes responsibility for it as a quest— is en-
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gaged in refl ection. Memory, observation, reading, communication
(a student's reason ior a teacher appears) — any means that will
yield data. (13) The reasons ior sources of information ariBt witf
the student himself and tne teacher is drawn upon. The method of
'projection' is one v/hich is largely comprised of instilling the
habit of searching past experience and present available resources
to see what they will yield in a specific given direction. (14)
Problem-solving turns, however, as a reflective performance, upon
the part 'ideas' play with 'data'. The 'facts' anybody may have,
but they play a part in solution only wnen they are manipulated by
ideas. What country is only just debating free schools? Why?
What is the present occasion? What is the experience or other
countries with free schools? What advantage or occasion did they
have? .Does anything they possess as advantage hang upon the fact
of free schools? Shall the maintenance of free schools be expected
to eftect certain improvements? How account for their not having
been accomplished here? etc., etc., — suggestions, inferences, con-
jectural meanings, suppositions, tentative explanations. (15)
Facts are to had which will answer many of these questions, at
least in part: partial answer to each helps to bring the problem to
a head. (16) For the rest, project, invent, try ingenious answers,
devise a final hypothesis and try it for solution. (17) Then final-
ly if one knows, when through, something of v/hich one was ignorant
before, not simply as information in answer to questions one has
never asked as one's own, but questions which this process has de-
vised, and answers, one has "invaded the unknown." (IS) But the
idea of free schools, since it must be a possessed conception to
the student we have in mind, is not new. It is his old context,
ipp.Cit
. pp. 171-178. Chapter XI Experience and Thinking.

in whatever way he may have had experience of free schoolB. The
real novelty is what he has taught himself of its manifold per-
tinence as a conception, he has made an excursion to a point to
which, so far as his thinking is concerned, nobody else has ever
gone
.
Collegiate Project-Thinking
The purpose and metnod of this study of collegiate education
must he exhi cited briefly in review, before suggesting its in-
stitutional application more specifically than was done in the
last chapter of Part I. A philosophy of education was adopted whict
builds up a doctrine of thinking as the most characteristic human
activity. While thinking is not relegated in that philosophy to
any period of human development exclusively and while that phil-
osophy's first claim is for the social character of learning,
we have for our purposes both emphasized the peculiar appropriate-
ness of thinking, and learning to think, as the absorbing demand
in a period which we call that of "making students"; end still
more empnaticaily, if possible, insisted that the collegiate
period is one in which sociality gets its meaning through the
development of individuation, in other words, it was maintained
that, while thinking is universally the essential activity of
learning, thinking as a mature art justifies devotion of an ap-
pro;' ri ate period of the life of carefully selected eligibles to
the cultivation of thinking itself. While this is a demand
rather than a discovery, this pnilosophy of education, which is
a philosophy of learning to think, justifies that demand on the
practical side by supplying an exposition 01 one science and art
of learning to think.

In process of such an exposition it appears that learning to
think exhibits much unity of type tnrough tre universal appearance
in it of what is called 'prohlera 1
,
involving solution of problem
as an expression equivalent to thinking-activity. He proiit by
the proofs furnished by trie author of this philosophy tnat this
identification of problem as its central ieature neither dis-
counts otner features of thinking nor allows them to be considered
as disconnected. Our own selection of the fact of problem for
emphasis as characteristic of collegiate student-thinking tries
consistently to pursue this theme under the applied iorm of
'project', similarly without estranging other essential features of
a doctrine of thinking. This study of problem-thinking in the
form of what are called 'individual projects' with a 'liberaliz-
ing' purpose is addressed to collegiate teachers as suggestion for
'general method'. The real test of such suggestions must come
unally in efforts of 'special method' to build up a practice
in the teaching of collegiate courses based upon the doctrine of
individual project. Readiness of collegiate students, however, for
an expectation from teachers of a more serious initiative on
students' part, is taken for granted. The theory banked upon is
that a revival of student-seriousness must come through the con-
viction tnat better teacher-procedure will follow a better discern-
ment of the precedence of learning procedure as its determinant.
This is one of many appeals made to the experience of elementary
teachers.
The central fact of collegiate education, then, the student,
with a central purpose
,
to facilitate his growth in power to think,
implies a teacher and a pedagogy for the college. A student, a
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teaoher, a purpose, and a pedagogy argue an institution. The con-
clusion of the whole study is, like the conclusion of its phil-
osophy, an argument for an institution.
It happens that the writer has "been engaged for fifteen years
in a study of the main proposal, viz., that collegiate education
deserves an institution of its own. In the midst of an experiment
whose history can be only alluded to here, the main proposal was
set forth a decade ago in terms of the thesis that a cultural col-
lege deserved a pedagogy. This study has aimed to add to that af-
firmation an effort to state a philosophy supporting at least a he-
ginning of the pedagogy there frankly sought. There was then ex-
pressed the conviction that all results of the experiment then in
progress pointed toward the legitimate function of the separately
habilitated cultural college. The findings of the present study
are that there is such a function and that it is increasingly capa-
ble of being expressed in terms which justify institutional ex-
pression. Two papers ?/hich gave results of the experiment were
published but only within academic circles in a collegiate publi-
cation. One"1" of these gives a statement of the original thesis,
i 2
j
though tne other is more minutely an account of results of experi-
ment.
The Type of College Implied
In conclusion it seems not out of place to hold that the
study of problem-thinking expressed in individual project supports
the belief that such a collegiate purpose will dictate the type
and style of the liberal college. It is not impossible, but seems
unlikely, that it should readily find place as one oi" the colleges
^-Liberal Culture and the Academi c College , Clark College Record,
July, 19 06.
20n the Approach to the Seventh Year of Clark College, Ibid ,
,
April, ly 08.

ol" our present universities,— unlikely because it is there that
the academic college has suffered the institutional eclipse which
I
has obscured the issue of the student as a student. It seems more
likely that this issue must have separate appreciation and treatment.
The tendency of universities is to objectify their purposes in ouite
I
other terms than those 01 devotion to the personal cultivation of
students. This stricture is laid solely on che side oi* organization,
Individual teachers in the university do such justice to individual
students as their leisure allows and their professional consciences
dictate. This leaves the matter to a chance that is weighted
against the student in the premises of institutional organization.
To outline the machinery which should make up the organi-
zation of such a college would be impossible in a concluding
word. It is summed up in the changed point of view demanded. It
is evident that only a small college made to serve the speciiic
purposes of united cooperative effort to "make students" would
I
answer to the exemplary demand. We have now only faculties of sub-
jects. We must have faculties of students. We have studied the
interrelations and integrations of sub jects of study . The college
implied must be integrated on the issue of the success of in-
dividual students. The responsibility for the individual student's
success may not without disaster be put upon faculty even so
much as it is now. To majre the student less self-directive than
now would be to court his defeat. The large and inclusive question
is the question 02 organic provision for the student's success in
initiative. The study of advisory organization is part of the ad-
ministrative side of the question. Beginnings have been made, and
a wide-spread interest in individual instruction and vocational
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guidance has "been discovered in college and university faculties.
Publication of experiments already reported in organizing ad-
visorship in colleges throughout the country v/ould be substantial
1
proof that the issue is increasingly appreciated. The results
of efforts to advise students under present conditions are bound
to be minor, because they are mere palliatives except as part of
a more radical regime. A size for the type of college v/e have in
mind might well depend upon such a ratio of staff to student-body
as would give each student a committee of the faculty able to
act with much deliberateness and intelligent enthusiasm under his
own chairmanshiT^
,
upon his course, and his work in the subjects
that should mate up his course, organized and regulated by their
wisdom in support of the student's initiative . t|f-^)-
The presumption of ''imparting information" as a teacher's
business is a deep-seated tradition. While it prevails exclusive-
ly, however, we are without a stimulus which is necessary to
collegiate vitality. It must give way in any collegiate situation
the moment there are purposes and individual researches sponsored
by students themselves. Our teaching attitude will not cease to
be complacent, as long as our teacher's scheme of thinking is the
only one broached or intended. On the other hand that complacency
will be wholesomely dissipated the moment we as teachers are in
the presence of companions in research, nothing can so surely save
information was gathered a few years ago by a committee
of the faculty of Stanford University, and painstakingly
prepared for publication by Professors Guido E. Marx and
George E. Sabine, chairman and secretary, but unfortunately
not published. Less attention seems to have been given to
the subject lately.
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from the dead level of mere didactic importation of irjformati on,
as the vital stimulus to the teacher which comes from the student
who is an aggressive thinking learner. For purposes of colleg-
iate instruction we cannot too soon accept the doctrine that "i-
deas...are intrinsically standpoints and methods for bringing
about a solution of a perplexing situation..."} we cannot too
soon abandon the notion that ideas may he passively transmitted
from him who knows to him who will know without thinking. Com-
placency increases as we go up the grades, until the college-
student gropes in the darkness that precedes the dawn of in-
dividual work in the university.
Our study has gone no further than to suggest help on the
student's side of such courses as the present regime gives us.
But the logic of conclusion compels an honest statement of the
mode of organization which full acceptance of project implies.
Whatever license the community grants to student-lawless-
ness — now happily out of vogue and very rapidly passing — is
a survival, even if hut a tradition, from the day when only the
faculty was responsible for students' acts because there was no
2
student autonomy. We are now in the midst of a similar intellect-
ual condition. Until the student is given a real chance to take
the reins of his own intellectual responsibility, we shall be found
trying to regulate intellectual, conduct by the petty devices
which take minute account of when and how a man takes a holiday,
as if that regulation could touch the vital features of his col-
legiate conduct in any way whatever. We have done pretty well
with general physical saif-control , at least as well as could be
•^Dewey
,
Phi 1 o s ophy of Education
,
p. 210.
2Briggs ,L.R.
.
School
,
College and Character .
if
expected while testa of intellectual fidelity are so divorced end
meaningless. All the autonomy of a student must be oulti rated in
him. Mere decent treatment of the community in which his college
happens to be is but barely bringing the student up to the level
of a tolerable citizen. It has not touched the evidences of i.is
naturalization in the community of tolerable ccholars. There
seems little likelihood that the student should ever take any
personal -oride in attainment which lie always states in terms of
teachers' requirements. Such a credential to intellectual citizen-
ship is too trivial for adults, and we know it as well as the
student.
Initiative is a principle which 'proj ct 1 as a precept is
intended to help secure. After all it is a limited initiative
that will be secured through our book-keeping which summarizes
the "results" of humanly uncorrelated courses. A better conception
of 'project' is that implied in the 'undergraduate thesis' than
in the term-thesis of a course. The project which forces the co-
operation of teachers upon the issue of a student's individual work
is the project that may be expected to get a new type of service
from teachers. The student has now his own unaided organizing
to do, but without the organizing motive his 'correlating'
project would supply. The small college that can organize its
effort on the lines of faculty-group devotion to the integration
of tne individual student's work has the credential of sound
pedagogical reasnn for its separate organization.
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